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SUMMARY
The increasing complexity of net-centric warfare requires assets to cooperate
to achieve mission success. Such cooperation requires the integration of many hetero-
geneous systems into an interoperable system-of-systems (SoS). Interoperability can
be considered a metric of an architecture, and must be understood as early as the
conceptual design phase. This thesis approaches interoperability by first creating a
general definition of interoperability, identifying factors that affect it, surveying exist-
ing models of interoperability, and identifying fields that can be leveraged to perform
a measurement, including reliability theory and graph theory.
The main contribution of this thesis is the development of the Architectural Re-
source Transfer and Exchange Measurement of Interoperability for Systems of Sys-
tems, or ARTEMIS methodology. ARTEMIS first outlines a quantitative measure-
ment of system pair interoperability using reliability in series and in parallel. This
step incorporates operational requirements and the capabilities of the system pair.
Next, a matrix of interoperability values for each resource exchange in an operational
process is constructed. These matrices can be used to calculate the interoperability
of a single resource exchange, IResource, and layered to generate a weighted adjacency
matrix of the entire SoS. This matrix can be plugged in to a separate model to link
interoperability with the mission performance of the system of systems. One output
of the M&S is a single value ISoS that can be used to rank architecture alternatives
based on their interoperability. This allows decision makers to narrow down a large
design space quickly using interoperability as one of several criteria, such as cost,
complexity, or risk.
xvii
A canonical problem was used to test the methodology. A discrete event sim-
ulation was constructed to model a small unmanned aircraft system performing a
search and rescue mission. Experiments were performed to understand how changing
the systems’ interoperability affected the overall interoperability; how the resource
transfer matrices were layered; and if the outputs could be calculated without time-
and computationally-intensive stochastic modeling. It was found that although a se-
ries model of reliability could predict a range of IResource, M&S is required to provide
exact values useful for ranking. Overall interoperability ISoS can be predicted using
a weighted average of IResource, but the weights must be determined by M&S.
Because a single interoperability value based on performance is not unique to an
architecture configuration, network analysis was conducted to assess further proper-
ties of a system of systems that may affect cost or vulnerability of the network. The
eigenvalue-based Coefficient of Networked Effects (CNE) was assessed and found to
be an appropriate measure of network complexity. Using the outputs of the discrete
event simulation, it was found that networks with higher interoperability tended to
have more networked effects. However, there was not enough correlation between the
two metrics to use them interchangeably. ARTEMIS recommends that both metrics
be used to assess a networked SoS.
This methodology is of extreme value to decision-makers by enabling trade studies
at the SoS level that were not possible previously. It can provide decision-makers with
information about an architecture and allow them to compare existing and potential
systems of systems during the early phases of acquisition. This method is unique
because it does not rely on qualitative assessments of technology maturity or adher-
ence to standards. By enabling a rigorous, objective mathematical measurement of
interoperability, decision-makers will better be able to select architecture alternatives




Modern technologies, like wireless communications, global positioning systems, smart
phones, and other conveniences, have highlighted the need for cooperation and in-
tegration across various platforms. Systems of systems (SoS) that operate over a
network can be found everywhere, from popular consumer electronics to advanced
military assets. The successful integration of these network-centric SoS often relies
on the ability of each component system to do its job reliably and to cooperate with
the other component systems. More specifically, the component systems need to be
able to exchange resources with one another within the framework of the SoS, i.e.,
they need to be interoperable.
The defense industry is interested in creating interoperable systems to facilitate
joint operations and allow reuse of platforms across missions to save cost. This
integration is called Network Centric Warfare (NCW) [19]. To understand the rise
of network centric operations and interoperability as a desired quality, a brief survey
was conducted of publications containing these keywords. Figure 1 was created by
searching Google Scholar [52] for the interoperability, interoperable, network-centric,
and system of systems. It can be seen that all terms see an increase in number of
publications per 5-year increment. The decrease from 2010-present is attributed to
the fact that the current time-span is not yet complete. The chart also shows that
the terms have emerged since 2000, and each five-year span sees more publications




















































Figure 1: Number of Publications vs. Time
In response to this need for interoperable assets as warfare shifts from platform-
centric to network-centric, the Department of Defense (DoD) has initiated several
organizations [96] to ensure interoperability in existing and future systems, among
them:
• Combatant Command Interoperability Program Office
• Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Center for Joint & Coalition In-
teroperability
• DISA Interoperability Directorate
• JFCOM Interoperability Technology Demonstration Center
• Joint Interoperability and Integration Directorate (JI&I)
• Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC)
• Joint Requirements and Integration Directorate (J8)
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• Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM)
This push for networked, interoperable, integrated systems has come without a
clear definition of what exactly interoperability is or how it should be measured.
The term interoperability can be applied at many levels of detail, from software and
electronics to international political cooperation. The current state of the art, the
1998 Levels of Information Systems Interoperability, produces a qualitative scale that
cannot be used in a modeling and simulation environment. The nature of interoper-
ability and factors that affect it must be grappled before an investigation for its use
as a quantitative metric can begin. Additionally, it is a combinatorial problem with
many factors that could affect it; information about all of these factors might not
be present during conceptual design. These concerns will be addressed in the next
several chapters, and will culminate in the presentation of a methodology that can




Interoperability is a difficult topic to address. It is often used as a buzzword; the next
synergy. This chapter will attempt to clarify what interoperability is and why it is
important to understand and measure. In Section 2.1, the use of policy to dictate that
defense assets be interoperable is explored. If interoperability is a metric of an SoS,
it should be considered as early in the design process as possible, along with other
measures of effectiveness. Capability-based analysis, defense acquisition policy, and
conceptual design are presented in Section 2.2. With the conceptual design context
in mind, interoperability will be defined so that it is a clearly stated concept instead
of a buzzword. Section 2.3 contains the development of a flexible definition and
scopes the measurement for this research. Next, motivating observations are drawn
in Section 2.4, leading to several research questions. The first, What factors affect the
understanding of interoperability at the syntactic system of systems level?, is answered
in Section 2.6, with knowledge gained from a survey of existing interoperability models
in Section 2.5. These factors are then used to evaluate the existing models in Section
2.7. Finally, when none of the existing models are found suitable to the specific
problem at hand, the primary research objective is stated in Section 2.8.
2.1 The Push for Interoperability
Interoperability among systems is critical to mission success [19, 1]. As information
technology (IT) proliferates, networked assets generate and consume ever-increasing
quantities of data. Without proper handling and sharing of information, the effort
that goes into collecting it is wasteful. The Department of Defense (DoD) recognizes
this, and has posted and reposted a directive since 2002 regarding the interoperability
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of IT and national security systems (NSS) [69]. This directive defines DoD policy as
such that:
IT and NSS employed by U.S. Forces shall. . . interoperate with existing
and planned, systems and equipment, of joint, combined and coalition
forces. . . The Department of Defense shall achieve and maintain decision
superiority for the warfighter and decision-maker by developing, acquiring,
procuring, maintaining, and leveraging interoperable and supportable IT
and NSS.
It further dictates that interoperability needs should be derived using integrated ar-
chitectures, should be updated throughout the system’s life, and shall be capability-
focused and effects-based. In other words, the goal should not be to increase inter-
operability for its own sake; rather, the focus should be on gaining effectiveness and
achieving the required capability. However, before evaluating an SoS architecture’s
interoperability, there must be a clear conceptual understanding of what “interoper-
ability” is. Is it a capability? Is it dependent on technology, or is it a function of
information sharing? Or does interoperability cover more than just information ex-
change? Which interpretation should be used for evaluating the operational success
of a system-of-systems?
To address these questions, a familiar example is presented. If one wishes to share
the information in a document with their coworker, they could send it over e-mail,
transfer the file onto a compact disc (CD), print a hard copy, use a shared network
space on a Local Area Network (LAN), or read it aloud to their coworker, among
other options. Each of these methods transfers the information in the document to
the coworker, but how does one rate the systems’ “interoperability” for each method?
If interoperability is purely a case of being able to send and receive the information,
then all of these methods make the coworkers interoperable. Both e-mail and CD file
transfer allow the coworker to have the original document in electronic form. Printing
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the document allows the coworker to reference the document but makes additional
sharing more cumbersome. Reading the document aloud conveys the information but
accuracy could be lost if the coworker has to take notes and summarize it in order to
share the information later. Additionally, images in the document would be lost. So,
can the interoperability be measured for these systems and methods of information
transfer?
Intuitively, they can be categorized into different levels. One could argue that e-
mail, CD file transfer, or use of a shared network are the “best” options, and therefore
exhibit a higher level of interoperability than printing or reading aloud. The levels
could be defined as 1: verbal transfer of information; 2: hard copy; and 3: digital
transfer of information. Assigning rankings based on file transfer capability seems easy
in this simple example. However, it is difficult to apply these rules across a broad
range of heterogeneous systems in practice. Published interoperability measurement
methods approach this by generating new models with different attributes for every
application, as will be shown in Section 2.5. Furthermore, what is important in
interoperability is scenario-dependent. For example, when working side-by-side to
complete a task, the verbal transfer of information may be much more desirable
than a digital transfer of information because of the proximity of the two parties.
Transferring the file digitally may actually be slower and less efficient. However, if
those same two co-workers are collaborating remotely, digital information transfers
of the same information may be preferable over verbal transfers. Thus, the “best”
way to achieve interoperability may depend on the scenario or application. This
implies a need to assess interoperability with more than a set of levels, and rather
to characterize interoperability based on a set of factors that capture its nature,
including its context.
One of the challenges of defining interoperability measures is to determine what
level of detail they are considering. Interoperability as a concept can be very detailed,
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from dealing with actual electronics components or telecommunications equipment, to
assessing compliance with standards, to a high-level metric of a system’s capabilities.
This research is motivated by the search for an interoperability measurement that
can be used to understand SoS at the conceptual level. This will affect what qualities
such a measurement should have, as well as what information is available to perform
an interoperability analysis. The next section presents conceptual design of systems
of systems in defense acquisition.
2.2 Conceptual-Level Design of Systems of Systems
Ultimately, engineering of any type is about decision making. Each choice that the
designer makes has a trade-off, and affects the system’s performance, cost, or another
objective, and the designer must justify these choices. Decision-making must begin
as soon as it is determined that a new system will be acquired, updated, or integrated
into an SoS.
Systems of systems are complex, consist of many components, and are constantly
changing. For this research, a system will be defined as a “functionally, physically,
and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements;
that group of elements forming a unified whole” [72]. A system of systems is a “set
or arrangement of systems that results when independent and useful systems are in-
tegrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities” [28]. Collaboration is
a part of what distinguishes an SoS from a system alone, as is the fact that a system
remains independent within the SoS architecture. Collaboration allows the SoS to
perform functions beyond the sum of its parts [53]. In addition to operational ele-
ment independence, characteristics of an SoS include managerial independence, evo-
lutionary development, emergent behavior, and geographic distribution [88]. When
designing a collection of systems to create a new capability, it is unlikely that a design
from scratch is being considered because most of the components probably already
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exist. Additionally, these existing component systems have their own organizational
structure. This specific type of SoS is known as an acknowledged SoS, which consists
of an overlay to a group of existing, independent systems that aims to create a new
capability [25]. The challenge comes in managing these independent systems and in
understanding how an update to one independent system affects the performance of
the SoS as a whole.
Systems of systems can also be categorized by whether they are bounded or un-
bounded [39]. Bounded or directed systems are the majority of modeled SoS; they
have centralized command and control, and it is assumed that component systems
are known, as are their linkages. This is the type of SoS that will be dealt with in this
research. Unbounded SoS operate within a dynamic environment, have an unknown
number of participants, and lack centralized control. Unbounded SoS interoperability
is implemented via standards and protocols (e.g., the Internet protocol, IP).
2.2.1 Defense Acquisition
As new defense needs arise, new systems or system updates are needed. In the defense
world, this triggers a Capability-Based Assessment (CBA), which is conducted to
identify and prioritize capabilities gaps and determine in which ways a gap could
be filled. The full spectrum of solutions includes doctrine, organization, training,
materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). This shift
towards capabilities-based analysis of user needs is relatively recent. In 2003, the
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was implemented
[70] with three primary principles:
1. Requirements should flow down from operational needs, and should be described
in terms of capabilities rather than specific system requirements.
2. A joint perspective should guide acquisition, providing insight not only to the
best way to operate with existing resources but also to provide room for future
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Figure 2: Defense Acquisition Process. Reproduced from [53, 34]
improvement across multiple domains.
3. A single general or flag officer should supervise each functional portfolio and be
the point of contact for that domain.
If the CBA determines that a material solution is required to fill the gap, a Ma-
teriel Development Decision (MDD) will be made which triggers “materiel solution
analysis”, including an analysis of alternatives. In this case, the bounded systems of
systems currently providing the capability must be updated to meet the new capa-
bility needs.
The DoD acquisition process is shown in Figure 2. The materiel solution analysis
and analysis of alternatives is conducted prior to Milestone A, the point at which the
decision is made to proceed with technical development [29]. Conducting a thorough
and accurate analysis is essential to finding affordable, timely, and effective solutions.
This analysis should include a quantification of interoperability, and should be con-
ducted prior to committing to the acquisition of a materiel solution. This research
will focus on pre-Milestone A decision making, and especially on the trade studies
made prior to the Materiel Development Decision. It is during this period that the
critical questions are asked: What are the gaps? Has enough analysis been done to
isolate the source of the gaps? Are there viable technical solutions to fill the gaps? By
studying interoperability at this phase and understanding its impact on performance
and capability, better decisions can be made during the ensuing design process.
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Measuring the Performance of Systems of Systems When examining a par-
ticular architecture and comparing it to other alternative during a CBA, a balance
must be struck between cost, schedule, performance, and risk. The concept of inter-
operability affects all of these to some extent, but the goal of this research is to pin
down how to relate interoperability to performance. In order to do so, it is important
to understand how performance is evaluated in the systems engineering process.
The high-level metrics by which an SoS is evaluated are called Measures of Effec-
tiveness (MOEs) [87]. They are defined as “measures of operational effectiveness. . . in
terms of operational outcomes. They identify the most critical performance require-
ments to meet system-level mission objectives.” [87, p. 125]. Characteristics include
that they:
• Relate to performance
• Are simple to state
• Are testable
• Are complete
• State any time dependency or environmental conditions
• Can be measured quantitatively, statitistically, or as a probability
• Are easy to measure [27]
MOEs can be decomposed into Measures of Performance (MOPs) and Measures of
Suitability. An MOP characterizes “physical or functional attributes relating to the
execution of the mission. . . They quantify a technical or performance requirement
directly derived from MOEs. . . A change in MOP can be related to a change in MOE”
[87, p. 126] An example of the difference in MOEs and MOPs is as follows: An MOE
states that a vehicle must be able to drive fully loaded from Point A to Point B
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on one tank of fuel. An MOP would state that vehicle range must be equal or
greater to 1,000 miles. Currently, interoperability is an abstract concept that is being
addressed as an MOE: systems must be interoperable. This research aims to quantify
it and link it to requirements so that the quality of interoperation can be measured.
This is still not quite enough to be called a measure of performance; no requirement
will state that SoS interoperability must be greater than X; the target value will
vary depending on mission requirements, and will be specific to each application.
Instead, interoperability is a measure of effectiveness at the system of systems level
that can still relate to performance, be testable, and be quantifiable. In Section 2.3,
where a detailed definition of interoperability is presented, this categorization will be
supported.
Other terms will be introduced in the course of this thesis. Of primary concern are
the concepts of capability and reliability. Capability is used as an expression of the
overall needs of the user of the SoS. The user desires a certain capability, and therefore
the SoS is studied to determine if it meets that capability in terms of performance,
cost, etc. This research effort aims to introduce interoperability as part of that study
of overall capability. Reliability will be used in its physical sense as a measure of
performance, not as a general concept of safety or risk of the system. One last note:
MOPs can be expressed in terms of Technical Performance Measurements, or TPMs.
A later experiment tracks the battery charge of a small UAV; this is a TPM, but will
simply be referred to as a representation of the performance of the SoS, and will be
used to show how interoperability as an MOE is linked to performance in the form
of a TPM tracked during modeling and simulation.
2.2.2 DoDAF
The qualities of an SoS must be tracked and recorded somehow, especially as the
number of involved systems and the complexity of their relationships increases. For
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this, an architecture framework is employed. Architecture frameworks track struc-
ture, properties, relationships, activities, and requirements for systems and systems
of systems. This information is required in order to evaluate the SoS.
The introductory section of this chapter introduced a DoD mandate, CJCSI
6212.01, that defines interoperability for IT and NSS systems. In the same instruction,
the Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter (NR-KPP) is defined. Within the context
of information systems, the NR-KPP “consists of information required to evaluate the
timely, accurate, and complete exchange and use of information to satisfy informa-
tion needs for a given capability” [69], and is mandatory for all acquisition and post
acquisition IT and NSS programs. The NR-KPP is intended to ensure compliance of
a new system with the existing DoD network, including the Global Information Grid
(GIG). It is a mandatory element of Capability Development Documents (CDDs),
Capability Production Documents (CPDs), Information Support Plans (ISPs) and
Tailored Information Support Plans (TISP) for IT and NSS that communicate with
external systems.
The NR-KPP also lists which DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF) [32] prod-
ucts are required for each stage in the acquisition process. The CDD and CPD are the
documents for JCIDS Milestones B and C, respectively. For pre-Milestone A studies,
a DOTMLPF Analysis would lead to the document called a DOTMLPF Change Rec-
ommendation (DCR); this is followed by a CBA, which leads to the second JCIDS
document, an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), which is the document required
for Milestone A decision-making. The required and recommended DoDAF V2.0 mod-
els for the ICD, according to [49], are:
AV-1 Overview and Summary Information: describes a project’s goals, plans, and
measures (required)
AV-2 Integrated Dictionary: contains definitions of all terms used in the architecture
(required)
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CV-1 Vision provides a strategic context for capabilities and a high-level scope (rec-
ommended)
CV-2 Capability Taxonomy: lists a hierarchy of capabilities (recommended)
CV-3 Capability Phasing: projects the achievement of capability at different points
in time (recommended)
CV-4 Capability Dependencies: shows dependencies and logical grouping of capabil-
ities (recommended)
CV-6 Capability to Operational Activities Mapping: maps capabilities required to
operational activities supported by those capabilities (recommended)
OV-1 High Level Operational Concept Graphic: is an image depicting main systems,
actions, and interactions without much detail (required)
OV-2 Operational Resource Flow Description: describes the resource flows exchanged
between operational activities (required)
OV-4 Organizational Relationships Chart: depicts organizational structure (civil or
military) (required)
OV-5a Operational Activity Decomposition Tree: organizes capabilities and opera-
tional activities hierarchically (required)
OV-5b Operational Activity Model: shows activities connected by resource flows
(recommended)
SV-7 or SvcV-7 Systems (S) or Services (Svc) Measures Matrix: defines metrics
of systems or services model elements (recommended)
Several of these DoDAF models contain information useful to storing or taking a
measurement of interoperability. However, interoperability requires more than just
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developing DoDAF architecture models and more than passing information between
systems [49]. Interoperability is assumed to have four requirements that are indepen-
dent of DoD instructions:
1. Support Net-Centric Military Operations
2. Enter and Be Managed in the Network
3. Exchange Information
4. Satisfy Technical Requirements implied by the other requirements
Each of these attributes is supported by operational and information requirements
and has associated KPPs, Threshholds, and Objectives. An example is shown in
Figure 3. Thresholds defined in the NR-KPPs of a desired SoS, such as a 100 meter
circle for location accuracy of a high-value target, could provide requirements for
measuring the interoperability of that SoS, allowing an interoperability metric to be
directly mapped back to the JCIDS process.
2.2.3 ARCHITECT
Despite the instruction to use the Defense Acquisition System and the JCIDS process
to identify and address interoperability needs, it is unclear how exactly a decision-
maker should address interoperability within the current acquisition process. A
capabilities-based systems engineering methodology called ARCHITECT, or the Architecture-
based Technology Evaluation and Capability Tradeoff methodology, has been devel-
oped at Georgia Tech by Griendling, Domerçant, Iacobucci, et al. [53, 40, 64].
ARCHITECT can be used when an update to an SoS is required and decision
makers are faced with an expansive design space with many alternatives. The AR-
CHITECT methodology runs a succession of evaluations on potential SoS architec-
tures, returning basic metrics of performance for a given mission scenario. These
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Figure 3: Example NR-KPP Values. Reproduced from [49]
metrics allow decision-makers to examine hundreds or thousands of potential archi-
tectures early in the design process and to perform trade studies using metrics such
as time to perform mission and probability of success. ARCHITECT follows a “vee”
model which is common in systems engineering. Beginning with problem formula-
tion, the ARCHITECT methodology guides decision makers through a breakdown of
the design space. Steps include Metrics Derivation, Gap Analysis, Alternative Iden-
tification & Generation, Evaluation, Decision Support, and Alternative Selection, as
shown for a sample Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) mission in Figure 4.
For additional information, please see [53, 40, 64].
Although interoperability is not the primary focus of the ARCHITECT method-
ology, it is incorporated as a factor used to generate and evaluate alternatives, as
shown in Figure 5. Each baseline SoS architecture has alternative Operational Pro-
cesses. Each Operational Process has alternative System Portfolios, and so on down
to the Interoperability Level (IOL) mix alternatives. Each of these permutations is
considered an architecture alternative, and the total number of alternatives under
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Figure 4: Visual Summary of ARCHITECT’s Design Process. Reproduced from [53]
consideration can number in the hundreds of thousands. For each SoS architecture
alternative, levels of interoperability are assigned to each system-to-system pair.
Figure 5: ARCHITECT Alternative Space
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When understanding how to measure interoperability, it will be necessary to con-
sider the impacts of each of these decision levels. The following questions have been
developed to begin a measurement:
• What systems are included in this alternative? What tasks must the SoS per-
form?
• What capabilities are required to perform those tasks successfully and to move
resources throughout the system?
• Given individual system capabilities, what interfaces can and must be formed?
• On each of those interfaces, how are the performance requirements of the oper-
ational process reflected in the interoperability of the systems?
These questions will affect the definition of interoperability for each system pair as
well as for the overall SoS.
2.3 Defining Interoperability
In order to understand interoperability, it is necessary to have a clear definition. Inter-
operability was originally a software engineering term, and many available definitions
pertain to the exchange of data over a network. The IEEE Standard Computer Dic-
tionary provides a general definition of interoperability: “The ability of two or more
systems or components to exchange information and to use the information that has
been exchanged” [65]. This definition implies several things. First, interoperability
is not a characteristic of a single system; it must be defined for at least pairs of sys-
tems. Second, there are two main considerations when understanding interoperability:
how well information is exchanged and whether or not that information can be used
once exchanged. Considering “how well” implies that measures of effectiveness are
required.
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The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated terms has two definitions, both of
which apply beyond military applications. The first defines interoperability as “The
ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks” [73]. However, this
definition is vague and gives no insight on how to measure or consider interoperability,
and categorizes it as a binary quality: it either exists, or it doesn’t. The second
definition is more specific to communications:
The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems. . . when
information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily be-
tween them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be
defined when referring to specific cases.
This definition also defines interoperability as a characteristic of systems, but what is
satisfactory exchange, and what does it mean by degree of interoperability? Several
attempts at answering these questions have been made, as will be shown in the next
section.
Finally, yet another definition from the Defense Acquisition University (DAU)
Glossary [28] is:
The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide data, information, ma-
teriel, and services to and accept the same from other systems, units,
or forces and to use the data, information, materiel, and services so ex-
changed to enable them to operate effectively together. Information Tech-
nology (IT) and National Security System (NSS) interoperability includes
both the technical exchange of information and the operational effective-
ness of that exchanged information as required for mission accomplish-
ment. (CJCSI 6212.01E)
This definition expands on the previous ones to encompass materiel and services
in addition to data and information. It also links an exchange with operational
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effectiveness. It will be shown later that this link with operational effectiveness will
be very useful for understanding how interoperability affects the performance of an
SoS and will allow a comparison of architecture alternatives based on interoperability.
The definition of interoperability generated and used by this research is a hybrid
of the above definitions:
The ability of two or more systems or components to exchange resources
in the form of data, information, materiel, and services, and to use the
resources that have been exchanged to enable them to operate effectively
together.
This definition makes it clear that the quantification of interoperability begins with
a measure of the ability of at least two systems to exchange a resource. A resource
is not limited to information. The ability to use the resource must be considered in
addition to the ability to transmit the resource. Finally, interoperability is linked to
performance, and changes in interoperability will affect the success of some associated
operation.
2.3.1 Dimensions of Interoperability
All these definitions of interoperability still fail to answer the question: at what level
of detail do systems interoperate? Most commentaries [85, 62, 121, 39, 50, 20, 94]
on interoperability concepts agree on the following planes or dimensions, or close
variations thereof:
Level 1: Machine Level or Technical Interoperability Physical interfaces at
the hardware and software level
Level 2: Syntactic Interoperability Shared language or format of systems. For
example, in software, two programs using different languages such as C++ and
Java would require a translator to be interoperable. Does not concern the
meaning of the resource being exchanged or whether it is actually useful.
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Level 3: Semantic or Operational Interoperability This dimension concerns
the actual meaning of a resource and whether it is understood. This usually
requires human interpretation. Cognitive science is required to assess this level
of interoperability.
Level 4: Organizational or Conceptual Interoperability Involves agreements
about the use of exchanged resources and whether or not it contributes to op-
erational success. Usually requires human-to-human interaction.
An example of the different conceptual levels is shown in Figure 6, reproduced
from Hura et al. [62] These authors go so far as to state that, in the context of
coalition air operations, “Interoperability at the operational and tactical levels. . . is
the real-world realm of the warfighter.”
Figure 6: Interoperability Examined at Four Levels. Reproduced from [62]
A more detailed breakdown of interoperability dimensions is shown in Figure 7.
This decomposition adds Procedural and Environmental categories, reflecting the
interoperability of processes and operational environments, respectively [50]. For
the purposes of this research, procedural and environmental interoperability will be
parts of the modeling and simulation of an SoS, and will be incorporated within the
interoperability values but not measured separately. Section 5.1 will explain how
environmental factors affect system pair calculations.
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Figure 7: Examples of Interoperability Dimensions. Reproduced from [50]
Consider the definitions from Section 2.3 in the context of interoperability dimen-
sions. The second definition from JP 1-02 is a definition of technical interoperability,
and that of the DAU glossary is an operational definition [75]. The hybrid definition
of interoperability developed for this research is meant to be used at the conceptual
design phase, but lends itself to syntactic, semantic, or organizational/conceptual in-
teroperability, depending on the decision makers’ desired level of fidelity. To study
interoperability at a given level implies that it has already been achieved or exists
satisfactorily at lower levels.
2.4 Motivating Observations
The preceding sections lead to several observations and corresponding research ques-
tions (RQs) that motivate this thesis:
Observations:
1. Interoperability affects the performance of a networked system of systems as
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well as the cost of acquiring new systems. It should be addressed during the
conceptual design phase.
2. The understanding and scope of interoperability changes depending on the con-
text.
3. Measuring interoperability alone does not provide a complete picture of SoS
capability; it affects overall MoEs, and the effects of interoperability should be
captured in the calculations for MoEs.
4. An interoperability metric that can inform measures of effectiveness
is needed during the conceptual design of systems of systems.
Research Questions:
1. What factors affect the understanding of interoperability at the syntactic system
of systems level?
2. How is system of systems interoperability currently measured?
3. Do any of the existing models take into account all of the factors needed to form
a complete picture of interoperability of a system of systems?
Research Question 1 will be answered in Section 2.6 by identifying architecture
elements that store interface data and examining existing models of interoperability
for common themes. Questions 2 and 3 will be answered in Sections 2.5 and 2.7,
respectively, with insight gained from RQ 1.
2.5 Interoperability Models
Interoperability is a concept of the late 20th century. As communications technology
evolved beyond voice communications and simple data exchange, there arose a need
to measure how well systems could interact. Prior to 1980, such a formalized model
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to measure interoperability did not exist. Communications technology was simpler,
and there was not really a need to identify the interoperability of systems. However,
as communication systems grew more diverse, it became necessary to be able to place
systems relative to one another on a spectrum of interoperability.
2.5.1 Spectrum of Interoperability Model (SoIM)
In 1980, LaVean defined such a spectrum with 7 levels, ranging from separate systems
at the lowest level and same system as the highest level of interoperability. Inter-
mediate steps include shared resources and compatible systems. An example of how
the spectrum might be implemented in architecture is shown in Figure 8. The inter-
operability matrix includes present and future goals for six classes of users’ ability
to access the Defense Communications System (DCS). LaVean stated that technical
interfaces and management philosophies were the two factors that most constrained
interoperability, and noted that interoperability was only one criterion by which sys-
tems are designed. Therefore, interoperability cannot be defined by technological
sophistication alone, and it is important to minimize the number of interoperable
modes [83].
2.5.2 Quantification of Interoperability Model (QoIM)
In 1989, Mensh et al. recognized that there was more than one aspect to interoper-
ability, and defined seven components of interoperability, developed alongside a set
of measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs). These
components are media, languages, environment, requirements, human factors, proce-
dures, and standards. Media and languages pertain to node connectivity and message
format. The environmental component covers external threats, weather, etc. Require-
ments and standards are design constraints, and are derived from operational require-
ments and criteria directing military communications equipment. Human factors and
procedures address the non-technology aspects of interoperability, and incorporate
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Figure 8: Interoperability Matrix (System A access to DCS [future]). Reproduced
from [83]
the effect of established doctrine and operational plans as well as the naturally un-
predictable behavior of any operation involving humans. In an exercise with message
generators and participants from the United States Navy, 4 of the 7 components of
interoperability were evaluated by measuring the success or failure of communications
in 3 hypothetical scenarios. By measuring the ratio of successful communications to
total communications, the authors hoped to measure the complete interoperability of
an architecture performing a scenario [93].
2.5.3 Levels of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI)
In 1998, in response to the need to provide interoperable systems for joint operations,
the Department of Defense C4ISR Architecture Working Group produced the Levels
of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI) model. This model was based on
the same concept as the earlier Capability Maturity Model, developed in 1987. In
general, maturity models provide a reference for assessing the stages through which
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processes or systems progress. LISI is focused on information systems, and evaluates
the interactions of system pairs within an architecture based on the sophistication
of their ability to exchange information. LISI defines 5 levels of interoperability
across 4 attributes. As shown in Figure 9, the levels range from isolated level to
enterprise level and the attributes are Procedures, Applications, Infrastructure, and
Data (PAID) [31].
Figure 9: LISI Capabilities Model and Sample Implementation Options Tables. Re-
produced from [31]
To determine the interoperability of an architecture of interest, a program manager
or system developer completes a questionnaire about their program. The question-
naire gathers information including every existing and potential system in the archi-
tecture and every possible implementation of the systems. This set of data is used to
create an interoperability profile, and the lowest level of interoperability across PAID
becomes the generic interoperability of that system, as shown in the upper right of
Figure 10. For example, a summary LISI measure could be G2, for a generic level
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of interoperability of 2. Sub-levels can also be defined, e.g. G2b. A detailed LISI
measure would include attribute levels: G2(P3A2I3D2).
The interoperability metrics for every system in the architecture are then combined
into an interoperability matrix, showing the expected levels of interoperability for each
system pair. Then, a specific level of interoperability is generated for each system
interaction in an architecture, based on implementation choices. The LISI metric
can be overlaid onto a system architecture product (in this case, the system interface
description from the C4ISR Architecture Framework) to show the generic level of each
system node and the directional specific interoperability of system pairs. A notional
system interface description is shown in the bottom center of Figure 10.
LISI is by far the most referenced and reviewed interoperability measurement
method currently available, and several of the following models used LISI as a foun-
dation for additional aspects of interoperability.
Figure 10: LISI Interoperability Assessment Process. Reproduced from [31]
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2.5.4 Additional Qualitative Models
The influence of LISI has been extended beyond IT applications. Extensions and
modifications were developed throughout the late 1990s and 2000s. These methods
address organizational, operational, multinational, and non-technical interoperability.
The Australian Defense Science and Technology Organisation developed an Organ-
isational Maturity Model (OIM) in 1998. It used LISI’s model of 5 levels of inter-
operability, but defined 4 attributes of preparation, understanding, command and
coordination, and ethos. The OIM recognized that interoperability is not limited to
technical systems, and has been updated several times [23].
Another model, known as the Stoplight model (2002), boils operations and acqui-
sition interoperability down to four options of red, orange, yellow, and green. This
non-leveling model is simply a 2 × 2 matrix where the rows are meets operational
requirements (yes/no) and the columns are meets acquisition requirements (yes/no).
It is intended for evaluation of legacy systems [58].
The Layers of Coalition Interoperability (LCI), published in 2003, defines nine lay-
ers of interoperability that bridge technical and operational interoperability. Chang-
ing knowledge and awareness increase coalition interoperability from 1: physical in-
teroperability to 9: political objectives. This maturity model is intended to be layered
with other interoperability models [132].
The first model to mention SoS is the Systems-of-Systems Interoperability Model
(SoSI). It breaks interoperability into operational, constructional, and programmatic,
and associates activities with each type. It does not have associated metrics, and is
a non-leveling method [96].
In 2004, the Non-Technical Interoperability (NTI) Framework was introduced to
the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence to highlight that social, personnel, and or-
ganizational interoperability were relevant to multinational forces’ cooperation. NTI
references OIM as a useful top-level model, and reused its four core attributes. The
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output of NTI is a Multinational Forces Cooperability Index [129].
This is still just a sampling of the more relevant interoperability models; Ford
et al. [46] presented a comprehensive survey of interoperability models with several
that were not included in this section. Additional literature on the subject, most
frequently at the software level, includes [14, 24, 37, 36, 44, 61, 74, 82, 94, 111, 134].
2.5.5 Ford’s Similarity-based Interoperability Measurement
Ford, in a 2008 dissertation, developed a very general quantitative interoperability
measurement based on the mathematical similarity of systems’ interoperability char-
acteristics. Although the main focus is on military applications, it is intended to
apply to non-military scenarios as well, and makes the distinction between collabora-
tive and confrontational interoperability. Previously published models pertaining to
military interoperability addressed cooperation among friendly systems. Ford recog-
nizes that having the highest possible level of collaborative interoperability could be
detrimental to mission performance in some cases, such as when a critical network
connection fails or a pilot is overwhelmed by the quantity of information streaming
into their cockpit. What is important for mission success in a confrontational situa-
tion is “a high degree of directional confrontational interoperability from friendly to
adversary systems” [45].
To measure the interoperability I of a set of systems, one must have an operational
process. This scopes the systems to be evaluated, as well as provides an opportunity to
measure the operational effectiveness of an architecture based on the interoperability
of its component systems. Once a set of systems S has been identified, each system is
then characterized by a string of characters X. The characters represent important
features of the system, and can be morphological, functional, interfacial, etc. For
measuring interoperability using Ford’s method, all system characters must be related
to interoperability. Each interoperability character has a state, defining whether or
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not that character applies to the system. Character states can also be positive real
numbers, but an important assumption is made that the range of all character states
is the same, e.g. 0 to 5 or 1 to 4.
Ford provides the following example: the sentence “the long train expeditiously
transports raw material down the tracks to the factory” is broken down into nouns,
which become systems in S in Equations 1. The verb, transports, is the interoper-
ability character, and different levels are defined as X. The character states C are
binary; either the train transports, or it transports material, or it transports material
on the tracks, and so on.









C = {0, 1} (3)
Once the systems have been identified in terms of their interoperability characters
and the states of those characters, a specific system can be modeled as a sequence of
character states. This is called a system instantiation. The core of Ford’s method lies
in comparing the similarity of these system instantiations using a weighted modified
Minkowski similarity function, Equation 4, where σ′ and σ′′ are the system instan-
tiations, n is the number of characters used to instantiate σ′, σ′′, cmax is the max
character state value, and r is the Minkowski parameter (usually r = 2). Given a
pair of system instantiations as inputs, this function will calculate a weighted and
normalized measure of the similarity of the systems. It can handle directional in-
teroperability as well (when a system can provide an interoperation but not accept
it). The result of this calculation is a matrix mapping system-to-system pairs, where
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each cell is the value I of that pair, ranked from 0 to 1. Ford states that a value of
0 means two systems are noninteroperable, and a value of 1 denotes perfectly inter-
operable systems. Ford assumes that self-interoperability is equal to 0, and uses a























Ford also defines eight modes of interoperability. These modes are: directional,
self, pure, contextual, time-variant, constrained upper bound, collaborative, and con-
frontational. Multiple modes may apply to an operational process and its systems.
Pure and contextual interoperability are related; pure interoperability is a measure of
a single system pair (the I-score matrix would be 2 × 2). Contextual interoperabil-
ity is the measurement of two systems relative to the other systems in the process.
With n systems, the matrix of I values would be n × n, and the I-score of the two
original systems could change depending on the value of the character states of the
other systems. Ford provides a numerical example for deeper understanding. To mea-
sure time-variant interoperability, the interoperability characters used to instantiate
a system can be functions of time, or a series of interoperability measurements can
be made, where each matrix of I values is a snapshot of the operational process at a
given point in time.
Ford’s method can also be used to measure confrontational interoperability when
two systems are on opposing sides (blue is friendly, red is adversary). For directional
operations, the system instantiations can be evaluated; if the I of the blue-to-red
operation (e.g. attack) is greater than I of the red system to blue (e.g. defend), then
blue enjoys a confrontational interoperability advantage. However, to consider the
interactions of multiple confrontational systems, additional modeling is required.
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2.5.6 ARCNET
Within the ARCHITECT methodology, if the decision makers wish to evaluate the
impact of varying levels of collaboration on the performance of the architecture alter-
native, the ARCNET model developed by Domerçant [40] has been used. ARCNET
integrates a collaboration model with an engagement model to examine the impact
of varying levels of collaboration on engagement outcomes. An interoperability scale
developed by Domerçant is mapped to the collaboration level, where increasing inter-
operability increases collaboration potential and reliability. The interoperability scale
ranges from 0 to 5, as shown in Figure 11, and was adapted from NATO1 STANAG2
4586 [102], a standard on unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) interoperability.
Figure 11: Interoperability Scale used by ARCNET
Results of Domerçant’s work show that there is potentially a knee in the curve
for interoperability, in which the performance increases due to interoperability tail off
after a certain level of interoperability is reached. Results also show that increasing
interoperability can enable the use of reduced force size to achieve similar engagement
outcomes due to increased information sharing. However, while these results are
1North Atlantic Treaty Organization
2Standardization Agreement
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interesting, the current applicability is limited to the example problem presented
by Domerçant and additional work is needed to expand and verify this model. It is
expected that the results of this thesis will provide an input to ARCNET’s engagement
model, as well as any others used in acquisition decision support processes, as well as
provide another ranking metric to compare architecture alternatives.
2.6 Desired Characteristics of SoS Interoperability
Before evaluating the above models for their suitability for this research, the desired
characteristics of a system of systems level interoperability measurement must be de-
fined. These characteristics will be derived from a variety of sources, including the
properties of architectures, commonalities among the existing models, and observa-
tions on what constitutes a useful metric.
An examination of information stored in an architecture includes a sequence of
required tasks, available systems and their capabilities, and compatibility of interfaces
among systems. The relevant DoDAF products are described below. It should be
noted that the OV-2 is the only one of these products required for JCIDS. Current
policy may not provide enough information to study interoperability during a CBA.
OV-2 Operational Resource Flow Description [33, p. 165]
“depicts Operational Needlines that indicate a need to exchange resources”
“shows flows of funding, personnel and materiel in addition to information”
“it is to describe who or what, not how”
OV-3 Operational Resource Flow Matrix [33, p. 168]
“addresses Operational Resource Flows exchanged between Operational Ac-
tivities and locations”
“The intended usage of the OV-3 includes. . . definition of interoperability
requirements”
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SV-1 Systems Interface Description [33, p. 202]
“addresses the composition and interaction of Systems.”
“links together the operational and systems architecture models by depict-
ing how Resources are structured and interact to realize the logical architecture
specified in an OV-2.”
SV-3 Systems-Systems Matrix [33, p. 202]
“enables a quick overview of all the system resource interactions specified
in one or more SV-1 models”
“the intended usage of the SV-3 includes. . . comparing interoperability char-
acteristics of solution options”
SV-6 Systems Resource Flow Matrix [33, p. 210]
“specifies the characteristics of the System Resource Flows exchanged be-
tween systems with emphasis on resources crossing the system boundary”
the intended usage of the SV-6 includes. . . detailed definition of Resource
Flows”
“The SV-6 is the physical equivalent of the logical OV-3 table; . . . non-
automated Resource Flow exchanges, such as verbal orders, are also captured”
Factors that can be distilled from these views include:
• Resource exchange requirements for each resource exchange in an operational
process. For example, a time to complete, a probability of success, or other
metric of performance.
• Each system’s capability. How many methods do they have available to conduct
each resource exchange? This is a form of redundancy.
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• The required system interfaces within the SoS. This determines/is determined
by what system pairs must exchange resources.
• Which systems are included in the SoS. Going back to acquisition, the addition
of a new system or inclusion of a legacy system will affect SoS interoperability,
as will removing a system (or a system being removed from the network in the
course of the operational process).
• Force structure. However, this may come into play in an engagement simulation
and not be a factor in the actual interoperability measurement. It is unlikely
that exact numbers of assets will be known at the conceptual design phase.
Next, what characteristics are common to the varied interoperability models sur-
veyed in Section 2.5? Many are leveling metrics, where an isolated system is compared
to a set of standards. This locks future systems into a potentially outdated system.
These levels are often derived qualitatively, and must be manipulated to allow input
into further models. To increase flexibility in measurement, an interoperability metric
should be decoupled from a fixed set of standards, and should be naturally quanti-
tative. Additionally, many existing models focused on isolated systems or on system
pairs, and never integrated characteristics of systems of systems, such as collaboration
and complexity, into their assessment.
Another part of the question, “What makes a good metric?”, is more philosoph-
ical. Fortunately, the literature includes several recommendations for the quality
of metrics. One such recommendation, by McCabe and Butler [92], is intended for
generating a metric of software complexity and is adapted for interoperability below:
• The metric is intuitive. Designs with intuitively low interoperability should have
a relatively low number, whereas designs with more interconnections or greater
capability should have a relatively high value. Note that high interoperability
may not transfer directly to high operational success.
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• The metric is objective and mathematically rigorous. The same design viewed in
separate instances or by different analysts should yield the same interoperability.
• The metric should be of operational help. The benefits of measuring interoper-
ability should outweigh the costs associated with data collection and analysis.
• The metric should help generate an integration test plan early in the life cycle.
If interoperability can be computed in the design phase, steps can be taken
during further design and development to test for interoperability and improve
it if desired/required.
• The metric and associated process should be automatable. As discussed previ-
ously, due to the high number of alternatives at the conceptual design phase,
any measure of interoperability will be unwieldy if manual input is required for
each alternative.
After examining architecture products, existing models, and understanding the
qualities of a useful metric, it can be inducted that to successfully capture the inter-
operability of an SoS, a measurement should:
• first quantitatively measure the interoperability of system pair interfaces
• account for networked system of systems effects
• accommodate non-materiel options
• be associated with the requirements of an operational process
• be intuitive
• be objective and quantitative
• provide useful information
• be automatable
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The synthesis and identification of these factors is a contribution of this thesis.
The models surveyed in the previous section will now be assessed against these criteria
to determine if any are suitable for use in a methodology to measure system of systems
interoperability.
2.7 Evaluating Existing Models against the Desired Crite-
ria
Each of the models discussed in Section 2.5 has merits that can be leveraged for the
SoS architecting problem as well as aspects that limit its usefulness. The models will
be evaluated based on the criteria established above.
A quantitative measurement associated with an operational process is desired. The
measurement should address non-technical and non-materiel interoperability, and
should be able to reflect the indirect interoperability inherent in a SoS. Additionally,
the measurement should be easily automatable so that large numbers of alternatives
can be evaluated easily. While these are desired characteristics for a measurement,
additional guidelines for creating a new measurement will be explored later in this
chapter. With these desired characteristics in mind, the existing models will be
revisited below to examine their suitability for measuring interoperability in an SoS.
2.7.1 Spectrum of Interoperability Model (SoIM)
In the SoIM, LaVean concluded that interoperability is just one design criteria, and
having a simple measure would allow individual system designers to maintain flexi-
bility. However, the 7-level spectrum of interoperability is insufficient to capture the
similarity or dissimilarity of systems. It could be considered to measure system pairs;
in Figure 8 it maps the ways in which System A connects to the DCS. This qualitative
model is limited to communications, which have evolved significantly since 1980.
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2.7.2 Quantification of Interoperability Model (QoIM)
In the QoIM, Mensh et al. tried to break interoperability into quantifiable compo-
nents. However, their experiments were time-consuming and subjective, as several
MoEs were evaluated by human observers. The interoperability components are also
limited to communication systems. Additionally, the information required to set up
a full-scale simulation (computer-based or by wargaming at a naval research center)
is unlikely to be available at the early phase of SoS design that is of concern to this
research.
2.7.3 Levels of Information Systems Interoperability (LISI)
Although LISI was created in support of JCIDS and complements the earliest incar-
nation of the Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF), it is now
outdated and does not correspond to DoDAF V2.0, released in 2009. LISI is quali-
tative in that to determine interoperability, a system must match predefined levels,
set by standards. Buddenberg [15] made the following remarks about LISI: “The
exercise was well-intentioned but fell short... LISI had a point system that rewarded
commonality and assumed that commonality would render interoperability. This is
closely related to the trap that assumes that standards compliance yields interop-
erability – equally fallacious.” LISI was intended to be used as a guide to develop
separate systems’ general capability without formal requirements being defined for
every system. Because it is impossible to know the details of a future system’s com-
munications capabilities early in the design process, the LISI metrics for a potential
architecture could be incorrect. The LISI documentation allows for a target LISI
profile, but the required communications interoperability capability could vary based
on the performance of other systems in the SoS architecture, causing the target LISI
profile to be variable.
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Because so many potential architectures can be considered during CBA, hav-
ing variable communications interoperability profiles for multiple systems performing
multiple variations on an operational process would quickly become unwieldy. Con-
structing a LISI profile for one SoS requires a program manager to assess individual
systems, then each potential system pair, and finally overlay on an SoS; this pro-
cess is not automatable. Furthermore, LISI is limited to the IT interoperability of
system pairs, and does not account for SoS effects or additional types of interoper-
ability. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, LISI is a static, nominal labeling of
systems that does not account for how interoperability can be controlled, changed, or
improved when necessary [130].
2.7.4 Additional Qualitative Models
Most of the models developed between LISI and Ford are useful in the sense that they
attempt to address interoperability beyond communications and IS, but those based
on LISI have the same concerns for an SoS as LISI. The SoSI model is important in
that it identifies three types of interoperability that are relevant to SoS (operational,
constructional, and programmatic), but the lack of associated metrics make it difficult
to apply.
2.7.5 Ford’s Similarity-based Interoperability Measurement
Ford’s measurement I is the first real quantitative interoperability measurement that
attempts to be flexible to all types of interoperability. It addresses interoperability
modes in great detail, requires a purpose in the form of a given operational pro-
cess, and introduces confrontational interoperability. This is very relevant to the
development of an SoS that is intended to perform a mission against an adversary.
However, Ford acknowledges that only system pairs’ confrontational interoperability
can be determined, and the success of a mission is almost never dependent on a single
interaction.
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The calculation of I itself requires several assumptions that can have an impact
on the ultimate outputs. For one, it assumes that the range of all interoperability
character states is the same. In a large network that encompasses many types of
attributes, this may not be a realistic expectation. Additionally, the fact that inter-
operability can change depending on whether pure interoperability (a system pair in
a 2 × 2 matrix) or contextual interoperability (a system pair in an n × n matrix)
is measured implies that one could manipulate the results to be a higher or lower I
simply by including or excluding systems. This has the potential to mislead end users
of the interoperability score. An example taken directly from Ford (pp. 55—56) is
shown in Equation 5. The first matrix (on the left) shows the interoperability of two
systems alone. The second matrix (on the right) shows the interoperability of those
same two systems in the context of a third system which has additional interoper-
ability characters. Their value goes from I = 0.259 to I = 0.207 in the context of
the third system’s higher score of I = 0.276. Ford postulates that the interoperabil-
ity measurement is more precise in the context of more systems, specifically, as the
number of characters used to instantiate S approaches infinity, the interoperability










Overall, this measurement does fulfill the goals of being flexible, quantitative, and
relevant to an operational purpose. Ford recommends two areas of future research
that are directly applicable to this research. The first is indirect interoperability, or
the ability for the interoperability of one system in a network to influence a distant
(non-adjacent) system. The second area is how to associate a change in friendly,
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cooperative interoperability with a change in operational effectiveness. Even if con-
frontational interoperability is not used, being able to understand how changing the
interoperability of a blue system (for example, adding requirements to a future system
or adding capability to an existing system) affects the SoS’ operational effectiveness is
an extremely valuable tool. Understanding this relationship could show that increas-
ing interoperability only improves operational effectiveness to a point. Ford points
out that an optimum could be reached and any further increase results in a signifi-
cant decrease in operational effectiveness, and Domerçant also shows that a “knee in
the curve” could exist where any additional increases in collaborative interoperability
lead to marginal or negative effects on mission success.
2.7.6 ARCNET
The general scale of interoperability developed by Domerçant for ARCNET is a six-
level scale, ranging from 0 to 5. It is modeled after an international standard for
unmanned combat system interoperability, STANAG 4586, with the addition of a 0
level, isolated or no exchange. Each system pair in an architecture is assigned a level
(qualitatively). These interoperability levels are used to calculate the local collab-
oration effects and overall network collaboration using information entropy theory,
which will be further explored in the next chapter, Section 3.4. The primary intent of
this research is to capture the effects of network-centric collaboration on architecture
complexity, and the final output of ARCNET is not an interoperability measurement
but rather an understanding of both the benefits and drawbacks of networking mil-
itary systems for increased situational awareness. It does generate interoperability
levels for system pairs, and calculates the collaboration across a network for a specific
operation (defined in the engagement model). ARCNET also attempts to determine
the negative effects on combat effectiveness that may result as the total number of
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connections between military units leads to increasingly complex architectures. AR-
CNET’s scale deals primarily with resource exchange and control. For the scope
of Domerçant’s sample problem, this was sufficient, but additional flexibility would
increase ARCNET’s value.
Table 1 summarizes the performance of existing models in terms of qualities that
are desired for measuring SoS interoperability. A mathematically calculated value
associated with an operational process is needed, not a qualitatively assigned level.
The measurement should be able to reflect the indirect interoperability inherent in
an SoS. It should be flexible, and able to handle more than just technical network
or communications interoperability. It should be related to a measure of operational
success, such as requirements.
Table 1: Models’ Suitability for ARCHITECT






SoIM System Pair Specific
QoIM X System Specific
LISI System Pair Specific
SoSI SoS General
Ford X System Pair General X
ARCNET System Pair Specific X
The table reflects that none of the currently available frameworks are complete for
an SoS. Additionally, there is no simple way to combine several to create a compre-
hensive measure of SoS interoperability. This leads to the observation that motivates
this research effort:
Observation 5: Existing interoperability models will not be able to completely
capture SoS collaborative interoperability at the conceptual design level. Existing
models do not satisfactorily measure system pair interfaces. A new model must be
generated to enable interoperability measurement during conceptual design.
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2.8 Primary Research Objective
The goal of this research is to develop a measure for interoperability at the system
pair level as well as at the system of systems level that will enable evaluation and com-
parison of system of systems architecture alternatives during the conceptual design
phase. An intuitive, quantitative metric that takes into account operational require-
ments, system capability, and system interfaces is desired. This metric will provide
an input for performance models of the system of systems under consideration and
will allow a link between interoperability values and operational success.
Chapter 3 provides a survey and overview of the methods that were used to create
the measurement, and Chapter 4 presents a methodology framework for implementing
the measurement in a capabilities-based assessment.
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CHAPTER III
WORKING TOWARDS AN ARCHITECTURE-BASED
MEASURE OF INTEROPERABILITY
The overview of existing interoperability measurement methods shown in Chapter
2 showed that although many models currently exist to address interoperability in
various domains, none of them provide adequate information for decision-makers at
the conceptual SoS design level. Observation 5 stated that a new model must be
generated to enable interoperability measurement during conceptual design. This
leads to the following research questions:
Research Question 5: What techniques are available to measure system pairs’
ability to exchange and use resources?
Research Question 6: Is the information required to make these measurements
available at a conceptual design phase?
Research Question 5 references the definition of interoperability as the exchange
and use of a resource involving two or more systems. At the conceptual level, informa-
tion about any given system pair will be relatively abstract. As defined in Section 2.3,
there are four types of interoperability used for scoping a problem: Technical, Syn-
tactic, Semantic, and Organizational. During conceptual design, information at each
stage will be limited. Organizational interoperability can be scoped out by limiting
the systems involved in the SoS. In a military context, the systems under immediate
consideration tend to be rigidly assigned to an organization, and thus their high-level
interactions are well understood. Some aspects of technical interoperability may be
too detailed for conceptual design, such as at the small electronics level; however,
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broader technical information may be known, such as what hardware each system is
equipped with, and if those hardware systems are generally compatible.
In this research effort, technical and syntactic interoperability will be studied. Se-
mantic interoperability, or the understanding and appropriate use of the content of
the resource being transferred, begins to tread in the realm of cognitive science and
human decision-making. Semantic and organizational interoperability will be scoped
out for the examples shown in this research, although the framework is meant to be
general enough to support these additional dimensions if the data and modeling capa-
bility exists. By focusing on technical and syntactic interoperability, the assumption
is made that enough physics of the resource exchange are understood to evaluate it
against some metrics or performance thresholds, and the exchange has enough value
to include it in a list of required exchanges.
With this technical and syntactical focus in mind, the methods for measuring
system pairs and ultimately an SoS that immediately come to mind are:
• Utilizing architecture products, which are an established method for storing
information about a system or system of systems
• Reliability theory, which measures the probability that a system will perform
its required function; in this case, it could measure the quality and usefulness
of a required resource exchange
• Information entropy, which quantifies the expected value of the information
contained in a message (or potentially another type of resource exchange) and
has been adapted to measure network collaboration
• Graph and network theory, which measure various properties of sets of vertices
(systems) and edges (required resource exchanges)
These concepts will be explored in the sections below in the context of their
potential application to interoperability measurement. This chapter will present the
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foundational principles of reliability theory, graph theory, and network theory. These
concepts will then be combined to develop ARTEMIS: a methodology that enables
the measurement of the interoperability of an SoS.
3.1 Decomposing the Problem of Interoperability Measure-
ment
The first step towards building a methodology for measuring interoperability is to
decompose the problem. The primary research objective is broken down below:
1. Develop a measure for interoperability at the system pair level as well as at the
system of systems level
2. Enable evaluation and comparison of system of systems architecture alternatives
during the conceptual design phase
3. Be intuitive and quantitative
4. Take into account operational requirements, system capability, and system in-
terfaces
5. Provide an input for performance models of the system of systems under con-
sideration
6. Allow a link between interoperability values and operational success
The first goal is to study SoS interoperability. In order to do so, an accurate
measurement of system pair interoperability must be taken. The focus can be on just
that system pair, and how well they interoperate. Each system pair interface can
be further decomposed into individual required tasks or resource exchanges. Their
behavior is defined by the requirements of the mission and what capabilities they
possess to fulfill those requirements. System architectures are commonly used to store
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such data, and several relevant frameworks can be leveraged. The use of architectures
to store interoperability data will be discussed in Section 3.2.
Reliability theory will be introduced as the basis for the system pair measurement
in Section 3.3. Reliability theory is used to solve problems very similar to system
interfaces; both involve the successful completion of a process, measured against time
and a performance objective. It will be shown that this is intuitive, and that it
provides a well-established mathematical framework for system pair interoperability.
Once system pairs have been accounted for, the SoS as a whole must be studied. When
network-centric design is considered, the first thing that comes to mind is of course
network theory. Section 3.5.2 will introduce network theory and its applicability for
this problem. The interoperability metric must also link to a measure of operational
success; the concept of splitting SoS interoperability into two parts: network structure
and network performance will be further discussed in Chapter 7.
3.2 Using Architectures to Store Interoperability Data
Before interoperability can be studied, the data that informs an analysis must be
stored appropriately, in a manner that is easily accessible by both human designers
and machines for simulation. Architecture products have been used by the DoD to
store data for CBA for many years. The Department of Defense Architecture Frame-
work (DoDAF) [32, 33, 60] was briefly mentioned in Section 2.2, but it is only one of
several architecture frameworks in use in the industry. A working group at the 1st
Joint Technical Committee of the International Organization of Standards and Inter-
national Electrical Commission, ISO/IEC JTC1 WG42, maintains an online database
of architecture frameworks [66]. Frameworks similar to the DoDAF — and on which
DoDAF was based — include the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence Architecture
Framework (MODAF) [135], the NATO C3 Systems Architecture Framework (NAF)
[98, 101], and The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) [131]. In some
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cases, these frameworks are accompanied by independently published methodologies,
such as an architectural methodology to support Family of Systems (FoS) engineer-
ing and acquisition within the DoD [38]. The general product groups in Dickerson’s
methodology are the operational concept, a system functional mapping, a system
interface mapping, architecture performance and behavior, and acquisition planning.
These groups of architectural analysis reflect the general systems engineering process
and will be emulated for the construction of a methodology focused on interoperabil-
ity.
A key concept to note is that these architecture products are stand-alone, and
are usually static. The emerging field of model-based systems engineering (MBSE)
[133] endeavors to store architecture data in formats such as the Unified Modeling
Language (UML) [106] and the systems engineering specific Systems Modeling Lan-
guage (SysML) [104, 63, 81]. For a comprehensive survey of MBSE methodologies,
the reader is referred to [42]. MBSE is mentioned because it enables the automated
evaluation of the performance of architecture alternatives. Such architecture models
seem trivial for small systems of systems, but make tracking changes much easier for
larger and more complex problems. MBSE enables engineers to create Designs of
Experiments (DoEs) and run architecture alternatives through automated analyses
to evaluate SoS performance. In an effort to reconcile the many modeling languages
in use by various entities, the Object Management Group (OMG), a computer indus-
try standards consortium that also created the standards for UML and standardized
SysML, has initiated a common profile for DoDAF and MODAF called the UPDM,
or the Unified Profile for the Unified Profile For The Department Of Defense Archi-
tecture Framework (DoDAF) And The Ministry Of Defence Architecture Framework
(MODAF) [105].
Architecture data is used to conduct evaluations of other metrics; a logical ex-
tension is that interoperability can be studied using architectures as well. The first
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attempt to use architecture data to directly assess interoperability was by Giammarco
et al. [50]. In addition to her detailed breakdown of dimensions of interoperability,
Giammarco presents the required UPDM elements necessary to establish whether or
not interoperability is present. Her contribution is the definition of seven necessary
conditions for interoperability, with an emphasis on conformation to standards. For
the purposes of the following methodology presented in this research, these necessary
conditions are assumed to have been met. The focus will be not on whether two
systems can interface, but on how well they interoperate, both as a pair and as part
of a networked SoS.
The DoD Architecture Framework is implied to be used for this problem. Its
products are not explicitly created for the test problem, but the models described
in Section 2.6 store enough relevant information that an interoperability study is
possible.
3.2.1 Conceptual Design Knowledge
Research Question 6 asks if the information required to make interoperability mea-
surements is available during the conceptual design phase. The information required
to study system interfaces and the properties of those interfaces should be contained
within the DoDAF products listed in Section 2.6. Additionally, current research by
Bagdatli [4] has the potential to provide a method for determining whether or not
a DoDAF architecture product contains enough information to construct a modeling
and simulation environment.
The area of the methodology most vulnerable to lack of information is the initial
reliability analysis that will be used to generate system pair interoperability values.
Although requirements will be provided in any CBA, and can be standardized for
certain system combinations, details of the physical environment may be unavail-
able during conceptual design. For the purposes of this research, it will be assumed
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that sufficient information is available to perform reliability calculations, and if not,
approximations based on historical performance or predicted performance may be ac-
cepted as inputs. The required information and assumptions about calculations shall
be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.3 Reliability Theory
The biggest enabler of this research was making the mental leap to associate reliability
theory with interoperability. The first step was to define interoperability not just as
can two systems exchange information, but how well do they transmit resources? In
trying to find a benchmark to measure how well an exchange was conducted, the use of
requirements such as net-ready key performance parameters was chosen. Next, it was
realized that by stating the performance of the system pair in terms of requirements,
measuring interoperability would be much like measuring reliability.
Like interoperability, reliability is a characteristic of an item, or in the case of SoS,
a system. The reliability of an item is “the probability that the item will perform
its required function under given conditions for a stated time interval” [12, p. 2]. A
logical extension of this definition is to consider the reliability of a pair of systems
performing a resource exchange as the probability that the resource exchange will
meet performance requirements, such as within a time interval or over a distance. This
resource exchange can be modeled using simple analogies to reliability theory, such as
reliability in series and standby redundancy. Reliability theory is well documented;
Ref. [78, 12, 125, 35, 113, 11] are but a few of the many sources of basic reliability
principles.
Reliability is an appropriate field to leverage in order to build an interoperability
metric for several reasons. At the most basic level, interoperability is a measure of
required resource exchanges among system pairs. The resource must be transmitted
and possibly transformed in some way in order to be usable. It will be possible
49
to measure physical things, such as the reliability of sending a file within a time
limit. This will lend the weight of real-life, physical believability to an interoperability
measure. It is also possible to estimate or calculate the frequency that a resource
needs to be translated, whether that is in computer syntax or a different type of
transformation, in order to be usable. If the most basic numbers that go into an
interoperability measurement are believable, the resulting SoS metric will be credible.
Additionally, the physical concepts behind reliability theory mate well with what
is happening in a system resource exchange. Both transmission and translation have
to be successful in order for a resource exchange to be successful; this corresponds to
reliability in series. Each system pair conducting a resource exchange will have one
or more methods available to it; various applications of redundancy can be employed.
3.3.1 Reliability in Series
Series reliability describes the situation where any failure in a chain of components
causes the system to fail. Basic reliability in series assumes that there is no redun-
dancy, and that each component is independent from the other components [125].
The most general reliability function RS for a system S with n events is given in





Series reliability can be visualized as a block diagram, as shown in Fig. 12. In the
case of an operational process where each component is a task or resource exchange,
each block in the diagram is a required resource exchange, and the failure of a resource
exchange would result in the failure of the entire process.
3.3.2 Redundancy: Reliability in Parallel
Redundancy is a way to increase reliability of a system by providing more than one
way for a required function to be performed. It is not necessarily a duplication of
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Figure 12: Block Diagram of a System. Adapted from [12]
hardware (e.g. having two valves instead of one), but can also be a software alternative
or an extra time allowance [12]. In a block diagram, redundancy of a function is
represented as items in parallel, even if the hardware is not actually parallel. Figure
13 shows that three units are available to perform task III.
There are many types of redundancy that are well documented in the literature
and that are shown in Fig. 14 [125]. Full active redundancy, where all redundant
units are operating under the same load from the beginning, is the simplest case. All
units would have to fail in order for the exchange to fail. Assuming only one unit is
required to complete the task, the units are not able to be repaired, and failed units
remain failed, the reliability of n units in parallel each with a reliability R is given by
Equation 7 [113]. The initial redundancy calculations presented in the next chapter
will use full active redundancy, but additional types of redundancy will be considered
when answering Research Question 1. The applicable type of redundancy will vary






The concept of treating a resource transfer like a reliability block diagram was inspired
by foundational work on communication by Claude Shannon. Shannon’s decomposi-
tion of a communication system into a transmitter and receiver (translator) provide
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Figure 13: Redundancy in a System
Figure 14: Types of Redundancy. Reproduced from [125]
the basis for the system pair measurement in Chapter 5.
3.4.1 Shannon’s Information Entropy
When one begins a search for mathematical ways to measure information exchange,
many articles lead back to the seminal work, “A Mathematical Theory of Communi-
cation,” [122, 123]. This article, later developed into a book, helped to further the
field of information theory [77, 59] and laid the groundwork for understanding signal
processing in the mid 20th century.
Shannon begins by defining a communication system, each part of which is then
mathematically modeled using entropy. The five parts of a communication system,
shown in Figure 15 are as follows:
1. An information source produces a message (which may be of various types) to
be communicated to the receiving terminal.
2. A transmitter operates on the message in some way to allow the message to be
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transmitted over the channel.
3. The channel is the medium used to transmit the signal.
4. A receiver reconstructs the message from the signal.
5. The destination is the person or thing for whom the message is intended.
Figure 15: Schematic Diagram of a General Communication System. Reproduced
from [122]
Shannon mathematically models each part of the communication system using
entropy, H, shown in Equation 8, where pi is the probability of a system being in
cell i of its phase space. The examples in the article deal with messages consisting of
symbols. The phase spaces are the symbols, and a Markov process is used to model




pi log pi (8)
In physical terms, Shannon explains that information entropy is a measure of
choice and uncertainty. Entropy can only vanish if we are certain of the outcome of
an event (we know that one of the pis equals 1). Entropy is a maximum and equal to
log n when all pi are equal (the most uncertain situation). If the pi becomes closer to
average, H increases. The uncertainty of a joint event is less than or equal to the sum
of individual uncertainties. For two chance events x and y, the conditional entropy
of y , Hx(y), is the average of the entropy of y for each value of x. The uncertainty
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of y is never increased by knowledge of x; entropy will decrease unless x and y are
independent, in which case entropy does not change.
Shannon’s model of a communication system is intuitive when considering inter-
operability. Let the information source be the first of two systems in a system pair
exchanging a resource. That resource must be transmitted somehow over a channel,
which shall be called a “method” of resource transfer in future sections. The resource
must be acted upon somehow in order to be used; this is analogous to the receiver
in Shannon’s description. Finally, the destination is simply the receiving system in a
system pair.
However, Shannon’s information entropy does not directly apply to measuring in-
teroperability because it is concerned with measuring the uncertainty of information
itself, not how that affects an SoS at a higher level. Fortunately, elaborations have
been made since Shannon published in 1948, including a measure of network collab-
oration by Perry [108, 109]. Perry’s measure of network collaboration was used by
ARCNET, and could potentially contribute to an SoS interoperability measurement.
3.4.2 Perry’s Network Collaboration
Perry asserts that “command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) operations have been analyzed separately using
measures of performance (MOPs)” [108] that don’t address the effects of information
sharing on mission performance. The benefits of improvements to C4ISR had not
been directly measured in the past. With the linking of systems in NCW to achieve
information superiority, being able to measure the effects of collaboration is vital to
the defense community.
Without guaranteeing the “correctness” of his formulations, Perry develops met-
rics using graph theory to understand the value of connectivity and information theory
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to assess collaboration and the effects that added knowledge have on combat perfor-
mance. The level of knowledge in a combat scenario can be modeled as a probability
distribution f(x) of informational uncertainty. Perry implements Shannon’s informa-
tion entropy in the differential form shown in Equation 9, interpreting it as a measure





Entropy is mapped onto a [0, 1] knowledge scale and is used to derive an equation
for knowledge as a function of λ, Equation 10. An engagement model is required to
apply this equation. In Perry’s missile attack example, x represents the fraction of
remaining missiles in an enemy inventory that will arrive in a certain period, and
the arrival rate uncertainty of those enemy missiles is modeled by a beta distribution
f(x). Then, λ is the mean arrival rate of missiles, and knowledge is a ratio of entropy
to minimum entropy, which occurs when the variance of the beta distribution is
minimized (α and β are very large). This knowledge function measures how much
information can be gathered independently (without collaboration) in an operation,





Perry defines collaboration as “a process in which individuals work together to
achieve a common goal” [108, p. 46]. Collaboration is a critical part of NCW, and
is highly relevant to interoperability for what are assumed to be obvious reasons.
Increased interoperability will enable collaboration, in theory yielding better mission
performance. Perry recognizes that too much collaboration could detract from effec-
tive combat operations, due to information overload, increased strain on the physical
network, etc.
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Perry uses statistical reliability to assess the effects of collaboration. Collaboration
between a pair of systems i and j is modeled as a function of the time required to
complete the collaboration, as shown in Equation 11.






Collaboration cij(t) ranges between 0 and 1, and incorporates a failure rate func-
tion r(s) which is dependent on the nature of the collaboration. Recall that ARCNET
is a combination of a collaborative model based on Perry and a separate engagement
model, which could be a discrete event simulation (DES) or other simulation. In
ARCNET, Domerçant replaces r(s) with a reliability constant θ that is a normal
distribution with mean and standard deviation. IOLs between 0 and 5 were used for
ARCNET, and the IOL for each system pair is mapped to a corresponding θ, shown
in Table 2.
Table 2: IOL to Reliability Constant Mappings. Reproduced from [40, p. 206]







This IOL-to-θ mapping was chosen so that there are diminishing returns as IOL
levels increase. To calculate collaboration reliability, Equation 12 is used. As men-
tioned in the previous chapter, ARCNET uses interoperability as an input to un-
derstand collaboration effects, and does not actually measure interoperability. The
method could be stronger if a quantitative value for interoperability could be cal-
culated, rather than assigning a level to a system pair. An interoperability metric
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of system pairs that ranged between 0 and 1 would fit very nicely into the reliabil-
ity constant θ, especially if that value was actually based in reliability theory. This
measure of collaboration could then be used as a factor in SoS interoperability.
Information entropy by itself is more useful for understanding the uncertainty of a
campaign, of both the information known about the mission status and of the decision-
making required during an operation [95]. Because this goes into the cognitive realm,
it may be useful in the later measuring of semantic interoperability but is beyond the
scope of this research.
cij(t) = 1− e−θt, t ≥ 0 (12)
3.5 Graph and Network Theories
Whenever one considers a network of interfacing systems, it is intuitive to depict it
as systems connected by links, in the form of a mathematical graph. This section will
survey basic graph theory and summarize existing properties of graphs that could be
leveraged to measure interoperability. Graph theory also leads directly to network
analysis, which is the practical application of the mathematical theory.
3.5.1 Graph Theory
A graph G consists of n vertices v and m edges e, where the systems are the vertices
and the connections between them the edges [54]. A vertex u is adjacent to vertex
v if they are joined by an edge. The edges can have directions, making the graph a
directed graph or digraph, and the directed edge with a head and tail is called an arc.
Two or more arcs with the same head and tail are called multi-arcs. Edges can also
have weight. Figure 16 shows a digraph, where the set of vertices V = u, v, w and
the set of edges, in this case arcs, is E = a, b, c, d, f, g, h, k. There are two multi-arcs
in this digraph, a, b and f, h. There are three self-loops, a, b, and k.
Graphs can be also be described using an adjacency matrix A, which is a square
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Figure 16: A digraph with self-loops and multi-arcs. Reproduced from [54]
matrix that identifies arcs aij from vertex i to vertex j [21]. Adjacency matrices are
populated by 0 and 1, where aij = 1 if an arc from i to j exists in graph G, and aij = 0
if the arc does not exist. The adjacency matrix of the previous digraph example is








Additional matrices that describe graphs are the incidence matrix (B) and the
reachability matrix (R). If a graph has n vertices and m arcs, the incidence matrix
B is n×m and is defined in Equation 14.
B = [bij] and

bij = 1 if xi is the initial vertex of arc aj
bij = −1 if xi is the final vertex of arc aj
bij = 0 if xi is not a terminal vertex of arc aj or if aj is a loop
(14)
The degree or valence of each vertex, deg(v), is the number of proper edges incident
on v plus twice the number of self-loops. Vertices in digraphs will have both an
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indegree and an outdegree; self-loops count towards one of each. For example, the
indegree of vertex u in the example is 3, and the indegree of v is 4. The outdegree of
w is 3. The degree matrix K is a diagonal n × n matrix, with kii populated by the
degree of vertex i. For digraphs, the matrix can be split into two diagonal matrices,
Kin and Kout.
The Laplacian matrix Q of a graph G is a combination of the adjacency matrix
A and the diagonal matrix of degrees D, as shown in Equation 15. The Laplacian
Spectrum is the list of eigenvalues of Q [141]. The Laplacian and its applications will
be explored in greater detail in the next section.
Q = D−A (15)
Reachability describes whether a path can be made from one vertex to another
vertex by moving along arcs and through vertices. It shows which vertices are con-
nected to others in the graph by multiple steps. It is similar to taking multiple airline
flights in order to get to a city that is not directly connected to the origin city. The
reachability matrix (R) is n× n, and the reaching matrix (Q = Rt) is the transpose
of (R), and is also n× n.
There are many other ways to describe graphs, including connectivity, centrality,
distance, and robustness, but what will be most applicable to connected systems
transferring resources may be found in sub-fields of graph theory.
3.5.2 Network Analysis and Spectral Graph Theory
Network theory concerns itself with the study of graphs as representations of asym-
metric relationships between discrete objects. Examples of networks include the In-
ternet, gene regulatory networks, and social networks (real-world as well as virtual).
Network theory has been leveraged to study many operations, economics, logistics,
sociological, and other problems. It is also useful for measuring network robustness
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[103].
A weighted adjacency matrix Aw is created by assigning an individual weight to
each edge [17]. The strength of the edge between vertices i and j is given by the
entry awij. A value of 0 means no edge between i and j. In most cases, there is cor-
relation between the edge weight awij and the degree of the end vertices ki, kj. This
measurement could be useful for measuring interoperability; if system pair interop-
erability populates an n × n matrix, it would essentially be a weighted adjacency
matrix. Network theory should be considered when developing a measurement of SoS
interoperability.
The normal matrix N can be created by dividing the elements of the adjacency
matrix by the degree of the node: N = K−1A, so that nij = aij/ki. This is also a
measure of the probability of passing directly from node i to one of its neighbors, and
therefore the normal matrix is also called the transition matrix. By construction, and
for probability to hold, the sum of entries along a row equals 1.
The Laplacian Spectrum, mentioned above, is part of a subset of graph theory
called Spectral Graph Theory. Spectral characteristics of graphs are those derived
from the study of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the graph [6]. In 2004, Cares [18]
presented an Information Age Combat Model (IACM) for the purpose of modeling
distributed, networked warfare. He proposed the IACM should have the mathematical
structure of a network, with nodes connected by links. Cares also notably specified
that links are not necessarily IT connections between nodes, but are the operative
interactions between nodes, a view that is echoed by this author for the study of
interoperability. Cares provides the following examples of a link:






It is also pointed out that the combat network is a combinatorial problem; a
network of n systems has a very large number of sub-networks that could be created
from an n × n matrix is 2(N2). Fortunately, adjacency matrices created by combat
networks or similarly structured systems of systems are sparse matrices, meaning the
adjacency matrix is primarily populated by zeros. This also alleviates the data storage
issue encountered when trying to store large quantities of data in matrix form, and
commonly used languages including MATLAB and Python have built-in functions to
address sparse matrices.
The eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the adjacency matrix can be calculated to
glean useful information about the network. Eigenvalues are the numbers, denoted
by λ, such that Ax = λx has a nonzero solution vector. The spectrum (not to be
confused with the Laplacian spectrum, because the current matrix under study is
the adjacency matrix, A) is “the list of distinct eigenvalues with their multiplicities





[141]. The principal component of a
matrix is its largest eigenvalue and the associated eigenvector.
The Perron-Frobenius theorem applies to sparse, non-negative matrices, a cat-
egory containing the weighted adjacency matrices used in the IACM. Many types
of matrices in real-world engineering problems also fit the criteria for applying this
theorem, including the steady-state behavior of Markov Chains, power control in
wireless networks, economic models, population growth models, and Internet search
algorithms including PageRank [110].
According to the Perron-Frobenius theorem, for a real, square, irreducible matrix
with non-negative entries, there exists at least one positive real eigenvalue that is
the maximum of the absolute values of the eigenvalues of A. The Perron-Frobenius
Eigenvalue (PFE) is also known as the spectral radius ρ(A) of the adjacency matrix.
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While the PFE is unique for positive matrices, there may be multiple eigenvalues λ
such that |λ| = ρ(A) [110, 18].
The PFE (sometimes written λPFE) essentially measures the centrality of the
nodes of a graph, and can be used to measure any networked effects. For graphs with
unweighted edges (adjacency matrices populated by zeros and ones only), the PFE
can be used to detect cycles. A PFE of 1 indicates the presence of a simple cycle,
where a complete loop is formed with no networked effects. Graphs with no closed
cycles have a PFE of 0. Additional linkages beyond simple feedback loops yield PFEs
greater than 1, and contribute to networked effects [18, 30].
The largest possible value for the PFE of an n× n matrix is n, and occurs when
all entries of the matrix are ones. For example, for the 3×3 graph shown in Equation







In order to make the PFE meaningful to many adjacency matrices, it is necessary
to normalize it by the size of the network. This value, the Coefficient of Networked
Effects (CNE), is calculated by dividing by the number of systems in the SoS [18, 6,
40], and is shown in Equation 17. For example, if there is one system of each type
in an SoS, a 4-system network will divide the PFE by 4, yielding a maximum CNE
of 1. If there are 4 system types but two of one system, the maximum CNE would
be 4/5, or 0.8. The resulting ranges for the PFE and the CNE are from 0 (for an
empty adjacency matrix) to n and 0 to 1, respectively. A note: it is easy to store the
force structure data in a form usable for CNE calculations by creating a 1× n vector
and populating the i(th) entry with the number of systems of type i included in the







As mentioned previously, real-world networks are often sparse. For weighted ad-
jacency matrices that hold information about the edges, the entries will be between 0
and 1. Examples of unweighted combat matrices are shown in Figures 17, 18, and 19
to illustrate a range of PFE and CNE values. Cares instructs that complex networks
should have a CNE between 0.1 and 0.25, but that true networked effects are unlikely
to occur in networks with n < 50.

1 2 3
1 0 1 0
2 0 0 1
3 0 0 0




Figure 17: A network with no cycles. λPFE = 0 [18]

1 2 3 4
1 0 1 0 0
2 0 0 1 0
3 0 0 0 1









Figure 18: A network with a simple cycle. λPFE = 1 [18]

1 2 3 4 5
1 0 1 1 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 0
3 0 0 0 1 0
4 0 0 0 0 1









Figure 19: A network with more complex linkages. λPFE = 1.35 [18]
3.5.3 Additional Spectral Network Analyses
As mentioned and demonstrated above, there are many metrics that can be calculated
as part of a network analysis. Two that bear highlighting in more depth are graph
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energy and algebraic connectivity.
Graph Energy Beginning in the 1940s, the energy of a graph was studied in a
chemical context, as a method for finding approximate solutions of the Schrödinger
equation of a class of organic molecules, conjugated hydrocarbons. These molecules’
chemical bond structure could be represented by an adjacency matrix, which was
used to calculate the total π-electron energy of the electrons, Eπ, where the individual
energy levels Ej of the electrons corresponded to the eigenvalues λj of the graph G by
the equation Ej = α + βλj where j = 1, 2, . . . , n for n vertices corresponding to the
carbon-atom skeleton of the molecule [86].
In the 1970s, Gutman [56] realized that energy could be calculated for all graphs,
not just those depicting molecular structure. Gutman defined the following: If G is a
graph on n vertices and λ1, λ2, . . . λn are its eigenvalues, then the energy of G is the
sum of the absolute value of its eigenvalues, as shown in Equation 18:




Graphs with E < n are called hypoenergetic and graphs for which E ≥ n are called
non-hypoenergetic. A hyperenergetic graph is one that has an energy greater than
the complete graph on the same number of vertices. Most applications for graph
energy seem to be preoccupied with unweighted graphs [57], and their direct appli-
cation to the study of interoperability is not clear. This is a potential area for future
exploration, but is not recommended to be incorporated to the methodology.
Algebraic Connectivity Because the study of graphs concerns nodes and their
connections, or edges, there are many measures of connectivity, e.g. vertex- and edge-
connectivity, denoted v(G) and e(G), respectively. In general, connectivity measures
the minimum number of elements (nodes or edges) that need to be removed to dis-
connect nodes from each other. A graph with maximum connectivity will be the least
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vulnerable to removal of nodes and edges, and thus can provide valuable information
about the robustness of a graph [100, 142].
The algebraic connectivity a(G) of a graph is calculated by calculating the spec-
trum of the Laplacian matrix of G. Then, a(G) is the second-smallest eigenvalue,
and is greater than 0 if and only if G is connected [2, 43, 55]. Algebraic connectivity
is dependent on the number of nodes and how those nodes are connected. A larger
graph (N → ∞) results in larger algebraic connectivity [67] and higher robustness,
but also results in increased costs. A study in robustness might run parallel to an
investigation of interoperability, but like graph energy, will not be pursued for the
present methodology under construction.
3.5.4 Concluding Remarks on Graph and Network Theory
Ultimately, graph theory is a rich mathematical field of study, and many metrics
already exist that could provide much information about the networks being studied
as architecture alternatives. These properties of nodes and edges can be readily found
in the literature. However, without some underlying information behind the values
of the edges, these measurements are not of much use to the study of interoperability
of an SoS. One expected contribution of this research is a means to calculate the
interoperability between system pairs, which would give quantitative meaning to the
values of edges. Reliability theory is applicable at the scope of system pairs, but
network analysis will prove valuable when studying the interoperability of a networked
SoS. The synthesis of these two concepts into a methodology and a sample problem
for consideration will be presented in the next chapter.
66
CHAPTER IV
ARTEMIS: A METHODOLOGY FOR MEASURING
INTEROPERABILITY
4.1 Methodology Overview
Reliability theory, network theory, and modeling and simulation form a set of tools
for measuring interoperability. These tools are adapted and synthesized to form a
methodology called ARTEMIS: the Architectural Resource Transfer and Exchange
Measurement of Interoperability for Systems of Systems. This methodology was de-
veloped based on the characteristics of a good metric presented in Chapter 2, and
incorporates system pair interoperability, system of systems interoperability, and en-
ables measurement of network metrics using interoperability inputs. ARTEMIS allows
decision makers to evaluate and compare SoS architecture alternatives’ interoperabil-
ity at several levels:
• The interoperability of system pairs, Θij
– for a single method of resource transfer (incorporating operational re-
quirements)
– for multiple methods of resource transfer (incorporating system capabil-
ity and redundancy)
• The interoperability of a SoS collaborating on a single resource exchange
(incorporating system interfaces and which systems are included in the SoS)
– Resource Transfer Interoperability Matrix (RTIM)
– Resource Transfer Interoperability (IResource)
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• The interoperability of a SoS performing multiple exchanges
– System of Systems Interoperability Matrix (SSIM)
– System of Systems Interoperability (ISoS)
The ARTEMIS methodology is summarized in Figure 20. Some helpful terminol-
ogy is below:
Resource: Information exchange (in the form of coordinates, commands, images,
videos, or other data) or another type of materiel, service, or delivery of goods.
Transfer: Directional transmission of a resource from one system to another.
Exchange: Collaborative transfer of a resource involving multiple systems.
Each step of ARTEMIS will be explored in greater detail in the next few chap-
ters. In the next section, the experiments used to test each step will be developed
and alternative calculations presented. Each chapter will contain the associated re-
search questions and hypotheses that will be used to test the methodology. For the
measurements of SoS interoperability, a canonical problem is defined and modeled,
as explained below in Section 4.2.
4.1.1 Using the Required Steps to Design Tests and Experiments
Many alternatives exist to populate each step of ARTEMIS. The options are out-
lined below and then placed into a matrix of alternatives where each row is a step
in the methodology. The leftmost column contains the scope of each step of the
methodology, and the alternative options are listed in no particular order in columns
to the right. Each row will require experiments to determine the most appropriate
approach to take to obtaining ARTEMIS products. At the end of the methodology
development and testing, each chosen method will be highlighted and the insufficient
methods eliminated.
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Figure 20: The ARTEMIS Methodology
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First, at the system pair level, interoperability must be measured for a single
means of transfer and for multiple methods of transferring a resource. Should an
existing model (as presented in Section 2.5) be used to measure system pair interac-
tion, or is another method necessary? Using a new reliability-based measurement is
proposed, and then explored in Chapter 5. The potential alternatives are using an
existing scale such as LISI or the one used by ARCNET, or taking a similarity-based
measurement like Ford. When multiple means of transferring a single type of resource
are considered, the designer must choose which of two or more values to choose. In
this case, they could choose the maximum value, the minimum (as LISI does), an
average, or match the physics of the problem using a reliability study. These options
populate the first and second rows of the matrix of alternatives, shown in Figure 21.
Rather than conduct experiments using modeling and simulation, Chapter 5 will
present the reasoning and mathematical calculations required to conduct a system
pair interoperability measurement using reliability concepts. It will address the inputs
required to perform the analysis, and explain why a reliability-based measurement is
appropriate.
Once a satisfactory system pair measurement has been taken for each possible
system-pair-resource combination, the appropriate way to develop a single method
for system of systems interoperability must be determined. This includes several
intermediate steps, where matrices are formed to store the system pair interoperability
values, and single values of SoS interoperability are calculated for each resource type.
When considering a single resource type, a single value could be obtained by taking
the average of all the interoperabilities of the system pairs transmitting that resource;
the maximum or the minimum could also be taken. Chapter 6 will also present the
hypothesis that series reliability can be used. These deterministic options will be
calculated for an architecture and compared against a value obtained by modeling

































































Figure 21: Matrix of Methodology Alternatives
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adjacency matrix and to obtain a value of overall SoS interoperability in Chapters
7 and 8. Finally, a method to capture the networked effects due to the structure of
the system of systems will be considered in a separate experiment. The methodology
options are presented in the bottom three rows of Figure 21.
Each of the 5 rows in the matrix of alternatives corresponds to an experiment
and finally a block in the methodology. Together, these steps will form a way to
measure interoperability at the same time as other SoS metrics such as performance,
complexity, robustness, and cost, and will support decision making. A summary
notional methodology is shown in Figure 22.
Figure 22: Building the ARTEMIS Methodology to Support Decision Making
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4.1.2 The Context of ARTEMIS within Design and Decision-Making
ARTEMIS itself is not a stand-alone design methodology, and it makes no rulings
about which interoperability alternative is the “best”. It can actually be viewed as
part of the top-down design and decision support process [90] and as a nested systems
engineering vee, such as was shown in Figure 4 from Section 2.2.3. After the overall
Problem Formulation, where operational tasks, requirements, and participatory sys-
tems are introduced, the Metrics Derivation process would yield interoperability as
a metric of interest. When generating architecture alternatives, the designers would
ensure that all relevant information necessary to study interoperability is included
in the architecture descriptions. Alternative Evaluation is where modeling and sim-
ulation takes place; for example, in ARCHITECT, this includes a very high level
filtering model, RAAM; a complexity evaluation and real options analysis, ARC-VM;
and other metrics identified in the earlier step. ARCNET is part of ARC-VM, and
takes as an input a matrix identical in form to the System of Systems Interoperability
Matrix, which is the third ARTEMIS product. As mentioned above, ARTEMIS is
nested within this evaluation step, and mirrors the design process, stopping short of
decision making, but offering valuable information that can inform decision-makers
when taken in the context of other SoS metrics. This relationship is depicted in
Figure 23.
Metric vs. Measure vs. Measurement vs. Methodology At this point, ter-
minology must be defined to clarify exactly what is being presented at each point
in the design process. The following terms are used somewhat interchangeably in
systems engineering, but have subtle differences. Their proper usage can assist in
distinguishing what exactly is meant when speaking of products of a process versus
the process itself.



















Figure 23: ARTEMIS within Design and Decision-Making
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between neighboring points for a given set” [140, 10]. In general engineering usage, a
metric is “a system of related measures that facilitates the quantification of some par-
ticular characteristic” [140]. By this definition, the interoperability of an architecture
is a metric of that architecture.
If a metric is a system of related measures, what is meant by a measure? For
this research, a measure will be treated as the systematic process of assigning a
number to the characteristic under study. In this case, it can be used interchangeably
with measurement. Measurement theory has been studied for the past century, with
Stevens setting forth the now widely recognized types of scales in 1946 [128]. These
scales are described below [10, 128, 22].
Nominal Scale The most unrestricted assignment of values, words, or letters, which
are used only as labels or type numbers. Most qualitative interoperability mod-
els that consist of levels use the nominal scale. Other examples include the
numbering of sports uniforms or categories for classification. Determination of
equality.
Ordinal Scale Used to rank objects relative to one another. Examples include finish
places in a foot race (first, second, third) or ratings of “poor”, “fair”, “good”.
Determination of greater or less.
Interval Scale Focused on determining the degree of difference (interval) between
values, but not the ratio between them. Zero is set arbitrarily or for convenience,
as in the Fahrenheit or Celsius temperature scales. Negative values are allowed.
Ratio Scale The ratio scale is the most common in the physical sciences and engi-
neering. All types of statistical measures, such as mean, mode, variance, etc.
are applicable to the ratio scale. An absolute zero exists, and ratios such as A
is two times B are meaningful, whereas something like Player 8 is two times
Player 4.
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By setting forth these definitions, an additional guideline beyond quantitative
is added to the desired interoperability metric characteristics set forth in Section
2.6. Because such a metric must capture the quantification of a characteristic of an
architecture relative to another alternative, the nominal and ordinal scales are not
appropriate. Nor is the interval scale, where an arbitrary zero and negative values of
interoperability are not intuitive. The framework of reliability theory and probability
has already been presented, and therefore the same ratio scale set between 0 and 1
will be appropriate for interoperability.
Finally, it is enlightening to distinguish a method from a methodology. For this
research, methodology is a general research strategy, while a method identifies a spe-
cific way of collecting information or calculating a metric. In summary, a need for a
methodology to study interoperability has been identified. ARTEMIS is the method-
ology that outlines the steps necessary to conduct a measurement of interoperability
(system pair, system of systems performance, network structure, etc.). Each step of
ARTEMIS is populated by a recommended method, such as reliability analysis or
network analysis. The products of the calculations of each steps are metrics for that
level of interoperability. The end result is that a measurement of interoperability has
been enabled.
4.2 Testing ARTEMIS with a Small Unmanned Aerial Sys-
tem
Investigation of the ARTEMIS methodology will be separated into three experimen-
tal portions. The first, at the system pair level, will address how to obtain the input
values for the system pair calculations, as well as the nature of the relationship be-
tween the inputs and the effects of relaxing constraints or improving redundancy. The
second part, at the resource exchange level, will focus on modeling and simulation to
obtain the interoperability of the SoS for each resource transfer and to explore the re-
lationship of system pairs that exchange more than one type of resource. The external
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modeling and simulation will also result in an overall interoperability value. The third
portion of ARTEMIS is a network analysis of the SoS’ weighted adjacency matrix,
which will help to identify critical systems and investigate the network’s structure.
These experiments are focused on testing the characteristics of the proposed
methodology, and can not replace a large-scale, industry-grade engineering investiga-
tion. In practice, it is expected that the reliability analysis in part one, the modeling
and simulation in part two, and the network analysis in part three will be conducted
externally; that is, by a dedicated division that has the resources and capabilities
to model the SoS fully and accurately. However, for this research, a simple scenario
must be examined that is feasible to model with some fidelity. The reliability analysis
will be left to users of the ARTEMIS methodology; reliability is an entire field unto
itself. It is assumed that in a real world study, the values populating RTIMs will
be as accurate as possible. Because current aim is to determine whether ARTEMIS
is a valid means of examining SoS interoperability, the main focus will be on the
effects of changing these interoperability inputs, and not on selecting a single value.
The model setup has been presented here to provide a reference for the test problem
scenario. Experimental results presented in the next few chapters will refer back to
this section without needing to explain the scenario as required. The test problem
and its performance modeling will now be explained in detail.
4.2.1 Defining the Scenario
When selecting a test problem, it is necessary to ensure that the canonical scenario
reflects as much as possible of what must be captured on a larger scale. Recall the
list of factors that affect a measurement of interoperability:
• The tasks required to complete a mission
• The performance requirements of those tasks
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• The ability to capture the transfer of any type of resource (not only electronic
data)
• The system capabilities available to transfer those resources
• The quantitative measurement of system pair interoperability
• The effects due to networking systems, such as collaboration, centrality, and
other networked effects
Based on these factors, a test problem will need to have a well defined set of tasks
to complete, given requirements for those tasks, systems designated to perform or col-
laborate on each task, and at least some information about how the systems conduct
those tasks. The ways in which the systems connect should be complicated enough to
exhibit nonlinear behavior characteristic of an SoS. The expected applications of the
ARTEMIS methodology are primarily of — but not limited to — a defense nature.
When drawing from potential networked assets, several missions are well-defined in
publicly available Joint Publications [72, 70, 71, 68]. Of these, a simple mission is
desired, as well as one that has non-classified, internationally available information.
A Search and Rescue (SAR) mission has been chosen, involving a small unmanned
aircraft system (sUAS) searching for a ground target in need of assistance. The 2013
Real World Design Challenge (RWDC) high school engineering competition provided
a scenario as well as detailed background information about on-board sensors, oper-
ations, and ground station components [114]. In this case, “small” refers to the class
of UAVs; a small UAV weighs no more than 55 pounds.
Operational Alternatives In the intended mission scenario provided by the RWDC
documentation, a system of one or more small unmanned aerial vehicles (sUAVs)
equipped with a sensor payload and connected to a ground station must search for an
immobilized child in rugged terrain. The design competition is to minimize both the
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search time and the cost of building and operating the sUAS. For this interoperabil-
ity study, the main focus will be on the connections between systems, and the exact
design and capabilities of the aircraft remain unknown. Assumptions made about
mission time and sensor capability will be outlined in 4.2.2.
The RWDC documentation provides a mission timeline for the operation: follow-
ing a standard mission thread of Find, Identify, Track, and Land, the aircraft is/are
launched and semi-autonomously perform a preset search pattern over the search
area. They must maintain line of sight (LOS) communication with the ground sta-
tion at all times. If a potential target is detected, the sUAV must be maneuvered
to loiter over the target and confirm its identity by redirecting the sensor payload.
Once the target is positively identified, the sUAV may remain loitering to track the
target while continuing to send live video feed to the payload operator at the ground
station. Once a rescue team has arrived at the target’s location, the pilot directs the
sUAV(s) to return to the mission staging area and land.
This mission therefore involves several simple commands to and position feedback
from the aircraft, with a separate data link for sending video to the payload oper-
ator. The RWDC scenario assumes U.S. Standard Atmosphere and Standard Day
conditions, but it is possible that weather or other environmental factors could affect
transmissions. A high level operational view (OV) is shown in Figure 24.
The current interoperability study is not focused on optimizing collaborative ef-
fects (requiring complicated command and control structuring and decision making)
or sensor capability (trading between many or few sensors, high quality or low res-
olution) and therefore the following configuration will be studied: a single sUAV
with a single sensor, connected to one ground station trailer, with one operational
pilot and one sensor payload operator. The safety pilot depicted in the OV will be
eliminated because they are not critical to the main mission thread — they are to
be used in case of emergency and are connected to the flight surfaces of the sUAV.
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Figure 24: sUAS SAR Mission. Reproduced from [114]
The performance of this SoS will be measured in terms of successful commands and
feedback transmissions over the course of a mission, using a range of interoperability
values for the links between systems. The on-board battery charge will be tracked
to determine whether interoperability also has a direct effect on some performance
aspects. More advanced modeling and simulation (M&S) could certainly be used
to examine additional metrics and scenarios and to compare the interoperability of
each. However, the goal here is to identify interoperability trends and how to mea-
sure a single configuration, not to establish which alternative configuration performs
the best. Although the canonical example presented here is simple, it does have a
complex enough communication structure to reveal networked effects (in Chapter 8)
and a sufficient number of resource types and system interfaces to demonstrate the
behavior of system pair interoperability. The configuration to be examined in the
test problem is shown in Figure 25, with systems represented as boxes and interfaces
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as dashed lines. An explanation of the functions and characteristics of the systems


























Feedback 1: UAV Position
Feedback 2: Sensor Orientation
Data: Video File
Figure 25: Test Problem SoS Configuration
4.2.2 Constructing the Model
Now that an operational scenario has been established, an appropriate M&S environ-
ment must be selected. Balestrini-Robinson’s comprehensive assessment [6, p. 49] of








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































environment for this canonical example. Because this problem is not intended to
capture any decision-making processes, an agent-based model would be overly com-
plicated, although higher-fidelity models such as the IACM [18, 30] and DiMA [6] use
agents to model combat systems similar to the current problem. The system is moving
from one state to another, but each state has sub-activities; a Markov Chain or Petri
Net will be insufficient. Because each command to and feedback from the sUAS will
be tracked, and because they occur at discrete intervals, a Discrete Event Simulation
(DES) is used to model the sUAS. This model is supported by the established use of
DES to model similar missions [6, 5]. The primary structure and assumptions of the
model are detailed below, and the pseudocode of the model is included in Appendix
C.
The model will be constructed according to the following assumptions, some of
which are derived from the given scenario, others from the particular needs of an
interoperability study:
Find:
1. The sUAV’s search pattern is preset.
2. There is no collaboration among sUAVs because there is only one aircraft.
3. The sUAV sends its position, sensor orientation, and video data at fixed inter-
vals. This will be a design variable, Feedback Interval, tFeedback.
4. Each attempt to send feedback takes a fixed amount of time. This will be a
design variable, Time Per Attempt, tAttempt.
5. Systems can only send one resource at a time. If multiple resources need to be
sent, they must queue behind the ones ahead of them.
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Identify:
1. After a time tFind chosen randomly using a normal distribution with a mean
of 30 minutes and standard deviation of 5 minutes (300 seconds), the Sensor
Payload Operator will identify a target and the sUAV will be redirected to
investigate.
2. This redirection will consist of one command with new Waypoints and one
command to Pan/Tilt/Zoom.
3. The sUAV will continue to send feedback at its regularly scheduled intervals.
4. The target will be identified as the lost one; there are no false positives, because
the desired performance metric is not the typical one of Time to Complete
Mission.
5. The Sensor Payload Workstation takes approximately 3 minutes to confirm
target identification. This value, tIdentify, is selected using a normal distribution
with a mean and standard deviation of 3 minutes and 45 seconds, respectively.
Track:
1. The sUAV is not required to loiter while a rescue party arrives; tTrack is set to
0.
2. If it were to remain above the target, a chain of commands identical to Identify
would be sent, and feedback would continue to be relayed back down to the
ground station.
Land:
1. The time required for the sUAV to return to land, tLand, is roughly one-half the
time it took to find the target (normal distribution with mean and standard
deviation of tFind/2 and 150 seconds).
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2. The total simulation length tTotal = tFind + tIdentify + tTrack + tLand will not exceed
60 minutes.
General Assumptions:
1. The interoperability value of each system pair will be treated as a probability
of success of that resource transmission between those two systems.
2. To determine the success of a transfer, a number will be randomly chosen from
a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 1. If that number is greater than the
interoperability value of the system pair, the resource transfer fails and must
be repeated until successful.
3. The sUAV has a battery to power its on-board components. This battery is
independent of the propulsion system, even if the propulsion system is electric.
Minimizing tTotal is impossible without knowing details like the velocity of the
sUAV, the propulsion system characteristics, its operating altitude, its search pattern,
the sensor’s exact capability, etc. Therefore, an alternative measure of performance
must be used to see if interoperability affects mission performance in some way. A
solution is found by considering the energy taken by sending each resource, and extra
energy spent by having to repeatedly attempt transmission. The RWDC detailed
background document [114] contains descriptions of each UAV component, including
dimensions, weight, input voltage, and power consumed during operation in terms of
Watts. If the on-board battery voltage and charge are known, then the battery usage
could be tracked over the course of the mission. The values used for the components
are shown in Table 4 and Equation 19 is used to calculate the charge drawn from the
battery.
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Power Equation: P = IV (19)




When implemented in the model, the power drawn P is the given value for that
component; voltage V is the battery’s terminal voltage; and t is the time the com-
ponent is in use, in this case the input variable “Time Per Attempt”. The selected
battery has two cells in series, each with a voltage of approximately 3.7 V for a to-
tal of 7.4 V. An ideal battery with constant terminal voltage over time is assumed.
The charge used during each transmission attempt is subtracted from the remaining
charge, and the Flight Control System and Sensor Payload are assumed to be running
constantly. Their battery use is calculated and subtracted over 10-second intervals.
For this application, typical remote controlled aircraft batteries were surveyed.
Lithium-polymer (LiPo) batteries are relatively lightweight, with better energy den-
sity and max power delivery compared to other battery types [120]. A 2-cell LiPo
battery with a 2000 mAh capacity was selected for the model; ultimately, the over-
all capacity is not as important as how much charge was used relative to the other
alternatives. The behavior of the battery will be discussed further in Chapter 7.
4.2.3 Gathering the Data
The model is split into two parts; one Python script runs the DES, while another con-
ducts simpler deterministic calculations to compare to the simulation results. The
configuration being modeled has 8 systems and 17 links between systems. Each of
these 17 links will have their interoperability value varied. The accuracy of the value
is not of concern; rather, the goal is to compare the behavior of the SoS while com-
pleting the mission to metrics derived from a network analysis of its structure, as
well as to expected trends. Additionally, to understand the effect of interoperabil-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tAttempt and tFeedback. The inputs and their ranges are listed in Table 5. TRX is a
common abbreviation for “transceiver”. Similarly, RX represents “receiver” and TX
“transmitter”. The interoperability inputs ΘResourcei,j are dimensionless; their minimum
value was limited to 0.2 (instead of their theoretical minimum of zero) because such
low interoperability values are unlikely to be encountered in an actual operation and
because they caused the simulation to fail.
Design of Experiments The focus of this experiment is to
• determine the relationship of the input interoperabilities ΘResourcei,j to output
products Ii,j, IResource, and ISoS, supporting or disproving the hypothesis that a
series model of reliability can be applied
• determine the effects of the input variables on a measure of performance; in this
case, battery usage during the mission
• check the model outputs against various manipulations of the inputs (average,
product, maximum, minimum) to see if there are simple mathematical rela-
tionships that would allow engineers to determine SoS interoperability without
requiring detailed M&S
These goals, as well as run time of one case and the ranges of the input variables,
will determine which type of experimental design is selected. After some test runs, it
was determined that the model runs quickly enough (less than 10 seconds per run)
that time and computing power is not an obstacle. A response surface model will
not need to be fitted to the data [99], which allows freedom of selection of design of
experiments. Because of this, and because the number of inputs is large, interaction
terms will not be included.
To test the edges of the design space, especially of the bounds on tFeedback and
tAttempt, a Box-Behnken Design (BBD) was selected [118]. Given the 17 inputs, 703
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Table 5: Inputs for a DES of a small UAS
Variable Name Symbol and Description




TimePerAttempt tAttempt: The time required for each transmission
attempt (seconds).
[0.5,50]
FeedbackInterval tFeedback: The time between required feedback
transmissions (e.g. send a position update every
15 seconds) (seconds).
[5-60]
c1PW Θc1PW,CDGT (Pilot Workstation, Waypoints,
Comm. Datalink Ground TRX)
[0.2,1]
c1CDGT Θc1CDGT,CDUT (Comm. Datalink Ground TRX,
Waypoints, Comm. Datalink UAV TRX)
[0.2,1]
c2CDGT Θc2CDGT,CDUT (Comm. Datalink Ground TRX,
Pan/Tilt/Zoom, Comm. Datalink UAV TRX)
[0.2,1]
f1CDGT Θf1CDGT,PW (Comm. Datalink Ground TRX, UAV
Position, Pilot Workstation)
[0.2,1]
f2CDGT Θf2CDGT,SPW (Comm. Datalink Ground TRX, Sen-
sor Orientation, Sensor Payload Workstation)
[0.2,1]
c1CDUT Θc1CDUT,FCS (Comm. Datalink UAV TRX, Way-
points, Flight Control System)
[0.2,1]
c2CDUT Θc2CDUT,FCS (Comm. Datalink UAV TRX,
Pan/Tilt/Zoom, Flight Control System)
[0.2,1]
f1CDUT Θf1CDUT,CDGT (Comm. Datalink UAV TRX, UAV
Position, Comm. Datalink Ground TRX)
[0.2,1]
f2CDUT Θf2CDUT,CDGT (Comm. Datalink UAV TRX, Sensor
Orientation, Comm. Datalink Ground TRX)
[0.2,1]
c2FCS Θc2FCS,SP (Flight Control System, Pan/Tilt/Zoom,
Sensor Payload)
[0.2,1]
f1FCS Θf1FCS,CDUT (Flight Control System, UAV Posi-
tion, Comm. Datalink UAV TRX)
[0.2,1]
f2FCS Θf2FCS,CDUT (Flight Control System, Sensor Orien-
tation, Comm. Datalink UAV TRX)
[0.2,1]
f2SP Θf2SP,FCS (Sensor Payload, Sensor Orientation,
Flight Control System)
[0.2,1]
d1SP Θd1SP,V DUT (Sensor Payload, Video, Video
Datalink UAV TX)
[0.2,1]
d1VDUT Θd1V DUT,V DGR (Video Datalink UAV TX, Video,
Video Datalink Ground RX)
[0.2,1]
d1VDGR Θd1V DGR,SPW (Video Datalink Ground RX, Video,
Sensor Payload Workstation)
[0.2,1]
c2SPW Θc2SPW,CDGT (Sensor Payload Workstation,
Pan/Tilt/Zoom, Comm. Datalink Ground TRX)
[0.2,1]
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unique cases were generated. Due to the stochasticity of the model (relying on ran-
domly generated numbers for both the find/identify/track/land times and the proba-
bility of successful transmission), each unique case was repeated 50 times. To explore
the entire design space, a Latin Hypercube Design (LHC) was also generated. This
input block consists of 1,000 unique cases, also repeated 50 times each, for a total of
85,150 cases. Following simulation, the blocks were then collapsed back in to 1703
points by taking the mean of the values of each variable. The points used for analysis
are appended along with a block version of the model code in Appendix C. The
results will be discussed as they are considered in each of the next chapters.













Figure 26: A Notional Scatter Plot of Modeling and Simulation Data
In most cases, the data will be plotted as a two-dimensional scatter plot, where a
point on the chart corresponds to a single case. The y-axis and x-axis will be labeled
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with either an input value, an output, or a calculation using inputs that is being
compared to a modeling output. In the case of comparing a calculation of inputs
to a modeling output, the goal is to match the calculation to the output. A perfect
match would look like a straight line with slope equal to 1 and intercept equal to 0.
Most plots will be in the range of 0 to 1, with the battery life the only exception. A
notional scatter plot is shown in Figure 26.
The purpose of comparing a deterministic calculation to a simulated output is
to see whether modeling and simulation can be bypassed in the methodology. By
finding a close relationship among the inputs, the computational effort and cost of
creating a detailed stochastic model such as a discrete event simulation or an agent
based model can be spared. A poor match, where the calculation does not match
the output at all, is shown on the left of Figure 27. The points are spread across the
chart area with no clear trend. A good match — one that could be used to eliminate
the modeling required to obtain the output — is shown on the right, where the data
points lie close to the ideal line of y = x.
There are also several symbols and colors to note when looking at the actual data
in the next few chapters.
• Box-Behnken data points are marked using a box: 2
• Latin Hypercube points are marked using a solid bullet: •
• The % Battery Remaining metric of performance is color-coded according to
generally accepted discharge thresholds. Batteries often come rated to 80%
depth of discharge; in other words, discharging a rechargeable battery past 20%
remaining capacity can limit the life of the battery. In the experimental results,
points with less than 20% are shaded orange, and with less than 0% are shaded
red.
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INTEROPERABILITY OF SYSTEM PAIRS
EXCHANGING A RESOURCE
The first step of the ARTEMIS methodology begins with a quantitative measurement
of system pair interoperability. As reviewed in Chapter 2, many models exist for the
measurement of system pair interoperability. However, most are qualitative, and
reflect either adherence to set standards or a position along a fixed scale of qualities,
exemplified by LISI. Although mathematical methods have been proposed, such as
Ford’s state characteristics, they calculate the similarity of two systems, and thus
represent a percentage of compatibility. Such methods do not reflect the quality of the
connection. Observation 1 noted that a new quantitative means of measuring system
pair interoperability should be developed. Research Question 1 led to a survey of
suitable frameworks, of which reliability was chosen for system pair interoperability.
This leads to the induction that although the use of reliability as the “best” option
cannot be proven or disproven, its appropriateness rests on the intuitive mirroring of
the physical process and the strength and depth of the field behind it.
Because the interoperability of two systems and the reliability of a process share
key characteristics, reliability theory can be used to measure system pair interoperabil-
ity. Appropriate application of redundancy can capture backup methods of resource
transfer.
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5.1 Interoperability of a Single Method of Exchange
For this new measurement, inspiration was drawn from communication theory and
reliability theory, a brief overview of which was presented in Chapter 3. When trans-
ferring a resource between two systems, consider the following. First, how well is the
resource transferred? By examining the transmission quality of the resource traveling
from the source system through the environment, a value can be calculated or as-
signed, called the Reliability of Transmission, Θm. Once the resource has arrived
at its destination, does it have to be manipulated in any way in order to be used? It
therefore has some Probability of Translation, Pl. If the resource does need to be
manipulated, how well is that translation conducted? This value is the Quality of
Translation, τq. These values are then combined to generate a value of interoper-
ability between system pairs for a resource using a certain method of transfer. The
ability to transfer a resource via two or more methods is discussed in the next section.
The values for reliability of transmission and translation are derived from opera-
tional requirements and system capabilities. Recall Figure 4, which showed that the
systems engineering process begins with a Problem Formulation and Metrics Deriva-
tion. During Problem Formulation, the operational requirements for the mission are
set. These requirements will be the basis for the interoperability measurements, and
it is vital to choose them carefully and understand their impact on the development
of the SoS [89]. In some cases, basic requirements will be defined when a gap in
capabilities is identified and the acquisition process begins. Additionally, the NR-
KPPs mentioned in Section 2.2.1 should provide measurable information exchange
requirements in the form of thresholds of timeliness, accuracy, completeness, etc.
[76]. A notional example provided in Koester et al. is adapted in Table 6. In this
case, the sending system and receiving systems are designated, and the resources have
requirements of < 10 seconds and < 15 seconds, respectively.
































































































































































































































































































































Pl, and τq is outside the scope of this research; they are inputs to the ARTEMIS
methodology. Part of the process should be a reliability-based analysis that assesses
the performance of system links under potential operating conditions. For example,
the two systems in Table 6 could be studied in operation over time to establish their
reliability for each resource exchange. If standards ensure that the data never has to
be manipulated, then Θl will equal 1, and the interoperability of the system pair for
that resource and that method of exchange (LAN, etc.) will depend on the reliability
of transmission, Θm.
If experimental data is not available to calculate these input values, then a relevant
requirements threshold relative to the requirements objective could be used as the
interoperability value. For example, if a transfer should be complete in less than 10
seconds, but 15 seconds is the threshold for an acceptable transfer, then at 10 seconds
the transfer could be 66.66% complete, for a Θm = 0.66. It is expected that a library
of values specific to system pairs transmitting certain resources via certain methods
could be compiled to enable automation of Θi,j calculations for different architectures.
These input values, Θm, Pl, and τq, must be calculated for every resource exchange
in the operational scenario, for every system pair, and for every means of transferring
that resource available to the system pair. A diagram showing this breakdown with
some notional systems, resources, and methods is shown in Figure 28.
Once the input values have been obtained, they must be combined into a mean-
ingful interoperability value that describes the link between system pairs. A re-
liability block diagram showing transmission and translation for a single exchange
option between System 1 and System 2 is shown in Figure 29. The reliability of
translation, Θl, is calculated using probability. If the set of outcomes is A: not
translating, or 1 − Pl, and B: translating and doing it correctly, or Plτq, then
P (A or B) = P (A) + P (B) − P (A and B). This is shown in Equation 21. The
reliability of translation can have a maximum value of 1 (if Pl = 0) and a minimum
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Figure 28: The Decomposition of Θmethodij
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Table 7: The Effects of Pl on Θl
Pl Plτq + (1− Pl) Θl
0 (0)(0.9) + (1− 0) 1
0.5 (0.5)(0.9) + (1− 0.5) 0.95
0.75 (0.75)(0.9) + (1− 0.75) 0.925
1 (1)(0.9) + (1− 1) 0.9
value of τq (if Pl = 1). An example of the effect of probability of translation on Θl
is provided in Table 7, where τq is fixed at 0.9 (translation quality depends on the
system receiving the resource, and should not change with probability of translation).
Figure 29: Transmission and Translation
Θl = Plτq + (1− Pl) (21)
To further understand the relationship of Pl and τq, refer to Figures 30 and 31. In
Figure 30, by varying Pl and τq and plotting the resulting value of Θl on the vertical
axis, it is seen that there is a region of consistently high Θl in the top right corner.
While not quite perfect (a value of Θl = 1 being perfectly translated/translatable),
this region allows a small sacrifice in the value of either Pl or τq without too much drop
in Θl. The goal is to minimize Pl (the less frequently a resource must be translated, the
better) and to maximize τq (when translation is necessary, do it as well as possible).
Figure 31 provides a different view, where Θl is increasing as τq increases and Pl
decreases. In the top left corner, reliability of translation stays constant as sacrifices
in either input are made. These plots show that it is better to have two good values
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(Pl close to 0, τq close to 1) rather than sacrificing either for the sake of having a
perfect value of probability or quality of translation. For a given value of Θl, a contour
similar to a Pareto front exists. Designers could play with the hardware, software, or
other specifications of systems if they had a required minimum value of Θl.
Figure 30: The Behavior of Θl
Finally, a value of interoperability for each available method is calculated by mul-
tiplying the reliability of transmission and reliability of translation. Equation 6 is
applied, resulting in Equation 22. This illustrates the concept of reliability in series,
where every component in a process must operate successfully in order for the pro-
cess to be successful. A system pair’s interoperability is determined by how well it
transmits a resource and how well it is able to translate that resource for use. When
translate is used in this context, it refers to the syntax or the physical form of the re-
source, and not whether the receiving system is able to process it successfully. Recall
the dimensions of interoperability; use after translation falls in the realm of semantic
interoperability, which is beyond the scope of this thesis’s guidelines.
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Figure 31: The Contours of Θl
Θ12 = ΘmΘl (22)
Also bear in mind that Θresourceij is directional; it is for a single method of trans-
ferring a resource from System i to System j. A transfer of the same resource from
System j to System i may have a different value, depending on its ability to transmit
the resource and whether translation is required. A different method of transfer will
probably also vary in transmission or translation reliability.
In summary, the measurement of system pairs interoperability when exchanging
a resource using a single means of transfer is the first step of the ARTEMIS method-
ology. Figure 32 provides a context for the necessary inputs for this measurement,
the synthesis of those inputs, and the outputs of the system pair measurement.
5.2 Interoperability of Multiple Methods of Exchange
In the previous section, the interoperability of a system pair transferring one resource
using one transmission method was examined. However, it is frequently the case that
more than one means of transfer will be available. For example, a person using a
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Figure 32: Step 1 of the ARTEMIS Methodology: Measuring System Pair Interop-
erability
laptop computer could send a file to another using a wireless connection, a Local
Area Network (LAN), by loading it onto a USB stick, burning it onto a CD, or some
other means. In this case, the Θij,method of each method must be obtained.
After calculating these values, a single value Θresourceij is calculated for that type
of resource exchange. This calculation uses the appropriate properties of redundancy,
such as full active redundancy (as shown previously in Equation 7), cold standby re-
dundancy, or an appropriate calculation that is representative of the actual physical
situation. Having multiple methods of resource exchange available will increase in-
teroperability, as will relaxing requirements. For example, two computers exchanging
a file only over a local network will have a lower interoperability score than two com-
puters exchanging a file over the local network but with a backup method of sending
the file on USB.
The study of redundancy is well established within reliability theory. It is not
the place of this research to provide a comprehensive overview, or make claims about
the best way to implement redundancy in every potential application. However, a
concrete example will now be provided.
A Close Air Support (CAS) mission involves fixed wing aircraft or helicopters
being deployed to protect friendly ground forces that are under attack. A successful
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CAS mission requires detailed integration of command and control (C2), well-trained
personnel, streamlined procedures, and air superiority. Specifically, CAS requires
a “dependable, interoperable, and secure communications architecture to exercise
control” [71]. An example of the complex connectivity of CAS systems is shown in
Figure 33.
This example will focus on one link in this web, between the Joint Tactical Air
Controller (JTAC) and the attack aircraft. The final set of instructions before putting
weapon on target is called the 9-line; it gives vital target information including coor-
dinates, distance, elevation, and description, as well as the initial attack coordinates
and heading and location of friendly forces. Until recent advances in data-link tech-
nology, the information in the 9-line has been delivered via voice communications
over the radio. A sample exchange, taken from Joint Publication 3-09.3, p. V-24, is
below:
JTAC: “Hog 11, this is A3C, this will be a Type 2 control, advise when
ready for 9-line.”
Attack Aircraft: “A3C, Hog 11 ready to copy.”
JTAC: “MAZDA, 360 right, 9.9, 450, T-80 dug in, NB 8652342745, NONE,
South 900, troops in contact. Egress east to CHEVY. Advise when ready
for remarks.”
Attack Aircraft: “Ready to copy remarks.”
JTAC: “Request one GBU-31, Final attack heading 300-345.”
The second line from JTAC to aircraft is a long series of letters and numbers, each
carrying information that could mean life or death for troops on the ground. The
reliability of this information transfer must be very high, indicating timeliness and
accuracy. A digital image of the target or target coordinates plugged directly into
the computer would provide a redundant means of sending the 9-line data, increasing
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Figure 33: Connectivity of CAS systems. Reproduced from [71]
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the interoperability of the JTAC and attack aircraft. As of 2010, a completely digital
9-line did not exist, although the 9-line could be supplemented with digital targeting
messages, including elevation data, and digital text messages that overlay the target
on the flight display [16]. This type of problem, where an additional method (co-
ordinates sent straight to the flight computer) would be used alongside the original
method (voice commands over the radio), is an example of full active redundancy;
the calculation proceeds as follows.
Assume that reliability values have been found for three combinations of 9-line
transmission:
• Voice transmission only
• Data in the form of an image overlay sent directly to the aircraft computer
• Both an image overlay and voice transmission
Additionally, reliability with a time cap of 5 minutes has been compared with a more
leisurely 10 minutes. These time frames could be derived from NR-KPP objectives
and thresholds, respectively. These values are shown in Table 8. First, Θm for voice
communications reflects that minimal improvement occurs when relaxing the time
requirements. Voice communications are very reliable, but perhaps the additional
time would allow the repetition of commands that were lost in radio crackle the first
time, or additional notes to increase situational awareness. The Θl values reflect
that the pilots are speaking the same coded language, and do not need to decipher
any encrypted information, yielding a Pl of 0 and thus Θl = 1. Their values of
Θ9−lineJTAC,AC,voice are the same as the reliability of transmission.
Next, consider the values for data transfer. With only 5 minutes to prepare many
incoming sources of target data, any coordinates might be only 50% accurate, and
80% accurate with 10 minutes. Perhaps 1 in every 4 transmissions will require pilot
manipulation, with resulting 80% accuracy. The effects of relaxing requirements are
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Table 8: Notional Values of Interoperability for CAS 9-Line
Transmission Translation Total
5 min 10 min Pl τq Θl 5 min 10 min
Voice 0.94 0.99 0 1 1 0.94 0.99
Data 0.50 0.80 0.25 0.8 0.95 0.48 0.76
Voice & Data 0.97 0.99
clearer for a resource that requires time to prepare, such as the data overlay. It
is possible that the input values for Θl could also change with time, especially if
translation is not automatic. For this example, it is assumed that most of the benefit
of having additional time would be linked to the sending system, and thus to the
reliability of transmission.
The resulting Θ values are shown in the right-most column of Table 8. Voice
communications are significantly more reliable than data overlays alone, and improve
as requirements are loosened. That is not to say that requirements should be loosened;
just that this measure of interoperability is directly traceable to and dependent on
operational requirements. Also, a quick reminder: these numbers are completely
notional, and meant to demonstrate the effects of Θm, Pl, and τq on Θ
Resource
ij,method and
the effects of relaxing requirements on interoperability. Reliability databases with
authentic values are readily available, including an appendix with human error rates
in Smith [125] and examples of mechanical and electrical failure rates in others [11,
12, 113, 143].
Now that values have been calculated for each method of transfer, what happens
when both are used in conjunction? This added redundancy can be calculated us-
ing the equation for full active redundancy, because the voice-based 9-line will occur
with supplemental data transmission. This calculation is shown for the 5-minute
case in Equation 23. When comparing ΘJTAC,AC,V oice+Data with ΘJTAC,AC,V oice and
ΘJTAC,AC,Data alone, it can be seen that there is a 3% improvement over voice alone
and a 104% improvement over data alone. This relationship is shown graphically
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in Figure 34. This figure also shows that relaxing requirements yields an interoper-
ability increase, with its magnitude dependent on the nature of the resource being
transferred.
ΘJTAC,AC,V oice+Data = 1− (1−ΘJTAC,AC,V oice)(1−ΘJTAC,AC,Data) (23)
= 1− (1− 0.94)(1− 0.48)
= 0.97
Figure 34: Interoperability Changes With Requirements and Redundancy
5.2.1 Guidelines for the Application of Redundancy
Types of Redundancy The calculation for full active redundancy, shown in the
example above, is but one of many implementations of redundancy. A brief overview
of common types of redundancy is below, compiled from [3, 8, 11, 12, 48, 78, 97, 112,
113, 117, 125, 126, 143, 144].
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Full Active Redundancy: Parallel reliability. All units are operating/transmitting
simultaneously. All methods need to fail in order for the exchange to fail.
Assumes repair of a method is not available and that failed redundant methods
remain inoperable until the whole system fails or until the end time t is reached.
Demonstrated in the CAS 9-line example.
Partial Active Redundancy: A subset of the methods/elements are allowed to
fail. As long as at least k out of n units are working in the interval (0, t], the
process/transmission is successful. Also called k-out-of-n redundancy. E.g., a
space vehicle that requires 3 out of 4 main engines to reach orbit is a 3-out-of-4
system.
Conditional Active Redundancy: Redundancy applied based on the failure mode
of the units. A spare tire to replace a flat would not be a sufficient redundant
system if the failure trigger, such as a bad road, was not repaired.
Cold Standby Redundancy: Redundant systems are turned off until needed. No
load means their failure rate in reserve is zero. Has highest reliability of re-
dundancy options. Subject to perfect or imperfect switching; for example, if
a cell phone’s reception was interrupted while using data, it would attempt to
connect via a local WiFi connection, but the user may need to enter a password
to enable the switch.
Warm Standby Redundancy: Redundant elements are subjected to a lower load
until one of the operating elements fails. Failure rate is between zero and the
failure rate under full load.
Standby Redundancy with Identical Units: All standby units are statistically
identical to the primary unit. That is, they have the same failure rate and
mean time to failure. This could occur when identical systems are used to
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send a resource upon failure, such as using another color printer to reprint a
document when the first printer misprints colors (a failure in translation, or
poor translation quality).
Standby Redundancy with Different Units: Standby elements can have differ-
ent statistical properties, such as higher or lower reliabilities. This is the more
realistic scenario for systems exchanging a resource with several methods at
their disposal; however, it is also the most complicated to calculate due to the
varying component reliabilities. An example is the first attempt to send a com-
puter file via LAN; if that failed, to put it on a USB drive; if that failed, to
print the file and manually transfer it to the destination system.
Most of these conditions are time-based, and require more sophisticated analysis
than has been shown in the CAS example. Time-dependent reliability will be more
appropriate for electrical and mechanical components and less appropriate for the type
of resource transfers that are not usually considered when studying interoperability,
such as the delivery of goods or provision of services. It should be noted that a
reliability-based model of interoperability has been proposed in a limited aspect by
McBeth [91], who suggested that the bathtub curve life distribution model (Figure
35) was a good analogy for the interoperation of two systems over time. This analogy
applies to more of a programmatic or enterprise level, as it considers the time when
two systems first interoperate (the early failure period), then transitions into the
successful intended functionality of the systems: the intrinsic failure period. This
period is “characterized by a constant instantaneous failure rate” [91], where the
failures are “random in nature and randomly distributed with respect to time” [91, 48].
The bathtub curve is based on electronic hardware reliability over time; an updated
curve must be used for software reliability, as shown in Figure 36. This distinction
between reliability behavior by type enforces the need for an external analysis. The
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external reliability analysis must yield a single value for system pair interoperability;
this constant instantaneous failure rate seems the most appropriate value to choose,
and its properties of random failure mesh well with the typical means of modeling






















Figure 35: The Bathtub Curve. Reproduced from [91].
Types of Resources The paragraph above revealed that there are many types
of redundancy available to apply to a resource exchange. Table 9 lists types of re-
sources and maps them to potential applications of redundancy. These definitions
were sourced from DoDAF [33] in their extensive description of Resource Flows. In
general, active redundancy can be used for “cheap” resource types, such as elec-
tronic data transmissions, where there is little to no cost penalty for sending multiple
versions of the same resource. Standby redundancy will be appropriate for unique
or expensive resources such as the provision of goods or services. For example, if
a resource exchange is the shipment of a product across 1000 kilometers, it would
not make sense to ship multiple pallets simultaneously in the hope that at least one
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Figure 36: The Software Reliability Curve. Reproduced from [107].
reaches its intended destination. In general, a resource is “a physical or virtual entity
of limited availability” [33, p. 49] so cost and availability of the resource will always
be a factor when considering which application of redundancy is most appropriate.
5.2.2 Other Reliability Concerns
Reliability of a system is a complicated problem; there are many considerations that
have not yet been addressed. This section will briefly list additional factors that could
affect a reliability analysis and will provide a commentary on how each factor might
be incorporated. First, a reminder of the intended scope of this interoperability study.
The problem currently under study is the ability for two or more systems to exchange
and use a resource. This chapter deals with isolated system pairs, and thus each
measurement is attempting to address only one link in a potentially long chain or
complex network. The problem also makes the assumption that if a resource transfer
is being studied at the conceptual level of design, it is required for mission success
and it is known that this particular transfer occurs between the given system pair.
Concerns about network reliability will be addressed in later chapters.
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Table 9: Resource Types and Associated Redundancy Applications
Resource Definition Redundancy
Data Representation of information
in a formalized manner
In general, takes little time or
cost to transmit; active redun-
dancy suitable.
Information The state of a something-of-
interest that is materialized in
any form and communicated or
received [33, p. 60]
Vague definition, but if infor-
mation is treated as data, then
active redundancy usually ap-
plies. Standby redundancy can
be used in the case of single,
expensive resources that send a
signal when failure to transmit
or translate occurs.
Performers Any entity (Services, Systems,
or Organizations) that performs
an activity and provides a capa-
bility [33, p. 50]
Providing a service might not
have redundancy, and might in-
stead rely on repeating a trans-
fer attempt in the event of a fail-
ure. If a redundant method of
providing the service exists, it
would be used in standby.
Materiel Equipment, apparatus, or sup-
plies such as ammunition, fuel,
etc.; important to consider for
modeling capabilities. Repre-
sents the M of DOTMLPF.
Because materiel resources are
often unique, standby redun-
dancy analysis should be con-




Also called Roles; can be a re-
source transferred between ge-
ographic locations or concep-
tual organizations to facilitate
the completion of the mission.
Represents the Personnel (P),
Training (T), and Leadership
and Education (L) aspects of
DOTMLPF.
Personnel are a more abstract
form of resource and may be dif-
ficult to measure using redun-
dancy in the sense that they
must be addressed on a case-by-
case basis. It is expected that if
redundancy applies to a Person-
nel resource transfer, standby
redundancy would apply.
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Multiplicity of Resources This chapter has so far addressed fairly simple con-
cerns regarding the transfer of resources: how well is it transferred, does it have to
be manipulated upon arrival, and what is the quality of any necessary manipulation?
A singular resource has been considered, but what happens when a resource can be
multiplied? Something like an electronic file could easily be duplicated and sent via
various paths. Which path is best? How is that decision made?
A brief answer is that the source and destination system are connected by a need-
line which represents an array of potential physical connections. Each unique path
can be studied during the reliability analysis as a method, and a value of reliability
or failure rate can be obtained. Then, if a resource is easily multiplied, it can be sent
along all available paths, so full active redundancy can be used. If a resource must be
sent along a single path, then standby redundancy can be used. If the resource can
not be re-sent easily (e.g. the resource is a service being performed, or a delivery of
expensive materiel) then a simple way to choose the best path is to choose the most
reliable. This selection would be left to the expert external reliability analysis, which
would then provide a single value for the needline of system i to system j for resource
m, or Θmij .
Voting and Coordination The possibility of multiple identical resources traveling
down several paths to a single destination brings up the concept of coordination of the
resources at the destination system. The destination node has to determine which,
if any, resource copy has been corrupted and needs translation, or alternatively to
select the most current version if the copied resource is time-dependent [7, 51, 80].
This can be done by assigning weights to each path based on their reliability and
then coordinating the votes to reach a quorum, or a minimum percentage of votes
required to proceed. Voting and coordination is a mini-field within reliability theory
that affects overall system reliability and deserves to be addressed during an expert
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reliability analysis, but the exact mathematics will not be pursued in this document.
Failure Modes Another topic for consideration when calculating reliability values
of the resource transfer between system pairs is the mode of failure. Failures have
many characteristics; they can be permanent or non-permanent, reparable or non-
reparable, and independent or conditional (dependent on previous failures). Failure
mode and effects analysis (FMEA) has four types: system, design, process, and service
[127]. System FMEA is used to analyze systems and subsystems in the early concept
and design stage; any detailed reliability analysis for this research will require a system
FMEA. This involves creating a list of potential failure modes and a list of design
actions to mitigate such failures. The failure modes of many electronic and software
components are well documented, though most references in the literature focus on a
specific type, such as microelectronics, electronics in space applications, etc. [84, 115].
A failure mode analysis could include:
• Whether a particular type of failure is permanent (once the resource transfer
fails, it will not ever succeed) or impermanent (try again after some amount of
time). Impermanent failures will result in a higher overall reliability value.
• Whether a method of transfer can be repaired if it fails initially. This is es-
pecially important for materiel resource transfers, e.g. repairing a truck that
is needed to transfer fuel, or repairing a jammed missile launcher upon which
mission success depends.
• Whether a future failure is affected by the mode of the initial failure, i.e. con-
ditional failure.
These considerations will be taken into account when generating the values of Θm
and Θl during the external reliability analysis.
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Risk Assessment With any consideration of reliability also comes an investigation
into the consequences of failures. Two types of risk assessment bear mentioning in
this context: Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and Quantitative Risk Assessment
(QRA). A simplified summary of risk assessment is that it studies the magnitude of
potential consequences (the quantitative aspect) and the probability that the conse-
quences will occur (the probabilistic aspect). In the context of decision support, risk
is considered alongside cost, schedule, and performance. While a methodology for
measuring interoperability can easily be related to cost (operating costs of additional
connections, cost of acquiring new methods of transfer) and performance, risk must
also be assessed. A risk assessment will allow decision makers
• “to evaluate and rank decision alternatives with respect to risk and other deci-
sion criteria”
• “to take the DM’s preferences and risk attitude explicitly into account”
• and “to treat uncertainty” [119]
Probabilistic Risk Assessment as a distinct process has been primarily applied in the
nuclear amd process engineering fields, with other fields using a simpler version of
PRA when risk quantification is necessary [79]. Using interoperability to conduct
PRA is an opportunity for cross-fertilization of ideas and application in a new dis-
cipline. Of specific interest are the mission-level consequences of failing to send a
resource; unfortunately, this might be difficult to study during the conceptual design
phase, and may have to wait until more information about the SoS is known.
Concluding Remarks on System Pair Interoperability When implementing
ARTEMIS, the reliability and redundancy analysis should be entrusted to experts
in the field, and is not prescribed here. Reliability modeling may be required, but
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several software suites exist to assist in block diagram construction or other time-
based reliability analyses. If detailed reliability analysis is not available, then values
for system pair interoperability could be constructed based on requirement objectives
or thresholds by making the assumption that at a bare minimum the requirements
were met. For example, if the objective was to send a resource within 5 minutes
95% of the time, then that value of Θij would be 0.95. The end result, whatever
the means, should be the combination of any available methods into a single value of
interoperability for each system pair exchanging a resource, ΘResourceij . This chapter
constituted Experiment 1 supported by Induction 1. The selections made to pursue
reliability are shown in the matrix of methodology of alternatives in Figure 37. This
process to develop a quantitative measure of system pair interoperability is one of
the major contributions of this research. Additionally, the link between operational
requirements and interoperability has been shown; one cannot be studied without
considering the other. The next step, explained in Chapter 6, will be to arrange these
values into matrices and use them to understand the interoperability of networked
systems of systems.
Figure 37: Populating the Matrix of Methodology Alternatives Using Exp. 1
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CHAPTER VI
INTEROPERABILITY OF NETWORKED SYSTEMS
PERFORMING A RESOURCE EXCHANGE
The previous chapter presented the first step of the ARTEMIS methodology: the
quantitative measurement of system pair interoperability. Now that this measurement
has been enabled, and values that intuitively relate back to the physical performance
of the system pairs exist, it is time to examine the system pairs in the context of
a networked system of systems. This chapter will present the organization of the
system pair values, the modeling and simulation that goes into deriving values of
interoperability for an SoS, and will present the results of the sUAS test problem to
corroborate assertions about the interoperability of an SoS.
6.1 Resource Transfer Interoperability Matrix
The previous step generated values of ΘResourceij for every system pair that conducts
a resource exchange in the course of an operational sequence. These values are then
arranged into m separate n× n adjacency matrices, where m is the number of types
of resource exchanges and n is the number of types of systems. This representation
of system pairs across different aspects is called a layered graph [47, 6]. Each layer
is called a Resource Transfer Interoperability Matrix, or RTIM. Figure 38 shows this
external reliability analysis (if necessary) being input to the RTIMs. Equation 24
shows the generic form of the RTIM, and an example 4× 4 network and correspond-
ing RTIM with both unidirectional and bidirectional resource transfers are shown in
Figure 39 and Equation 25.
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Figure 39: A Notional Network Exchanging a Single Type of Resource
RTIMResourcex =

Θ11 0 Θ13 0
0 0 0 Θ24
Θ31 0 0 0
0 0 Θ43 0

(25)
These adjacency matrices are by nature sparse; if there are 10 resource types
exchanged in the course of a task sequence, then there will be 10 RTIMs, but only a
few systems of the overall network are required to exchange each resource type. For
example, a command to slew a sensor will be relayed from the ground station to the
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sensor payload on the UAV, via antennae and the flight control system, but does not
involve the video feedback loop or the operational pilot. The form of RTIMs in the
context of the test problem will be shown below.
RTIMs in an sUAS: The test problem of the sUAS has five types of resource
transfers, listed below for reference, along with the system pairs that exchange that
resource. For each required resource exchange, the interoperability values Θij for each
system pair are combined into their respective RTIM. In this case, there are eight
systems, which were described in Table 3, so there will be m = 5 RTIMs that are
each 8 rows by 8 columns. This structure is shown for one of the five, RTIMCommand 1,
in Equation 26.

PW SPW CDGT V DGR CDUT V DUT FCS SP
PW 0 0 ΘCommand1PW,CDGT 0 0 0 0 0
SPW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CDGT 0 0 0 0 ΘCommand1CDGT,CDUT 0 0 0
V DGR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CDUT 0 0 0 0 0 0 ΘCommand1CDUT,FCS 0
V DUT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(26)
Because these matrices are so sparse, in actual practice they would be stored in a
different format such as Compressed Sparse Column, Compressed Sparse Row, Block
Sparse Row, List of Lists, Dictionary of Keys, Coordinate, or Diagonal format [13].
Each storage method has strengths and weaknesses depending on the desired analysis
and manipulations required of the matrix, and all result in much faster computation
time. Rather than analyzing 64 cells individually (for an 8 × 8 matrix), only the 3
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Table 10: Resource Transfers of the sUAS
Resource Type Sending System to Receiving System
Command 1: Waypoints Pilot Workstation to
Comm. Datalink Ground TRX
Comm. Datalink Ground TRX to
Comm. Datalink UAV TRX
Comm. Datalink UAV TRX to
Flight Control System
Command 2: Pan/Tilt/Zoom Sensor Payload Workstation to
Comm. Datalink Ground TRX
Comm. Datalink Ground TRX to
Comm. Datalink UAV TRX
Comm. Datalink UAV TRX to
Flight Control System
Flight Control System to Sensor Payload
Feedback 1: UAV Position Flight Control System to
Comm. Datalink UAV TRX
Comm. Datalink UAV TRX to
Comm. Datalink Ground TRX
Comm. Datalink Ground TRX to
Pilot Workstation
Feedback 2: Sensor Orientation Sensor Payload to Flight Control System
Flight Control System to
Comm. Datalink UAV TRX
Comm. Datalink UAV TRX to
Comm. Datalink Ground TRX
Comm. Datalink Ground TRX to
Sensor Payload Workstation
Data: Video File Sensor Payload to Video Datalink UAV TX
Video Datalink UAV TX to
Video Datalink Ground RX
Video Datalink Ground RX to
Sensor Payload Workstation
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or 4 populated values would require attention. However, to keep the context of the
values clear, this research will present relevant matrices in their full form.
6.1.1 Comparing the RTIM to Existing Interoperability Matrix Formats
The RTIM’s structure of an adjacency matrix reflects several already existing models
of system pair interoperability. However, it differs in several ways:
There are more than just one matrix. LISI [31], ARCNET [40], and Ford [45]
do not decompose the system pair interoperabilities by resource type. Their matrices
are comparable to the SSIM presented in the next chapter.
Directional interoperability is the default. By making the system pair mea-
surement dependent on the sending system’s transmission capabilities and the receiv-
ing system’s translation capabilities, ARTEMIS is inherently directional, although
it is entirely possible that the directional interoperabilities would be equal for one
type of resource. LISI and the values used for ARCNET are stored in a triangular
format, and are thus bidirectional. Ford can accommodate directional interoperabil-
ity as a special case (it is usually assumed to be bidirectional, and his matrices are
symmetric).
The diagonals can have value.
• LISI leaves these values blank when constructing the Potential Interoperability
Matrix (Figure 40), assuming that systems are not interoperable with them-
selves or with other identical systems.
• Ford assumes that self-interoperability is zero, because it implies “an interoper-
ation originating at the system, exiting the system boundary and then accepted
back through the boundary”. This is due to the nature of his interoperability
measurement, which only takes into account the similarity of systems. A system
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Figure 40: LISI’s Potential Interoperability Matrix
is fully interoperable with itself because they are identical, but Ford does not
support systems interoperating with like systems.
• ARCNET’s input values allow for self-interoperability because of the definition
of levels used. As a reminder, it is a bit unfair to lump ARCNET with purpose-
built interoperability models; its goal is to measure the effects of collaboration,
and not to measure interoperability itself. However, it is a clear example of using
an interoperability matrix as an input to simulation, and is worth including here.
ARTEMIS allows for all three facets: decomposition over a mission’s compo-
nents, directionality, and interoperability of systems with others of the same type.
ARTEMIS will present a single matrix of SoS interoperability that can be used for
M&S. It is inherently directional. It can handle the interoperability of systems trans-
ferring resources to identical system types. For example, if the sUAS contained 3
UAVs that collaborated to find a target, these UAVs could automatically exchange
information over a datalink, such as data for collision avoidance. Although no transla-
tion would be necessary, the reliability of transmission (and thus their interoperability
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ΘUAV,UAV) could depend on environmental conditions such as weather and range. If,
on the other hand, these UAVs differed in capability (e.g. different sensor suites or a
hierarchical communication structure) they would be considered two different types
of systems, perhaps named UAV-1 and UAV-2.
6.2 Resource Transfer Interoperability Value
Now that the input interoperability values have been organized, what do they mean
for the networked system of systems? What can be learned from keeping resource
exchanges separate from one another, as opposed to initially combining them into a
single value of system pair interoperability, and placing them in a matrix like LISI or
Ford? How can a single value for each resource type be obtained?
First, the resource transfers performed in the course of a mission are linked to
the required tasks, which are in turn related to performance requirements and the
desired high-level capabilities of the SoS. By tracking the interoperability of the SoS
performing each resource exchange, the decision-makers (DMs) can quickly see which
mission segments are more or less interoperable, and use that information to increase
system performance where necessary. By also modeling other metrics of effectiveness
(time to complete mission, percent of targets found, fuel or battery charge used, etc.)
the effects of interoperability on performance can be shown.
To obtain a single value for resource transfer interoperability, this thesis had pro-
posed to extend the logic of reliability in series. Each RTIM contains information
about required system pair interfaces; if any of these interfaces failed, the resource
exchange would fail. To condense the system pairs down into a single value for the
entire SoS, let the Resource Transfer Interoperability (IResource) be the product of the
elements of the RTIM. Using the RTIM example in Equation 25, a sample calculation
of IResource is shown in Equation 27.
122
IResource = Θ11Θ13Θ24Θ31Θ43 (27)
This can be formally stated:
Hypothesis 2: Because all resource transfers in the exchange are required, the fail-
ure of any transfer causes the exchange to fail. A series model of reliability can
predict the interoperability of the exchange, IResource.
Experiment 2: Compare a series model of reliability to modeling outputs of IResource
and deterministic manipulations of the set of input ΘResourceij : their average,
maximum, and minimum.
To determine if this series calculation of IResource was correct, the following exper-
iment was performed within the modeling and simulation environment described in
Section 4.2. The 17 inputs are the values ΘResourceij that populate the system’s RTIMs.
The modeling environment takes these values and runs through the mission as pro-
grammed, treating each interoperability value as a probability of successful resource
transfer. Every time a resource transfer is required, a check is performed to determine
a successful transfer from system to system. In accordance with the nature of the con-
stant failure rate portion of the bathtub reliability curve, whether or not the transfer
fails is determined by randomly sampling a uniform distribution between 0 and 1.
If the value is higher than the ΘResourceij , the attempt fails and must be tried again.
Each failure of a system on the UAV subtracts charge from the battery, according to
Equation 19. In this way, a higher interoperability should use less energy, with how
much less dependent on the time per attempt and how frequently the resource must
be sent.
At completion of the mission, the success of each resource type was tracked several
ways:
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Overall success: The raw tally of overall successes for that type of resource, calcu-
lated by taking 1− nFailures
nAttempts
. This can be taken as IactualResource.
Relay success: Each resource transfer for this particular problem is in the form of
a relay, skipping in a chain from a starting system to a destination system, with
relay systems between. Relay success measures the failures and attempts of
each relay, then takes the mean over the course of the mission. For example:
on one relay, the resource goes successfully from System A to System B on the
first try; it fails once going from B to C, and goes through from C to D without
failing. This would be a relay success of 1− (1
4
) = 0.75.
Series model of success: If possible, it is desirable to have a means of calculating
IResource without performing detailed M&S. A series reliability model would
take the product of the system pair interoperabilities. It can be thought of as
IpredictedResource .
Average of ΘResourceij : It is also possible that the average (specifically, the arithmetic
mean) of the input interoperabilities could result in the interoperability of the
resource transfer. This value was also calculated for comparison.
Maximum or Minimum: LISI took the minimum interoperability level across 4
domains as the interoperability of a single system. This is not expected to be
an accurate method for determining IResource but is included for thoroughness.
Similarly, the maximum of the inputs ΘResourceij is not expected to be able to
predict SoS interoperability for a resource, but will be compared.
These calculations are shown for a single design point, for the second type of
resource in the sUAS problem: the command to Pan/Tilt/Zoom. The input values
for this resource type are shown in Equation 28.
124
Table 11: Resource Transfers of the sUAS








PW SPW CDGT V DGR CDUT V DUT FCS SP
PW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SPW 0 0 0.495 0 0 0 0 0
CDGT 0 0 0 0 0.388 0 0 0
V DGR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CDUT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.811 0
V DUT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FCS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.482
SP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

(28)
The input values do not reflect any actual measurement; they are part of the
DoE constructed to test the entire design space, to understand how interoperability
changes, rather than to test the accuracy of the values selected for the sample problem.
Therefore, it is of interest to see how the low and high values, such as ΘCommand2CDGT,CDUT =
0.39 and ΘCommand2CDUT,FCS = 0.81, affect the output. Table 11 shows these calculations.
However, these isolated points mean little without placing them in the context of
the whole design of experiments, with overall success values. The proposal for this
thesis hypothesized that a series reliability model would approximate the resource
interoperability. By multiplying the entries of each resource matrix, a single value
could be found. These relationships are plotted in the multivariate scatterplots in
Figures 41 – 45. If the M&S output of Overall Success for Resource X is treated as
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the accurate resource interoperability, IXResource, are any of the calculations that do not
require M&S a good predictor of the actual interoperability? How does the overall
success compare to the relay success? These figures will be explained and interpreted
in depth in the next section.
Figure 41: ICommand 1 Multivariate Plot
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Figure 42: ICommand 2 Multivariate Plot
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Figure 43: IFeedback 1 Multivariate Plot
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Figure 44: IFeedback 2 Multivariate Plot
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Figure 45: IData 1 Multivariate Plot
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6.2.1 Interpreting the M&S Results
The six outputs from the modeling of resource interoperability fall into two categories:
two that are the result of a discrete event simulation (Overall Success and Relay
Success) and four that can be calculated without modeling and simulation (the Series
product, Average, Max, and Min of the inputs). To determine the appropriate way
to measure success, Overall vs. Relay success should be considered. Then, the four
deterministic outputs should be compared to the simulated outputs to determine if
any can be used as a substitute for time-consuming, detailed modeling and simulation.
What is the appropriate way to measure resource success from the simula-
tion? First, compare Overall Success against Relay Success. One can observe that
Relay Success is very close — but not exactly equal — to Overall Success for all of the
resources. A closer examination, excluding the outliers in the command resources,
shows the values are within 0.1 of each other. It should be noted that these corre-
lation values excluded the 107 points that are outliers as seen in the command plots
in order to get a better estimate of the correlations of the bulk of the points. (The
values of the correlations are in Appendix A.) For flexibility in future models, the
Overall Success should be used. Relays might not be the only expression of a resource
exchange among systems, and something like collaboration may be more difficult to
measure in a similar format. Also, measuring success by the overall ratio of successes
out of attempts (or 1 − failures out of attempts) will be echoed in the measurement
of overall system of system success.
Why are there outliers? There are approximately 100 points that do not follow
the clustering in the two Command resource types (and to a much lesser extent, the
Feedback 2 resource). This can be accounted for by considering the percentage con-
tribution of each resource to the overall number of transmissions. Figure 46 shows
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the distributions of the 1000 LHC points. The Box-Behnken points were excluded
because they are not evenly distributed around the design space to begin with, but
the plot with the distributions of all but the 107 excluded points is included in the ap-
pendix. In Figure 46, one can see that Command 1 and Command 2 were sent much
less frequently than the feedbacks. This is to be expected, and is partially dependent
on how the model was coded. This would show more variation if there were false tar-
gets that required additional redirections, or some other decision-making algorithm.
As it is, because the two command resources are sent so much less frequently than








































































































































Figure 46: Distributions and Statistics of % Transmissions of Each Resource Type
Because these communications are so infrequent, it is quite vital that they succeed.
If the UAV does not receive the command to go identify a target, the mission could
fail. The ability to decompose interoperability by resource can provide DMs with
information about where to focus their efforts; not by which system to improve, as
can be easily calculated using centrality, but by which leg of the operational sequence.
Do any of the deterministic methods of modeling IResource match the stochas-
tic M&S results? This is the primary focus of the IResource problem. The goal is to
conduct conceptual design of architectures, quickly, accounting for many alternatives.
Running a stochastic simulation for each alternative could quickly become unwieldy,
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and may require more detailed information about the operational process than is
available. When treating ΘResourceij as probabilities of success, is there a deterministic
way to approximate the output IResource? The originally proposed method was to ex-
tend the reliability in series model. However, it became clear that networked effects
would likely be present, especially as the SoS grows, that could not be captured by
simple multiplication. To prove or disprove the reliability in series hypothesis, con-
sider the results from the earlier multivariate plots, as well as the more detailed plots
of Figures 47. Mappings with high correlations could potentially be used for a direct
calculation. When comparing Overall Success to the Series model, Average, Max,
and Min of the inputs ΘResourceij , it can be seen that a series model is actually closely
matched. This is not a linear relationship, however, and the fit is best matched using
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Figure 51: Id1 Overall Success vs. Deterministic Calculations
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The estimated terms of the cubic fits are very similar across resource types, with
R2 values of between 0.950 and 0.974 (see Tables 21–22 in the appendix). This leads
to the following conclusion: After initial modeling and simulation, the series model
of reliability can be fit to the output success of each relayed resource type. This fit can
be used to estimate IResource without requiring additional simulations.
Behavior of Box-Behnken Points The Box-Behnken design (BBD) points are
denoted by 2 in the scatter-plots. The behavior of these points in the IOverall Success vs.
IMax and IMin plots is particularly interesting. These points are clumped in vertical
bars. Because their values are mostly fixed at I = 0.6, these bars show the spread of
overall interoperability possible for a particular research exchange. In other words, if
the maximum interoperability of any system pair in the ICommand 1relay is 0.6, then
the overall success can be anywhere between 0.25 and 0.7. If the minimum is 0.6, then
interoperability range increases to approximately 0.9. This makes sense because of
the structure of a BBD: mostly central design variable values with one variable being
tested at the max or min of its range. A maximum of 0.6, the center point, means
the minimum is either 0.2 (the minimum of the design variable input range) or also
0.6. Such a low value will drive down the overall relay interoperability, forming the
lower portion of the vertical band of points. Similarly, a mid-valued minimum of 0.6
means the other relay links are either 0.6 or 1, resulting in a higher overall reliability.
Comparing the command relays to the feedback and data relays shows that the range
of overall success tightens as the number of transmissions increases, in keeping with
the law of large numbers. Additionally, comparing the plots of Overall Success vs.
the Series calculation of LHC and BBD points shows that both tightly follow the
same trend. The BBD points are indistinguishable from the LHC points. Although
they seem like the trends do not hold, these points provide valuable insight as to the
behavior of an average design, where many relays are mediocre. Their visual contrast
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in the plots is simply due to the nature of plotting a central composite DoE with an
evenly distributed space-filling design.
Summary of Resource Interoperability Analysis: An outline of the analysis
required to proceed through the Resource Interoperability measurement step of the
ARTEMIS methodology can now be presented:
1. Calculate the series reliability of the systems relaying the resource. This may not
work for exchanges that are not relays. This calculation is performed by taking
the product of the non-zero elements of each RTIM. In Python, the language
used for M&S in this thesis, this can be done using numpy.prod(RTIM) with
some logic to ignore any Θij = 0.
2. Fit the obtained series value, ΘSeries, to the output values of IResource, to obtain
coefficients for the appropriate regression.
3. For any additional resource analysis, use the regression to obtain an estimate of
the performance interoperability without needing to run the simulation again.
Another interesting result is that the average of the inputs ΘResourceij forms an
upper bound on the overall success. If a fit cannot be found for some reason, then
this average may be taken as a maximum value. Decision makers could treat it as
a best-case-scenario interoperability, knowing that there would be some (unknown)
degradation of IResource in actual implementation.
Resolution of Hypothesis 2: Modeling and simulation has confirmed that there
is some deterministic relationship between a reliability in series interpretation of in-
put values of ΘResourceij and a resource transfer interoperability IResource. However, the
nature of this relationship is only revealed by M&S. This step of ARTEMIS is sum-
marized in Figure 52. The matrix of methodology alternatives can be filled out as
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shown in Figure 53, where the yellow shading indicates that the average can be used
if no M&S exists, but performance modeling is the primary means of determining
IResource. The modeling is also necessary to move on to the next step: measuring the
interoperability of an SoS, based on performance, and understanding the interoper-
ability of system pairs within the SoS if they pass more than one type of resource
over the course of a mission. These two topics will be explored in Chapter 7.
Figure 52: Steps 2 and 3 of the ARTEMIS methodology: Measuring the Interop-
erability of an SoS Exchanging a Single Resource and Completing an Operational
Sequence
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Figure 53: Populating the Matrix of Methodology Alternatives Using Exp. 2
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CHAPTER VII
INTEROPERABILITY OF A SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS
PERFORMING MULTIPLE RESOURCE EXCHANGES
Steps 1 and 2 of the ARTEMIS methodology have been covered:
1. Interoperability of system pairs
• How to obtain inputs for the interoperability of system pairs transferring
a resource via a single method, based on operational requirements and
system capabilities
• The appropriate application of redundancy to obtain a physically realistic,
quantitative value for system pair interoperability when multiple methods
of transfer are available
2. Interoperability of an SoS, decomposed by resource type
• Organization in a matrix form, the Resource Transfer Interoperability
Matrix (RTIM), that allows DMs to track the network interactions being
conducted for each task in an operational sequence
• A performance-based measurement of interoperability for an SoS for each
resource, the Resource Transfer Interoperability: IResource
The next portion of ARTEMIS is to take these components and combine them
into a mission-wide measure of SoS interoperability. This step was summarized in the
last chapter in Figure 52. First, the system pair interoperability must be traced to
each pair’s overall interoperability. The result is a weighted adjacency matrix for the
SoS, the System of Systems Interoperability Matrix (SSIM) that can be used
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to calculate network metrics using graph theory. Then, the interoperability of the
SoS as a whole can be calculated, based on the interoperabilities of its components:
the System of Systems Interoperability, ISoS. These products of ARTEMIS,
intended to be obtained via an external, thorough simulation process, are examined
in this thesis using the sUAS test problem.
7.1 System of Systems Interoperability Matrix
In the last step of the measurement, m Resource Transfer Interoperability Matrices
were created. Now, those layered RTIMs must be combined into a single interoper-
ability matrix. This is for several reasons:
• It is the industry-accepted form of storing interoperability information (LISI,
Ford, etc.)
• It is the most commonly accepted input for models that accept such information
(ARCNET, IACM)
• It enables network analysis by acting as a weighted adjacency matrix of a graph,
where the edge weights are the system pair interoperabilities
With these motivations in mind, the matter of actually creating such a single matrix
must be addressed. The form is straightforward: an n × n matrix, where n is the
number of systems in the SoS. This form is shown in Equation 29. But how to
construct it? It would be most straightforward to just overlay the RTIMs. They are
sparse, and many system pairs would only exchange one resource type over the course
of a mission. A notional diagram of this concept is shown in Figure 54, and in matrix
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
(29)
Figure 54: Overlaying the Resource Exchanges of a Notional SoS
Figure 55: Combining RTIMs into a Single Matrix
However, there are several cases where there are multiple types of resources passing
between system pairs. This yields some important research questions.
• How do multiple resources through a given system pair affect the overall in-
teroperability of that system pair? Is there some function such that Iij =
f(ΘResource 1ij , . . . ,Θ
Resourcem
ij )? What is the nature of this function? Can relia-
bility in series be invoked again?
• If there is only one resource passed through the system pair, does Iij = Θij?
Hypothesis 3a: When overlaying RTIMs, the interoperability Iij of system pairs
with more than one type of resource exchange Θ1ij . . .Θ
n
ij can be calculated by
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taking reliability in series. Because all resource exchanges through the system
pair are required, the failure of any transfer causes the system pair to fail.
Experiment 3a: Compare a series model of reliability to modeling outputs of Iij and
deterministic manipulations of the set of input Θij: their average, maximum,
and minimum.
The relationship between Iij and multiple Θij had been proposed to again fol-
low reliability in series. For the mission to be successful, that pair of systems must
successfully transmit every resource type. If one required transfer fails (is not inter-
operable), the entire process fails. In accordance with the simple series model, all
Θij exchanges would be multiplied to yield a cumulative interoperability value Iij for
that system pair. This relation is shown in Equation 30, where there are m required





This operation is performed using element-wise multiplication of all Resource
Transfer Interoperability Matrices (essentially laying them on top of one another).
This mathematical operation is also called the Hadamard product, entrywise prod-
uct, or Schur product [26], and uses the symbol ◦ (Equation 31). This function is
built in to many programming languages, and should be easy to automate (with some
logic to ignore zero entries).
SSIM = (RTIM1 ◦RTIM2 ◦ . . . ◦RTIMm) (31)
Iij = (RTIM1 ◦RTIM2 ◦ . . . ◦RTIMm)ij (32)
= (RTIM1)ij(RTIM2)ij . . . (RTIMm)ij
= Θ1ijΘ
2




It is notable that, for the purposes of this calculation, the order of resource ex-
changes is irrelevant. This will allow for a reduction in the number of alternatives that
have to be examined, because in the generation of architecture alternatives, changing
the order of tasks constitutes a separate operational alternative. If this calculation
works, then it could result in a reduction in simulation runs for studying alternatives’
interoperability.
Although the series formulation seems physically realistic, the examination of a
similar calculation in Section 6.2 revealed that further manipulation was necessary
to relate this series calculation to M&S outputs. In addition to mapping Iij to the
product of its component Θijs, it will also be measured against their arithmetic mean,
weighted average, maximum, and minimum. The weighted average will be calculated
by taking the percentage contribution of each resource and normalizing by the re-
sources under consideration to weight each input. This calculation is shown in Equa-
tion 33 using the connection between the Comm. Datalink Ground TRX (CDGT) to
Comm. Datalink UAV TRX (CDUT) as an example. In the case of the test problem,
no system pairs exchange more than two types of resource, so the maximum and









%(Command 1) + %(Command 2)
)
ĪCDGT,CDUT = w1 ·ΘCommand 1CDGT,CDUT + w2 ·ΘCommand 2CDGT,CDUT (33)
Upon inspection, the weighted average is so close to the regular average in this
test problem that it will be substituted for the average, which will be omitted from
the comparison below. One of the four plots is contained in Appendix B, Figure 85.
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In the test problem, 8 of the 17 resource transfers share a system link with another:
• ICDGT,CDUT : Sending Commands 1 and 2 from the Comm. Datalink Ground
TRX to the Comm. Datalink UAV TRX
• ICDUT,FCS: Sending Commands 1 and 2 from the Comm. Datalink UAV TRX
to the Flight Control System
• IFCS,CDUT : Sending Feedback 1 and 2 from the Flight Control System to the
Comm. Datalink UAV TRX
• ICDUT,CDGT : Sending Feedback 1 and 2 from the Comm. Datalink UAV TRX
to the Comm. Datalink Ground TRX







PW SPW CDGT V DGR CDUT V DUT FCS SP
PW 0 0 Θc1 0 0 0 0 0
SPW 0 0 Θc2 0 0 0 0 0
CDGT Θf1 Θf2 0 0 Ic1,c2 0 0 0
V DGR 0 Θd1 0 0 0 0 0 0
CDUT 0 0 If1,f2 0 0 0 Ic1,c2 0
V DUT 0 0 0 Θd1 0 0 0 0
FCS 0 0 0 0 If1,f2 0 0 Θc2
SP 0 0 0 0 0 Θd1 Θf2 0

(34)
These four Iij entries are examined in Figures 56 – 59. As when studying IResource,
the simulated output of overall probability of success is on the vertical axis, and is
plotted against the potential deterministic predictors. The calculation for weighted
average assumes that the contribution of each resource transfer between systems iandj
is known, which might be possible to calculate, but here is taken as an output of M&S.
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Figure 56: Modeled ICDGT,CDUT vs. Series, Weighted Mean, Max, and Min
Figure 57: Modeled ICDUT,FCS vs. Series, Weighted Mean, Max, and Min
Figure 58: Modeled IFCS,CDUT vs. Series, Weighted Mean, Max, and Min
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Figure 59: Modeled ICDUT,CDGT vs. Series, Weighted Mean, Max, and Min
These plots show that the relationships from these calculated, deterministic quan-
tities of Iij vs. Θij are similar to the relationships of IResource vs. Θ
Resource:
1. The series model matches the most closely; a fit can be made after M&S, en-
abling an estimation of Iij given the product of inputs Θ
Resource 1
ij . . .Θ
Resourcem
ij
and coefficients of fit.
2. The average gives an upper bound of Iij. The weighted average may be used if
weightings by frequency are available.
3. The max also shows an upper bound; that maximum value of interoperability
can not be exceeded (even if all the other Θij = 1), but if those other Θij are
very low, Iij can drop quite low. This lower bound has not been calculated, and
may change depending on the complexity of the interactions among different
resources.
4. Iij is bounded by the lowest value of the input Θijs.
While both the average and the maximum reveal an upper bound, the average
is more tightly clustered along the line Iij = Mean(Θij) and could also be used to
roughly estimate Iij without knowing the parameters of the fit of the series reliability
model, which includes a significant offset. Exploration of various fits (polynomial fits,
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transformed axes, etc.) revealed that quadratic and cubic fits achieved R2 values of at
least 0.95, often in the 0.97 – 0.98 range. However, they were different for each system
pair, and the coefficients of the polynomials could not be used interchangeably. This
shows that there is still behavior unaccounted for in the interoperability of system
pairs at the SoS level, and the following conclusion can be made:
Modeling and simulation is required to obtain values of Iij for system pairs that
transmit multiple resource types during a mission. However, regressions can be con-
ducted and will utilize a calculation based on the concept of reliability in series to
predict Iij. In the absence of modeling and simulation, the average of inputs Θij can
be taken to establish an upper bound on system pair interoperability.
Before moving on, it is necessary to confirm that when two systems transmit a
single type of resource in the context of the whole mission, their SoS interoperability
equals their pair interoperability, or Iij = Θij. Plotting all such cases along the
diagonal in Figure 60 supports this assertion. The commands (labeled “c1” or “c2”
on their inputs along the bottom) are not as precise as the feedbacks because they
have many fewer transmissions per mission, and have not converged on the expected
value yet. This is called the law of large numbers, formally written in Equation
35, and for this thesis’ implementation in Equation 36 [116]. The sample mean X̄
converges to the random variable’s expected value, µ, as the number of samples n
approaches infinity.
X̄ → µ for n→∞ (35)
Iij → Θij for n→∞ (36)
Resolution of Hypothesis 3a: This section examined the options for populating
the SoS Interoperability Matrix, using the entries of the Resource Transfer Interop-







































































































































































Figure 60: Modeled Iij vs. Input Θij
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• For most SSIM entries, where a system pair only transmits one resource type in
a mission, using the corresponding entry of the RTIM is sufficient to populate
the SSIM.
• For situations with more than one resource type exchanged, more complex be-
havior is observed due to the fact that an SoS is interacting. The series model
of reliability does not apply directly, although a fit of the data can be used. It is
necessary to conduct modeling and simulation to obtain an accurate value of Iij
and to fit the series model to the stochastic data.
• If M&S is not available, the maximum and minimum of the inputs Θij may be
taken to provide an upper and lower bound, respectively, on interoperability Iij at
the mission level. These bounds limit the range of possible SoS interoperability
and can be used to focus on meaningful portions of the design alternative space.
SSIM as a Modeling and Simulation Enabler for Designers This matrix
format can provide a quantitatively obtained input for more advanced modeling and
simulation, such as additional network analysis, agent-based modeling where sys-
tems can make decisions about how to use their available interfaces, or other system
models. Next, now that the SSIM exists, what knowledge can be gained about the
interoperability of the SoS as a whole, using a single value that will enable ranking
across alternatives?
7.2 System of Systems Interoperability Value
Part of the primary objective of this research is to obtain a measurement of interop-
erability that “will enable comparison of system of systems architecture alternatives
during the conceptual design phase” and “will allow a link between interoperability
values and operational success”. How can the matrix of system pair interoperabilities
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be synthesized into a single metric of interoperability? Can the effects of interoper-
ability on other metrics of performance be demonstrated?
The simplest answer is to continue considering the pair interoperabilities Iij as the
probability of successful interoperation, to run the whole operational scenario, and
to measure the overall probability of successful interoperation. This metric is called
the System of Systems Interoperability, ISoS. It is easily tracked in modeling
and simulation, but the same question must be asked as before: is it possible to
calculate ISoS without resorting to modeling that may require more information than
is available during conceptual design? By making assumptions about the detailed
operation of the SoS, an engineer is essentially making design decisions that may or
may not result in the optimum operational performance.
Hypothesis 3b: The calculation for ISoS will again follow the same basic physical
model of reliability in series. If every resource exchange is required to work
between every system pair, then a failure of one results in failure of the mission.
Therefore, the overall interoperability is calculated by taking the product of the
non-zero entries of a SSIM. Additionally, had the original hypothesis held that a series
model of reliability could be used to calculate IResource exactly by taking the product
of the non-zero entries of the RTIMs, the associative property of multiplication would
reveal two separate but mathematically equal paths to obtain ISoS:
Calculate SSIM by taking the Hadamard product of the RTIMs:
SSIM = (RTIM1 ◦RTIM2 ◦ . . . ◦RTIMm)





Or, calculate each of m values of IResource by taking the product of the non-zero
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And then take the product of each IResource to obtain ISoS:
ISoS = IResource 1 · IResource 2 · · · · · IResourcem
Although this would certainly be convenient, it is overly simplified, and the use
of a series reliability model without post-simulation regression has been shown to
be infeasible. Still, the following experiments shall be conducted to determine the
relationship between what can be considered the “actual” behavior of the system (as
far as the modeling can reveal) and the “predicted” deterministic calculations. As
a reminder, the output “Overall Success” is tracked by taking the total number of
successful transmissions divided by the number of attempts, without accounting for
which systems were transferring which resource.
Experiment 3b: Determine the nature of ISoS by examining
• Distribution of modeling outputs of ISoS given a space-filling DoE (Latin
Hypercube cases only)
• ISoS (Overall Success) vs.
products of non-zero SSIM entries (Iij) (series reliability model)
average of non-zero SSIM entries (Iij)
average of IResource
ISoS calculated using a weighted average of the m values of IResource,
with % of transmission as the weighting factor
First, how does ISoS behave as an output? Recall that the original inputs that
affect this output were distributed evenly using a computer-generated space-filling
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Latin Hypercube design of experiments. Ranges for the inputs ΘResourceij were between
0.2 and 1; the lower cutoff of 0.2 was selected after test simulations because any lower
interoperability and the mission “failed” without providing feasible values of Iij. In
practice, it is hoped that systems will interoperate with a better reliability than only
a 20% success rate. Within each resource transfer, interoperation success or failure
was determined by random sampling of a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. With
these design parameters in mind, Figure 61 shows the distribution of ISoS (Overall















Figure 61: The Distribution of ISoS (Overall Transmission Success)
The closest fits are the log-normal distribution and the gamma distribution. This
is conflicting information; a log-normal distribution models a variable that is a result
of many multiplicative products of independent input variables, and is used in relia-
bility analysis to model time to failure [139]. The gamma distribution fit estimates
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Table 12: Summary Statistics for the Distribution of ISoS
Mean 0.5070848
Std Dev 0.0789325
Std Err Mean 0.0024961
Upper 95% Mean 0.5119829
Lower 95% Mean 0.5021867
N 1000
two parameters, α and β, and is used to calculate information entropy. As can be seen
in the figure, the distributions are almost identical, and which distribution is more
appropriate is definitely an area for further research when more virtual experimenta-
tion platforms are available to test different SoS configurations. The parameters of
each distribution are in Tables 23 and 24 in Appendix B.
Figure 62 shows an initial look at actual ISoS vs. calculations. An additional
multivariate plot and correlations are included in the appendix (Fig. 86, Tab. 25).
These calculations can not really be called deterministic any more, because their
inputs have been derived using the same M&S as ISoS. However, if an engineer
received a complete SSIM from an external source, it would be useful to be able to

























0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
I_SoS
Average
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
I_SoS
Wtd. Avg.
Figure 62: ISoS Simulation Output vs. Series, Avg., and Weighted Avg.
The following conclusions can be drawn from Figure 62:
• ISoS (Series by taking the product of SSIM entries) yields a very small number,
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as would be expected of the product of many values less than 1. Its axis is
on a logarithmic scale, and there is a definite correlation with ISoS, but the
relationship is not tightly defined.
• Similarly, the series model by taking the product of IResource, the average of the
non-zero entries of the SSIM, and the average of the IResource values yield positive
correlations with the simulation results, but are not a definitive relationship.
• The weighted average of the five IResource values, on the other hand, is worth
investigating further.
A calculation of the weighted average of the IResource values can be used to establish
the upper bound of ISoS, marked in the plot by the line, which matches the upper
bound very closely. The equation of the line is:
ISoS = w1IResource 1 + . . .+ wmIResourcem
or basically y = x, where wi is the percent share of total transmissions of IResource i.
This weighted average calculation also gives the actual SoS interoperability to within,
at most, 0.1. The distribution of the error of the calculated weighted average as a
prediction of the simulation output ISoS is shown in Figure 64, with pertinent values
in Table 13. The weighted average actually overestimates the measured ISoS, but
only by a mean of 0.02. Depending on the acceptable error of SoS interoperability
measurement, this calculation could be used to eliminate a modeling and simulation
step. Such a tolerance would need to be determined by a separate analysis of actual
interoperability values, however; the purpose of this research effort is not to determine
the difference that a small interoperability increase makes in performance, although








































































































Figure 64: Distribution of ISoS − ISoS Weighted Avg.








Std Err Mean 0.0006665
Resolution of Hypothesis 3b: Earlier, a way to calculate ISoS from the SSIM
alone had been desired; unfortunately, the data from this test problem do not support
any calculation that has been considered, and disproves the hypothesized application
of a series model of reliability. Instead, the closest match is a weighted average that
takes the IResource values as input. It is unlikely that these values can be known with-
out modeling and simulation, which can capture the complex effects of a networked
system of systems. The primary conclusions about the SoS Interoperability Value,
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ISoS, are:
• The exact value of performance-based measure of interoperability, ISoS, must be
obtained by modeling and simulation.
• A series model of reliability does not account for the behavior of the SoS in
practice, and does not result in an accurate estimation of the actual modeled
value.
• Although a weighted average can determine an upper bound, this calculation is
not possible without also conducting modeling and simulation, and it is more
straightforward to simply record the model output ISoS.
It should be noted that it is still possible to estimate ISoS in the absence of M&S
to obtain the weights. If the basic properties of the interactions are known (e.g. for
every 1 command, there are 10 feedback messages sent), then the weightings can be
approximated and used to obtain a close value of ISoS as a function of IResource. If
weights are still unobtainable, then ISoS can still be bounded by the maximum and
minimum entries, Iij of the SSIM. This helps pare down the design space and focus
any available M&S efforts during design space exploration.
The population of the matrix of methodology alternatives can be continued. For
these experiments, the corresponding row of Figure 21 is shown in Figure 65.
Figure 65: Populating the Matrix of Methodology Alternatives Using Exp. 3a, 3b
ISoS as an Alternative Comparison Enabler for Decision Makers This single
value for an entire SoS performing multiple resource exchanges will allow DMs to
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quickly rank SoS alternatives with a single value. For example, in an alternative
space with 1000 potential architectures, DMs could throw out those beneath some
ISoS threshold. They could then examine the higher-valued alternatives and go back
to the SSIM or even the RTIMs and compare interoperability at the resource exchange
level using the values of IResource or system pair interoperability Θij within the RTIMs.
The value of ISoS found in this chapter is a measure of the interoperability of the
SoS as it performs a sequence of required resource exchanges. However, two very dif-
ferent architectures could have a similar interoperability while having vastly different
network structures, cost, and other important properties that DMs should consider
when selecting a design. Evaluating for metrics such as cost and the performance of
individual systems are outside the scope of this study of interoperability, but the next
chapter will show that interoperability can affect performance, and that network met-




INTEROPERABILITY, NETWORK STRUCTURE, AND
PERFORMANCE
In the previous chapters, a quantitative method for evaluating the interoperability of
system pairs has been presented. Using this method, interoperability can be studied
at the SoS level both as a whole and decomposed by resource type for a given mission
scenario. Now, what is the link, if any, between interoperability and operational
effectiveness of an SoS? Can network metrics be used to provide additional insight
to SoS interoperability? The following sections will address each of these topics.
Section 8.1 will use the example sUAS as a means to observe the direct effects of
interoperability on one variable, the percent of battery charge remaining at the end of
a mission. While this is not a high-level measure of effectiveness like time to complete
mission, number of targets found, etc. it is sufficient to see that interoperability can
affect the physical performance of an SoS. Section 8.2 will explore how the structure
of the network can be used in conjunction with the ISoS to create a better picture of
the implications of interoperability.
8.1 Interoperability as a Force Multiplier
As the defense industry focuses on integrating systems to enable network-centric op-
erations, a frequent assertion is that “interoperability in the form of collaboration
is a force multiplier” [41, 19, 1, 38]. In this context, interoperability is the satisfac-
tory exchange of resources to ensure mission success. What is “satisfactory” can be
measured in several ways. Completion of mission requirements is obvious; although
ARTEMIS does not treat interoperability as binary (it exists or it doesn’t), an SoS
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can be said to be interoperable if it allows the SoS to meet the desired capabilities
to some threshold. Does interoperability have a direct effect on high-level mission
metrics? Does it directly increase time to complete the mission, lead to more targets
found, enemies neutralized, or reduce friendly casualties? What are other implications
of high or low interoperability?
8.1.1 Linking sUAS Interoperability to a Performance Metric
Hypothesis 3c: Interoperability has a direct, measurable effect on measures of per-
formance. This relationship can be seen using simulation of the system of system
conducting a mission.
Experiment 3c: In a modeling and simulation environment, track both interoper-
ability and a measure of performance (in this case, battery charge remaining at
the end of the mission). Examine the relationship between the output battery
charge and the input system-pair-resource interoperabilities (ΘResourceij ) using a
neural net model trained to the M&S results.
This thesis is limited by the simulation resources available, but using the test sUAS
problem, interoperability can be found to have a tangible effect on a physical aspect of
the UAV that could affect overall mission time. When making decisions about how to
model the SoS, it was determined that not enough information about the vehicle itself
was available (size, range, velocity, sensing capabilities, sophistication of waypoint and
autonomy algorithms) to try to accurately measure the common metric of time to
complete the mission. As explained in Chapter 4, the battery charge remaining was
tracked instead. Test cases were conducted to get a rough estimate of required battery
charge, and a 2 mAh LiPo battery was selected. Out of 1703 test cases, the battery
was completely exhausted only 63 times and was discharged below the 20% threshold
112 times. The distribution of charge remaining is shown in Figure 66. Because this
battery is required to power all on-board electronics, exhaustion of the battery due
160
to repeated attempts to transmit resources could possibly result in the UAV needing
to return to the ground station to charge, whether the mission was complete or not,
thus indirectly affecting a higher-level metric.
Figure 66: Distribution of % Battery Charge Remaining
Cases with a discharged battery are marked with orange and red. Interestingly,
most of these points were also those that had lower-than-average ICommand 1 and
ICommand 2 values. Figure 67 plots the overall interoperability ISoS and the 5 val-
ues of IResource against battery charge.
This plot shows that there is a broad spread of interoperability values that also had
completely discharged batteries, especially at the resource interoperability level. At
the SoS level, although low ISoS does not necessarily mean a completely discharged
battery, a low charge means interoperability is relatively low. For example, if one
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Figure 67: ISoS vs. % Battery Charge Remaining
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make the statement that ISoS had to be at least X. An ISoS = 0.35 could result in
a battery charge between -0.33 and 0.43, or in other words the whole range of the
remaining charges. It’s not until ISoS > 0.67 that a UAV is guaranteed to finish its
mission with at least 20% of its battery remaining. Of course, the battery size could
be considered a detailed design decision, but because relatively few cases ran out of
battery, it has been deemed sufficient for this test problem. Because the battery was
modeled as ideal, there is no voltage penalty for reaching a high level of discharge,
and a larger capacity battery with the same terminal voltage could be substituted in
practice.
To determine which variables are affecting the battery charge, a neural net was
fitted to the data, and the profiler examined to understand how the input variables
(tFeedback, tAttempt, and the 17 Θ
Resource
ij ) affect battery consumption. The variables in
the profiler were reordered according to their main effects; their importance is shown
in Table 14. The Battery Charge vs. the first five input variables are shown in Figure
68, with the first four pegged against their maximum and minimum values.






All others (each) 0.003
Figure 68: % Battery Charge Remaining vs. Inputs, Worst Case
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Figure 69: % Battery Charge Remaining vs. Inputs, Perfect ΘSP
The profiler shows that of the interoperability variables, the sensor payload (SP)
affects battery charge the most; this makes sense, because it consumes the most power
out of the UAV’s onboard components (refer back to Table 4). The greatest impact is
from the feedback interval; the profiler shows that there is a large increase in battery
charge at approximately 30 seconds. Improving the time spent making a transmission
moves this increase slightly back, to 20 seconds, leading to the conclusion that data
should be sent in intervals of at least 20 seconds to conserve battery. In Figure 69, the
sensor payload interoperability has been set to a perfect 1; in this case, the feedback
interval and time per attempt do not affect the battery as much, because precious
time and charge is not spent on repeated attempts to make a successful transmission.
In this scenario, the battery will not reach its discharge threshold of 20%.
Resolution of Hypothesis 3c: Although this information can be used to speculate
about indirect effects of interoperability on mission-level metrics, the nature of the
information available for the test problem limited what direct links could be made
between interoperability and operational performance. It is likely that this same lack
of knowledge could affect SoS designers trying to model a complex system and its
behaviors at the conceptual design level. It can be concluded that interoperability
does affect operational performance, but its effects may not be directly measured at
the conceptual design level. It is more likely that something like network overload
could be modeled more accurately, as it relies less on locational data and vehicle
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performance. The next section addresses metrics that could be used to track the
network effects and how they change with interoperability.
8.2 Network Structure Metrics and the Coefficient of Net-
worked Effects
Network analysis has the potential to reveal much about the interoperability of an
SoS. One downside of increased networking, as observed by Perry [108] and others, is
that a highly connected network may be very interoperable but can suffer from net-
work overload, especially in a network with unregulated access. Consider the analogy
of subscription streaming services able to be used on many platforms (smart phone,
laptop, television, etc.) but drawing bandwidth away, limiting the speed of other
Internet traffic. What metrics from graph and network theory can track this connec-
tivity and allow comparisons between architectures with comparable interoperability
in the form of ISoS but vastly different structures?
The field of graph theory is well developed, and several relevant network metrics
were surveyed in Section 3.5. Of these, the Coefficient of Networked Effects (CNE) was
selected as a good metric to use based on its established use in the defense community
for combat models. The CNE is calculated using the adjacency matrix of a graph,
which in this case is represented by the SSIM. The SSIM is weighted, but this should
not affect the calculation; Balestrini-Robinson [6] conducted the same calculation
using a similarly layered matrix form. Ref. [6, p. 147] also contains an excellent survey
of network ranking measures, which greatly informed this research. Additionally,
Domerçant used the CNE as part of measures of complexity of system of systems, in
the form of Resource Processing Complexity. This metric could be left as the Perron-
Frobenius Eigenvalue (PFE), or normalized by the force structure, and “allows the
system architect to evaluate the benefits derived from increased interoperability and
force structure against the cost of complexity” [40, p. 133].
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8.2.1 Interoperability and Networked Effects
Induction 4: When compared to the properties and applications of other network
metrics, such as information entropy, source-terminal network reliability, graph
energy, and algebraic connectivity, the Coefficient of Networked Effects (CNE)
stands out as most fitting to the problem. Its use is supported by the acceptance
of this metric in existing literature from the same field of military networks.
Experiments 4a, 4b: • Measure CNE for architecture alternatives used in M&S
environment and compare to ISoS to examine any relationship.
• Vary the network structure of the test problem (additional UAVs, sensors,
data types) and examine the effects on the CNE.
When examining the relationship between CNE and interoperability for the sUAS
problem, it should be noted that the network structure does not change; for these
cases at least the CNE will be dependent on the strength of the graph edges (the
values Iij populating the SSIM). Changes in network structure while holding edge
values constant will be considered as well in the next section. After modeling and
simulation, the CNE was calculated for each alternative. Figure 70 plots ISoS against
the CNE for all cases run, with the distribution of the CNE along the top of the plot.
Both BBD and LHC points are plotted, with the BBD points again forming bars
due to their nature of having most Iij = 0.6. However, they are within the right-most
cluster of points, so this behavior is not concerning. By including all data points,
there doesn’t seem to be a strong relationship governing CNE and ISoS. The outlying
points that deviated from earlier relationships, marked by ×, mostly fall below CNE
= 0.1. What causes this? Recall that these points had low values of ICommand 1 and
ICommand 2; so low, in fact, that they effectively removed those links and changed the
structure of the system. The orange and red shading of the points shows that this
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Figure 70: ISoS vs. CNE, All Points
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the SoS no longer has a complete command/feedback cycle. The CNE measures the
presence of cycles in a network. Cares [18] actually gives the following guideline for
CNE ranges: “Complex networks should have a CNE between 0.1 and 0.25”. The data
in Figure 70 does not quite reach the top of this range, but if the CNE is calculated
for this SoS with perfect interoperability (all Iij = 1), the CNE is 0.2398, which again
fits with Cares’ recommendations. Both [18] and [6] state that true networked effects
are unlikely to be measured for networks with n < 50 systems; despite the fact that
the sUAS contains only 8 systems, it does contain cycles and extra edges that make
it an adequate experimental testbed in the absence of a larger SoS sample problem.
Remarks on Experiment 4a: Once the cases that do not show networked effects
have been filtered out, Figure 71 demonstrates that CNE and ISoS are not tightly
correlated. Rather than combine them into a single value, it is suggested that the
performance-based ISoS and the coefficient of networked effects be considered to-
gether. The statement that ISoS should be maximized can be made, as it correlates
to increased performance, but it is still undetermined whether DMs will want to
maximize CNE or whether the cost and effect on the network become prohibitive.
The ARTEMIS methodology does not recommend ranking by CNE as a viable al-
ternative down-selection technique. Instead, because ARTEMIS is part of a greater
design process with many separate studies of SoS performance, CNE and ISoS should
be calculated for each alternative and incorporated into the greater decision-making
process, which is outside this thesis’ scope.
8.2.2 Effects of Network Structure Change
Interoperability based on performance has been discussed at length; the structure of
the network should also be considered. Figure 72 shows the basic network used in the
simulation, and Figure 73 translates this model into a graph format with abbreviated
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Figure 71: ISoS vs. CNE, LHC Cases Only
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Because the performance of the edges is not going to be modeled, the weighting
system for these figures has shifted. Now, the weight denotes how many resource types
must use the edge. In other words, how many input Θij values must be considered
to obtain Iij? Unless otherwise noted, the weight of each edge equals 1 and will be


























Feedback 1: UAV Position
Feedback 2: Sensor Orientation
Data: Video File
Figure 72: The Network Structure of the Test Problem
The structural changes that will be evaluated in this section are:































Figure 73: Graph of an sUAS with 1 sUAV and 1 Sensor Payload
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Table 15: Effects of Changing Network Structure on CNE
Scenario Nodes Edges Res. Types Θij Inputs CNE
1 sUAV, 1 sensor 8 13 5 17 0.386
1 sUAV, 2 sensors 11 18 5 28 0.423
2 sUAVs, 1 sensor ea. 15 26 5 34 0.212
2 sUAVs collaborating 15 28 6 40 0.288
• The addition of an additional sUAV with one sensor: Figure 75
• The collaboration of two sUAVs by sending a new type of resource, Data 2:
Collision Avoidance: Figure 76
Adding a sensor requires a new, dedicated video datalink transmitter and receiver,
but the two sensors can share a sensor payload workstation. Adding another UAV
(represented as a new flight control system) requires new video datalinks as well as
a new command datalink transceiver, both on the UAV and at the ground station.
Adding collaboration creates a new type of resource (for a total of 6) and creates
an information relay between the flight control systems of the aircraft via the UAV
command transceivers. In each figure, the baseline configuration is shown in teal and
the new edges are labeled in black.
Table 15 tracks the increase in nodes, edges, and CNE as the networks become
more complicated. The number of edges per network is the number of Iij values, and
the number of resource transfers (in this case, the sum of the edge weights) is the num-
ber of required input values of ΘResourceij . For identical sending and receiving systems,
Θij should be able to remain the same, especially for systems that are in the same ge-
ographic location (such as the pilot workstations and the datalink transceivers). The
underlying reliability of transmission Θm could change however, causing two identical
system pairs to have varying values of Θij. This is one reason why ARTEMIS recom-
mends external modeling and simulation to determine the values of Iij to populate





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Remarks on Experiment 4b: Upon examination of the CNEs of the alternatives,
it is observed that networked effects increase as more nodes are added to a system,
but a significant change in structure such as adding another sUAV drops the CNE as
more nodes are included and the cycles are broken. The highest CNE is for the 2-
sensor alternative because the addition of a sensor, transmitter, and receiver between
existing nodes adds a complete cycle to the network. Adding another sUAV, on the
other hand, essentially adds a parallel network that is only connected to the baseline
by the sensor payload workstation. As a result, the payload workstation has very high
betweenness and centrality, as tracked in Table 29 in the appendix. The addition of
a data sharing link between the two sUAVs ties the two networks with an additional
edge and adds more cyclicity. As expected, this increased networking results in an
increased CNE. These basic observations support the findings of previous researchers
[6, 40] that the CNE is an appropriate measure of network complexity. It can be used




The increasing complexity of net-centric warfare requires assets to cooperate to achieve
mission success. Such cooperation requires the integration of many heterogeneous sys-
tems into a system-of-systems (SoS). The component systems need to be able to share
data and resources with one another within the framework of the SoS, i.e., they need
to be interoperable. The Department of Defense (DoD) has been pushing interoper-
ability as a requirement for the past several years, and mandates that all current and
future joint programs should be interoperable. Interoperability can be considered a
metric of an architecture, and must be understood by decision makers as early as the
conceptual design phase.
However, the concept of interoperability is hard to grasp, with many definitions
in use, and lack of guidance as to where focused interoperability studies should be
conducted. The mandate that “systems must interoperate” has been met with a
series of interoperability models that each address only one dimension of the problem,
such as technical interoperability of communication systems or the programmatic
interoperability of a joint organization. These models are limited in scope, and most
often succeed in generating a set of qualitative levels that are difficult to extend
beyond their initial scope.
As the focus on acquisition shifts from materiel systems to DOTMLPF solutions at
the system of systems level, it is important to evaluate interoperability as early in the
design process as possible. System architects need to be able to model interoperability
quantitatively in the context of other performance parameters, and to use it as a tool
for evaluating architectures during the decision-making process.
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9.1 Resolution of Research Questions and Hypotheses
The development of the methodology began with the research questions presented in
Chapter 2, Section 2.4 and Chapter 3:
1. What factors affect the understanding of interoperability at the syntactic system
of systems level?
2. How is system of systems interoperability currently measured?
3. Do any of the existing models take into account all of the factors needed to form
a complete picture of interoperability of a system of systems?
Factors affecting interoperability were gathered in Section 2.6. Section 2.5 pre-
sented a survey of available metrics for interoperability, and by evaluating them
against the desired characteristics, Section 2.7 found that none fit the problem, or
even measured system pair interoperability adequately. These conclusions lead to a
motivating observation, the primary research objective, and two additional research
questions:
4. An interoperability metric that can inform measures of effectiveness is needed
during the conceptual design of systems of systems.
Primary Research Objective
The goal of this research is to develop a measure for interoperability
at the system pair level as well as at the system of systems level that will
enable evaluation and comparison of system of systems architecture al-
ternatives during the conceptual design phase. An intuitive, quantitative
metric that takes into account operational requirements, system capabil-
ity, and system interfaces is desired. This metric will provide an input
for performance models of the system of systems under consideration and
will allow a link between interoperability values and operational success.
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To begin constructing a way to measure SoS interoperability, system pair inter-
operability is considered first:
5. What techniques are available to measure system pairs’ ability to exchange and
use resources?
6. Is the information required to make these measurements available at a concep-
tual design phase?
Chapter 3 sets out to answer these questions by surveying possible mathematical
frameworks that could be used to construct a methodology for measuring interoper-
ability. The problem is decomposed in Section 3.1, out of which the basic outline
of a process can be assembled. The potential steps of the outline were presented
in Chapter 4 and used to design experiments in Chapters 5-8. The methodology is
summarized below, and in Figure 77.
ARTEMIS allows decision makers to evaluate and compare SoS architecture al-
ternatives’ interoperability at several levels:
• The interoperability of system pairs, Θij
– for a single method of resource transfer (incorporating operational re-
quirements)
– for multiple methods of resource transfer (incorporating system capabil-
ity and redundancy)
• The interoperability of a SoS collaborating on a single resource exchange
(incorporating system interfaces and which systems are included in the SoS)
– Resource Transfer Interoperability Matrix (RTIM)
– Resource Transfer Interoperability (IResource)
• The interoperability of a SoS performing multiple exchanges
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– System of Systems Interoperability Matrix (SSIM)
– System of Systems Interoperability (ISoS)
The construction of the final methodology began by building off of existing commu-
nication models (Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication) for the structure
of a resource transmission. By making the induction that network-centric operation
requirements could inform the reliability of these exchanges, a quantitative model of
system pair interoperability was presented. This system pair interoperability is de-
composed by function in the form of resource type, enabling architects and decision
makers to provide traceable justification for interoperability values. Linking interop-
erability to system capability, the method used in most previous models, provides a
numerical valuation of the effects of adding materiel capability in the form of new
links or redundancy. The dependency of system pair interoperability on operational
requirements allows quantification of the changes obtained when requirements are
tightened or relaxed.
Induction 1 and Experiment 1: The suitability of reliability as a mathematical
framework was shown by Induction 1 in Chapter 5. Reliability matches the physics
of the resource transfer and exchange process, including the use of redundancy as
a reliability enhancement. An external reliability analysis could provide accurate
estimates of interoperability values for individual resource exchanges between system
pairs by measuring how well operational requirements are met.
Next, experiments were laid out to examine interoperability at the SoS level.
System pair interoperabilities are integrated into matrices that can inform external
modeling and simulation. The decomposition by resource type of the RTIMs enables
detailed modeling of interfaces. The higher-level SSIM enables broader command and
control studies. Both matrix forms result in single values of interoperability that can























































































































Hypothesis 2 and Experiment 2: Hypothesis 2 stated that series reliability
would apply to the calculation of IResource. Experiment 2 showed that there was
a relationship, but modeling and simulation was required to discover the nature of
the fit. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was disproved: a deterministic series model of reliability
was not sufficient to measure the SoS interoperability of a resource exchange. The
average of inputs ΘResourceij could be used to determine an upper bound on IResource,
but ultimately stochastic modeling is necessary.
Hypotheses 3a, 3b and Experiments 3a, 3b: Hypothesis 3a stated that, in or-
der to obtain a single value for an entry Iij of the SSIM, the Hadamard product could
be taken; in other words, the product of the values of Θij from the RTIMs. Experi-
ment 3 compared this calculation to modeling and simulation results and found that
although a close relationship existed, it could only be found by obtaining stochastic
model data. In the absence of M&S, the maximum and minimum of the input Θij
could be used to find upper and lower bounds, respectively, on Iij.
Hypothesis 3b stated that series reliability would apply to the calculation of ISoS.
Experiment 3b compared this to several other calculations of ISoS as well as simu-
lated results of the overall interoperability of the SoS. It was found that the weighted
average of the entries of the SSIM is the only deterministic calculation that exhibited
a correlation to the M&S results, but that the weights to be used could only be ob-
tained by some preliminary M&S. In other words, modeling is necessary to accurately
estimate the interoperability of an SoS.
Hypothesis 3c and Experiment 3c: Interoperability does affect operational per-
formance, but its effects may not be directly measured at the conceptual design level
due to limited design knowledge. The measure of performance being used must be
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chosen carefully; for this test problem, Remaining Battery Charge was a more suitable
metric than the more common Time to Complete Mission.
Induction 4 and Experiments 4a, 4b: The inclusion of the CNE as a metric of
network structure is important to the overall understanding of the interoperability
of a system of systems. It provides valuable information that cannot be obtained by
a stochastic performance model alone. It has special consequences for cost, because
the addition or subtraction of links can be tracked in terms of acquisition and main-
tenance costs. However, CNE cannot be substituted for ISoS and must be considered
separately. Future study should include an in-depth examination of any correlation
between modeled interoperability and other network properties such as all-terminal
network reliability, entropy, graph energy, and algebraic connectivity.
After confirming each step of the methodology with induction and experiments,
the matrix of methodology alternatives first presented in Figure 21 has been updated
to show the appropriate methods to use when conducting an interoperability study.
These methods are highlighted in Figure 78. Red shading indicates that the method
was found unsuitable; yellow indicates that the method could be used in certain
limited applications; green shading and border indicates that the method is the most
appropriate for use in that step of the methodology. As a reminder, the chart should
be read by row (e.g. options for measuring Single Method System Pair Interoperability
include LISI, Ford, ARCNET, or a New Reliability-Based Method).
9.1.1 Application of Results During Design and Decision Making
Integrating Interoperability Measurement into M&S The above remarks on
the resolution hypotheses have a common thread: that interoperability should be mea-
sured using modeling and simulation. Although this seems like a trivial conclusion, it
should be clarified that the M&S required is not in addition to existing environments

































































Figure 78: Completed Matrix of Methodology Alternatives
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SoS Interoperability Matrix, the set of IResource, ISoS, and the CNE) presented as part
of the ARTEMIS methodology are easy to track using counters for successful and
failed resource transmissions. In this way, the required measurements can be taken
during existing studies. ARTEMIS is intended to be conducted at the same time as
analyses for cost, performance, schedule, and risk; it is presented so that interoper-
ability information can be extracted from existing modeling efforts. This knowledge
comes at a relatively low computational overhead cost and can enhance the usability
of modeling environments.
Measuring Interoperability in the Absence of M&S If, for some reason, it
is not possible to construct a detailed environment to measure SoS performance,
ARTEMIS is flexible enough for an interoperability study to still be carried out. A
main focus of the experiments was to determine which, if any, ARTEMIS products
could be determined accurately without a detailed simulation.
• A Resource Transfer Interoperability Matrix could be constructed for each re-
source based on requirement objectives or thresholds by making the assumption
that at a bare minimum the requirements were met. For example, if the objec-
tive was to send a resource within 5 minutes 95% of the time, then that value
of Θij would be 0.95.
• When calculating IResource and Iij using multiple values of Θij, a series model
of reliability was found to have a close relationship with their modeled coun-
terparts. As more interoperability studies are conducted, a database of fits for
series models of reliability may be assembled. If the type of problem’s relation-
ship (cubic, quadratic, etc.) is known, then an estimate of both IResource and
SSIM entries Iij could be made.
• If fits are not available, then the average of the entries of the RTIM can be used
to obtain an upper bound on IResource. This best-case-scenario is still useful
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for determining interoperability under optimum conditions and comparing the
potential bests of multiple alternatives.
• The calculation of ISoS without modeling and simulation depends on a weighted
average, where the weights are ideally pulled from simulation results. However,
if the basic properties of the interactions are known (e.g. for every 1 command,
there are 10 feedback messages sent), then the weightings can be approximated
and used to obtain a close value of ISoS as a function of IResource.
• If weights are unavailable, then ISoS can still be bounded by the maximum and
minimum entries, Iij of the SSIM. This helps pare down the design space and
focus any available M&S efforts during design space exploration.
• The SoS Interoperability Matrix can be used to find many network metrics
deterministically, including the CNE recommended as most appropriate in this
context. Although the results would still only be estimates of upper bounds,
they provide valuable insight in their own respect.
Supporting Decision Making The initial motivation of using interoperability as
a measure of effectiveness was so that it could be compared to other MoEs such as
schedule, cost, performance, and risk during decision making. Specifically, by consid-
ering interoperability early in the acquisition process, it might be found that acquir-
ing a new system is not necessary to fulfill goals of increased capability. ARTEMIS
makes it possible to compare alternative network structures or improved reliability
of resource transfers in the existing network. This allows decision makers to focus
on an entirely new group of alternatives that was difficult to study before, when a
quantitative measure of interoperability at the SoS level did not exist. Additionally,
interoperability can be linked to cost in tangible ways such as the upgrade of system-
pair interfaces or acquisition of new systems; these costs should be considered during
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conceptual design. By bringing a study of interoperability forward in the design pro-
cess, better decisions can be made that fulfill DoD instructions to ensure that all
existing and planned systems must be interoperable.
9.2 Contributions
Interoperability is a balance between the ability to exchange and use resources to
successfully complete a mission, and the mitigation of the costs and challenges as-
sociated with increased complexity. The main contribution of this thesis has been a
means to put a number to one side of the equation.
Before the methodology could even be created, it was necessary to identify which
factors affect interoperability. These factors were identified, and include required
functions, system capabilities, and mission requirements. Reliability theory is a rich
field that could be leveraged to understand the quality of system interactions. This
resulted in a reliability-based framework for the measurement of system pairs. This
method is unique because it does not rely on assessments of technology maturity
or adherence to standards. It allows numerical tracking of the quality of individual
interactions in a complex system of systems and traceability of design decisions.
With a sound metric for system pair interoperability, SoS interoperability can
now be addressed. ARTEMIS allows architects to evaluate the performance interop-
erability, ISoS, in a traceable, quantitative way that can inform decision makers. It
produces products in a form that enables network analysis, which can be used to ac-
count for the complex behavior of systems of systems. It has provided a methodology
that system architects can follow to ensure that they are meeting the performance
needs set forth in the operational requirements. This allows designers to explore
the many implications of interoperability within their SoS alternatives. When linked
with a separate performance model, decision makers will be able to track how chang-
ing systems’ reliability or adding a method of transfer affects a system of systems’
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operational performance.
Interoperability can now be considered a metric of a system of systems, to be
modeled as part of a decision-making process. The inclusion of interoperability on
the same level as cost and other measures of effectiveness was not previously pos-
sible. ARTEMIS enables system architects to move beyond merely identifying the
existence or absence of interoperability. Additionally, it has shown that it is possi-
ble to make this measurement at the conceptual design level. By assessing whether
requirements are being met, necessary changes to improve interoperability can be
made early enough to mitigate the cost overruns and scheduling delays associated
with last-minute design changes.
9.2.1 Enabled Trade Studies
The value of having a quantitative means to measure interoperability that links to
performance simulations is that it enables virtual experimentation at the conceptual
design level. Such experiments will reveal the characteristics of the potential SoS,
and in turn increase the design knowledge available to planners and decision-makers.
The ARTEMIS products developed over the past few chapters, combined with
M&S that is outside the scope of this focused research effort, are intended to be inte-
grated into a decision support environment that considers interoperability alongside
cost, schedule, performance, and risk. Examining interoperability in this context can
help answer the following questions:
• To increase capability via improved interoperability, should the focus be on a
specific system, a specific type of connection, or in a network-wide upgrade?
• How much increase in interoperability will X amount of dollars buy? Does this
necessarily mean an increase in performance?
• Where should funds be focused, specifically? On the acquisition of new systems?
On network infrastructure?
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• Consider a confrontational situation where increased effectiveness is desired.
Should interoperability be improved, or should more lethal weapons be ac-
quired?
• How do changing requirements (relaxing thresholds, creating objectives) affect
interoperability? What other performance metrics suffer if a requirement is
changed for the sake of a higher interoperability value?
• If a revolutionary communications technology is found, all or most systems in
an SoS may need to be upgraded. This could drastically change the shape of a
network by creating many new links or making old ones obsolete. Is the increase
in interoperability worth the cost of updating the entire SoS?
• At the networked system of systems level, the SSIM can be an input to agent-
based models to determine emergent effects and behavior of the SoS that is not
revealed in simpler models. Given known interoperabilities between different
systems, the command and control structure of the SoS could be manipulated
to evaluate changes in doctrine and leadership.
• When desiring an increase in capability via improved interoperability, should
the increase be focused at a specific system, a specific type of connection, or in
a network-wide upgrade? Take the example of increasing communication range
in a small UAS. The antenna on the aircraft or the ground station could be
upgraded, or the entire network could shift from line-of-sight communications to
satellite communications. The addition of satellite communications will increase
range, but also comes with an added cost. On the other hand, making a network-
wide upgrade could enable further capabilities. Where is the tipping point of
improving performance “enough” while keeping other objectives in check?
These are but a few of the potential studies that are enabled now that a quanti-
tative interoperability measurement exists. Many more are expected to be revealed
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as system architects and decision makers delve into the effects of collaboration, co-
operation, complexity, and other facets of system of systems. These abstract metrics
are the next frontier of understanding network-centric architectures. The quality of
an over-arching metric is only as good as the physical foundation on which it is con-
structed; it is hoped that by providing traceable inputs for interoperability analysis,
the currently hidden effects of SoS interoperability will be revealed, explored and used
to make well-informed decisions.
9.2.2 Recommendations for Future Study
The ARTEMIS methodology has been supported by leveraging existing fields and
turning their concepts to a new interoperability measurement. It was tested using
a small SoS with notional data. The first recommended study is that ARTEMIS
be implemented for a larger problem with real-world data. No existing problems
have been found that make statements about the value of interoperability for an SoS:
“The ISoS of Close Air Support using system portfolio X and operational sequence
Y equals Z ”. Because the high-level interoperability score is intended to be used
as a ranking metric within the context of mission requirements, this is acceptable.
However, performance data is desired so that the interoperability of a known low-
performing SoS can be combined with a higher-performing configuration.
By modeling interoperability for a larger problem, additional data will be gen-
erated for the relationships between system-pair-resource interoperability Θij and
system-pair SoS interoperability Iij. By examining many different problems, the as-
sertions made in Chapters 6 and 7 can be thoroughly validated. An assessment of
the different relationships between series reliability and modeled outputs of IResource
and ISoS (polynomial, square root, etc.) should be conducted to create a database
that will enable these measurements without needing detailed M&S.
At an even broader scale than an SoS performing a given mission, a single system
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portfolio could be used for multiple missions. After obtaining the interoperability
of each operational scenario with its required tasks, the ISoS of mission 1 could be
compared to mission 2. This would allow decision makers to increase the flexibility of
existing assets rather than acquiring a new system for every new desired capability.
Finally, now that interoperability can be quantified at the system pair and SoS
level, ARTEMIS could be extended to conduct sensitivity analyses to
• optimize the existing SoS network structure by improving interoperability of
the links
• quantify the changes and network costs that would be incurred by acquiring a
system and additional links
• compare rearranged network structures: original system portfolio, reconfigured
links




ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS OF RESOURCE
INTEROPERABILITY
A.1 Correlations of Resource Variables
A.1.1 Command 1: Waypoints
Pilot Workstation→ Command Datalink Ground Transceiver→ Command Datalink
UAV Transceiver → Flight Control System
Table 16: Correlations for ICommand 1 Outputs
Overall Success Relay Success Series Average Max Min
Overall Success 1.0000 0.9970 0.9327 0.9225 0.4382 0.8703
Relay Success 0.9970 1.0000 0.9291 0.9353 0.4663 0.8520
Series 0.9327 0.9291 1.0000 0.9400 0.5592 0.7501
Average 0.9225 0.9353 0.9400 1.0000 0.6957 0.6734
Max 0.4382 0.4663 0.5592 0.6957 1.0000 0.0497
Min 0.8703 0.8520 0.7501 0.6734 0.0497 1.0000
A.1.2 Command 2: Pan/Tilt/Zoom
Sensor Payload Workstation→ Command Datalink Ground Transceiver→ Command
Datalink UAV Transceiver → Flight Control System → Sensor Payload
Table 17: Correlations for ICommand 2 Outputs
Overall Success Relay Success Series Average Max Min
Overall Success 1 0.9971 0.8949 0.9026 0.3085 0.8372
Relay Success 0.9971 1 0.8927 0.9184 0.3346 0.8157
Series 0.8949 0.8927 1 0.9076 0.449 0.6608
Average 0.9026 0.9184 0.9076 1 0.5954 0.5894
Max 0.3085 0.3346 0.449 0.5954 1 -0.0746
Min 0.8372 0.8157 0.6608 0.5894 -0.0746 1
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A.1.3 Feedback 1: UAV Position
Flight Control System→ Command Datalink UAV Transceiver→ Command Datalink
Ground Transceiver → Pilot Workstation
Table 18: Correlations for IFeedback 1 Outputs
Overall Success Relay Success Series Average Max Min
Overall Success 1 0.9961 0.9414 0.912 0.3829 0.8906
Relay Success 0.9961 1 0.9412 0.9384 0.4309 0.8612
Series 0.9414 0.9412 1 0.9426 0.5381 0.7426
Average 0.912 0.9384 0.9426 1 0.6745 0.6601
Max 0.3829 0.4309 0.5381 0.6745 1 0.0122
Min 0.8906 0.8612 0.7426 0.6601 0.0122 1
A.1.4 Feedback 2: Sensor Orientation
Sensor Payload → Flight Control System → Command Datalink UAV Transceiver
→ Command Datalink Ground Transceiver → Sensor Payload Workstation
Table 19: Correlations for IFeedback 2 Outputs
Overall Success Relay Success Series Average Max Min
Overall Success 1 0.995 0.9049 0.8954 0.2896 0.854
Relay Success 0.995 1 0.9086 0.9265 0.3345 0.8182
Series 0.9049 0.9086 1 0.9114 0.4546 0.6519
Average 0.8954 0.9265 0.9114 1 0.5963 0.5765
Max 0.2896 0.3345 0.4546 0.5963 1 -0.0862
Min 0.854 0.8182 0.6519 0.5765 -0.0862 1
A.1.5 Data 1: Video File
Sensor Payload → Video Datalink UAV Transmitter → Video Datalink Ground Re-
ceiver → Sensor Payload Workstation
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Table 20: Correlations for IData 1 Outputs
Overall Success Relay Success Series Average Max Min
Overall Success 1 0.9962 0.9412 0.9239 0.425 0.8918
Relay Success 0.9962 1 0.9388 0.9468 0.4698 0.8642
Series 0.9412 0.9388 1 0.9421 0.5578 0.7529
Average 0.9239 0.9468 0.9421 1 0.6915 0.6827
Max 0.425 0.4698 0.5578 0.6915 1 0.0593
Min 0.8918 0.8642 0.7529 0.6827 0.0593 1
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Figure 79: Distributions and Statistics of % Transmissions of Each Resource Type
(all DoE points)
A.3 Fitting Overall Success by Deterministic Calculations




















































I_c1 Overall Success = 0.05 + 1*I_c1 Average
Figure 80: Ic1 Overall Success vs. Series model, Average
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Figure 81: Ic2 Overall Success vs. Series model, Average
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Figure 82: If1 Overall Success vs. Series model, Average
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Figure 83: If2 Overall Success vs. Series model, Average
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ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS OF SOS INTEROPERABILITY
B.1 System of Systems Interoperability Matrix
Figure 85: Comparing Arithmetic Mean to Weighted Arithmetic Mean of
ΘFeedback 1,2CDUT,CDGT inputs for ICDUT,CDGT
B.2 System of Systems Interoperability Value
B.2.1 Fitted ISoS Distribution Parameters
Table 23: Log Normal Distribution Parameters for ISoS
Parameter Estimate Lower 95% Upper 95%
Scale, µ -0.691098 -0.700726 -0.68147
Shape, σ 0.1551924 0.1486316 0.1622505
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Table 24: Gamma Distribution Parameters for ISoS
Parameter Estimate Lower 95% Upper 95%
Shape, α 41.759746 38.219662 45.512849
Scale, σ 0.0121429 0.011136 0.013275
Threshold, θ 0






































































































































































































































Table 26: Statistics for the Neural Net Fit of % Battery Charge Remaining
Measures Training Validation
hline RSquare 0.930998 0.9143297
RMSE 0.0363463 0.0352231
Mean Abs Dev 0.0231939 0.0236148
-LogLikelihood -2151.648 -1094.602
SSE 1.4993923 0.7046971
Sum Freq 1135 568
B.4 Networked Effects
B.4.1 Baseline: 1 sUAV, 1 Sensor Payload
Adjacency Matrix

PW SPW CDGT VDGR CDUT VDUT FCS SP
PW 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
SPW 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
CDGT 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0
V DGR 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
CDUT 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0
V DUT 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
FCS 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1
SP 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0

Table 27: Network Metrics of Baseline sUAS










B.4.2 Alternative 1: 1 sUAV, 2 Sensors
Adjacency Matrix

FCS SP CDUT VDUT CDGT VDGR PW SPW SP−2 V DUT−2 V DGR
FCS 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
SP 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CDUT 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
V DUT 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
CDGT 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0
V DGR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
PW 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
SPW 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
SP−2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
V DUT−2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
V DGR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

Table 28: Network Metrics of Alternative 1













B.4.3 Alternative 2: 2 sUAVs, 1 Sensor Payload Each






























































































































































































































































































































































                                             
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Table 29: Network Metrics of Alternative 2
















B.4.4 Alternative 3: 2 Collaborating sUAVs, 1 Sensor Payload Each
Table 30: Network Metrics of Alternative 3



















































































































































































































































































































































































C.1 Discrete Event Simulation
formfeed
## Name: sUAS.py
## Scenario : Simple UAS v1 − time modeling of a series of resource exchanges
## Model : Model the time i t takes to send commands to and receive feedback from
## a small UAV that i s searching for a lo s t hiker/ l i f e boa t (3 mile l imit )
## Author : E. Annie Jones Wyatt
## Created : Feb . 19, 2014
import relevant modules
## MODEL COMPONENTS−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
def main(TimePerAttempt , FeedbackInterval , c1PW , c1CDGT , c2CDGT , f1CDGT , f2CDGT , c1CDUT , c2CDUT , f1CDUT , f2CDUT ,
c2FCS , f1FCS , f2FCS , f2SP , d1SP , d1VDUT , d1VDGR , c2SPW):
class G: # Global Variables
MaxSimTime = 3600 # Set the max simulation length , in seconds (60 minutes to ta l )
NTransfers = 0 # Track how many resource transfers were conducted
NFailures = 0 # Track number of fa i l ed resource transfers
## Set up Monitors and i n i t i a l i z e tracking variables




## For each system in the SoS:
# Define the system node as a Resource that can only transmit one command/feedback/data f i l e at a time .
# This i s most important for the relay nodes , CDUT, CDGT, VDUT, and VDGR.
# Define the power usage of each system on the UAV, in watts , as given by the RWDC Equipment Catalog (
unless otherwise noted) .
# In i t i a l i z e counters for tracking the number of fa i lures and transfers of each resource and system pair
## PilotWorkstation :













CDUT = Resource(name="CommandDatalinkUAVTransceiver",capacity =1)]






FCS = Resource(name="FlightControlSystem",capacity =1)











# Define power consumption of avai lab le sensors
PSensor1 = 1.5 # watts (nominal) , 2 watts (maximum) X1000
PSensor2 = 2 # watts (nominal) , 4 watts (maximum) X2000
PSensor3 = 10 # watts (nominal) , 14 watts (maximum) X3000
PSensor4 = 2.5 # watts (nominal) , 5 watts (maximum) X4000
PSensor5 = 15 # watts (nominal) , 25 watts (maximum) X5000
# Define which sensors (and how many) are in use :
# This scenario is one sUAV with a single , r e l a t i ve l y sophisticated sensor :
PSensorPackage = PSensor3 # This i s the spec i f i c sensor package chosen for the scenario .
# It can be a homogeneous or heterogeneous combination of 1 or more sensors .
## VideoDatalinkUAVTransmitter :
VDUT = Resource(name="VideoDatalinkUAVTransmitter",capacity =1)












## ””” The battery powers the e l e c t r i ca l components on board the UAV.
## It i s separate from the propulsion system .
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## ”””
BatteryCapacity = 2*3600 # 2 Amp−hours∗3600 seconds/hour , for the electronics on board the UAV
BatteryThreshold = 20 % of BatteryCapacity # Amp−hours remaining when the UAV must return to base to
charge
BatteryVoltage = 7.4 # Variable input voltage from 5V−24V; chose a 3.7V/ ce l l 2S LiPo battery
BatteryCharge = Monitor () # Monitor battery ’ s charge over time
## Begin defining the processes for sending each resource
class CommandWaypoints(Process):
""" Send new coordinates to the sUAV """
def send(self):
LocalNFailures = 0
# Start by sending from PW to CDGT
yield request , self , G.CDGT # Request to use the receiving system
while random.random () > c1PW: # If the transmission fa i l s ,
yield hold , self , TimePerAttempt # Be in use for the time required
LocalNFailures += 1 # Add to the # of fa i lures for th is exchange
G.NFailures += 1 # Add to the to ta l # of fa i lures
G.NFailsc1 += 1 # Add to the # of fa i lures while sending c1
G.NFailsPW2CDGT += 1 # Add to the # of fa i lures of th is system pair
#
yield hold , self , TimePerAttempt # If the transmission succeeds , be in use for the time
required
yield release , self , G.CDGT # When finished , release the system for any queued resource
transfers
# Next , from CDGT−> CDUT
yield request , self , G.CDUT
while random.random () > c1CDGT:






yield hold , self , TimePerAttempt
yield release , self , G.CDUT
# And on down the relay : CDUT−> FCS
yield request , self , G.FCS
while random.random () > c1CDUT:








yield hold , self , TimePerAttempt
yield release , self , G.FCS
# Track how many transmissions have been sent
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G.NTransfers += 3 # Total successful transfers
G.NTransc1 += 3 # Total c1 transfers
G.NTransPW2CDGT += 1 # Total system pair transfers
G.NTransCDGT2CDUT += 1 # ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
G.NTransCDUT2FCS += 1 # ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’
# Track the success of th is relay
G.NetCommandWaypoints.observe(1- LocalNFailures /( LocalNFailures +3))
class CommandPanTiltZoom(Process):





# FCS −> SP







G.NetCommandPanTiltZoom.observe(1- LocalNFailures /( LocalNFailures +4))
class FeedbackUAVPosition(Process):
""" Send feedback about the UAV’s position """
def send(self):
# FCS −> CDUT
# CDUT−> CDGT
# CDGT−> PW






G.NetFeedbackUAVPosition.observe(1- LocalNFailures /( LocalNFailures +3))
class FeedbackSource1(Process):
""" Generate feedback for the ground station at regular intervals """
class FeedbackSensorOrientation(Process):
""" Send feedback about the sensor orientation """
def send(self):
# SP −> FCS
# FCS −> CDUT
# CDUT−> CDGT
# CDGT−> SPW








G.NetFeedbackSensorOrientation.observe(1- LocalNFailures /( LocalNFailures +4))
class FeedbackSource2(Process):
""" Generate feedback for the ground station at regular intervals """
class VideoFile(Process):
""" Send video files back to the ground station """
def send(self):
# SP −> VDUT
# VDUT−> VDGR
# VDGR−> SPW






G.NetVideoFile.observe(1- LocalNFailures /( LocalNFailures +3))
class DataSource(Process):
""" Generate video file data for the ground station at regular intervals """
class BatteryUse(Process):
""" Calculate the battery draw of the onboard electrical components during normal use (not incl. 
transmissions)"""





## The model w i l l progress through the resource exchanges conducted when the sUAS conducts a standard ISR
Operations Sequence of Find , Identify , Track , and then Land
## The model s tarts with the sUAV(s) deployed , beginning the Find part of the Operations Sequence .
## In rea l i ty the ”waypoints” in the command would be a search pattern , but that i s irre levant here .
## The Sensor Payload wi l l be f ixed in a search pattern mode.
## Calculate the to ta l mission length outright :
# At a random time (normally dis tr ibuted about the mean time to find target ) the target w i l l be found ,
tr iggering a redirection of the sUAV:
findtime = ceil(normalvariate (1800 ,300))
# The mean time to find target i s 30 minutes or 1800 sec ( set based on operational requirements )
# The target then must be ident i f i ed ; th is requires the sensor payload operator to confirm that the image in
the VideoFile i s the target . This has a time distr ibut ion as wel l :
idtime = ceil(normalvariate (180 ,45))




# Assume the f i r s t target found is the right one , even though the scenario provided with the sUAS states
there are 4 dummy targets as wel l . Any real dif ference in performance in terms of ident i f icat ion wi l l
probably not be due to communications backlogs ; instead , i t ’ l l depend on the capab i l i t i e s of the sensors
and the search patterns chosen by the ground station prior to the launch of the UAV(s) .
# Because the scenario features a f ixed lo s t hiker or slowly dr i f t ing l i feboat , assume long−term tracking is
not rea l ly required .
# At th is point , ground/sea search parties w i l l be dispatched to rescue the target .
# I f the mission requires lo i ter ing over the target and keeping eyes on i t unt i l the search party gets there ,
that would go here :
# tracktime = findtime+idtime+(how long i t takes rescue party to get to the target )
# The simulation wi l l not exceed G.MaxSimTime = 3600 sec (60 minutes , 1 hour)
# The sUAV wi l l send feedback at regular interva ls for the whole time that i t i s performing the mission , so
an assumption is made about how long i t takes to get back to the launch site , based on how long i t took
to find the target . Obviously , search pattern wi l l a f f ec t this , but we aren ’ t modeling that .
tracktime = 0 # this can be changed la ter i f i t i s decided that the target does need to be tracked




# At a random time (normally dis tr ibuted about the mean time to find target ) the target w i l l be found ,
tr iggering a redirection of the sUAV
# Until then :
# Calculate the battery drain while running the Sensor Payload and Flight Control System
# Add the Sensor Package and Flight Control System together ( the only two components running the whole time
the aircraf t i s performing the mission)
find3 = BatteryUse ()
activate(find3 ,find3.powerdraw(feedbacktime ,(G.PSensorPackage+G.PFCS) ,10))
# Return FeedbackUAVPosition and FeedbackSensorOrientation at regular interva ls
find1 = FeedbackSource1 ()
activate(find1 ,find1.generate(howmanytotal ,FeedbackInterval ,0),at=0)
find2 = FeedbackSource2 ()
activate(find2 ,find2.generate(howmanytotal ,FeedbackInterval ,0),at=0)
# Return VideoFile at regular interva ls
data = DataSource ()
activate(data ,data.generate(howmanytotal ,FeedbackInterval ,0),at=FeedbackInterval)
# The transmission of the video f i l e i s staggered to begin after the i n i t i a l FeedbackUAVPosition transfer ,
but i s conducted at the same time to a) l ink the f i l e with an exact position and b) because no
transmission nodes are shared for FeedbackUAVPosition and VideoFile . However , repeated transmissions for
the FeedbackSensorOrientation wi l l e s sent ia l l y be queued after the FeedbackUAVPosition .







# Send CommandWaypoints to descend and c irc l e the target
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identify1 = CommandWaypoints(name="CommandWaypoints_IDENTIFY")
activate(identify1 ,identify1.send(),at=findtime +30) # Delay to allow p i l o t to assign new search pattern and
execute the command − 30 seconds
# Send CommandPanTiltZoom to focus on the target
identify2 = CommandPanTiltZoom(name="CommandPanTiltZoom_IDENTIFY")
activate(identify2 ,identify2.send(),at=findtime +30) #+G.CommandDelay) # Automatically queue behind
CommandWaypoints
# Assume the f i r s t target found is the right one , even though the scenario provided by RWDC states there are
4 dummy targets as wel l . Any real dif ference in performance in terms of ident i f icat ion wi l l probably not
be due to communications backlogs ; instead , i t ’ l l depend on the capab i l i t i e s of the sensors and the
search patterns chosen by the ground station prior to the launch of the UAV(s) .
##−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− TRACK−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
# Because the scenario features a f ixed lo s t hiker or slowly dr i f t ing l i feboat , assume tracking is not rea l ly
required .






# Send CommandWaypoints to return the sUAV to the landing area and terminate the simulation .








# What is the breakdown of percentage of the overal l resource transfers?
SoSsuccess = 1-(G.NFailures /(G.NTransfers+G.NFailures))
c1percent = G.NTransc1 /(G.NTransfers)
c2percent = G.NTransc2 /(G.NTransfers)
f1percent = G.NTransf1 /(G.NTransfers)
f2percent = G.NTransf2 /(G.NTransfers)
d1percent = G.NTransd1 /(G.NTransfers)
# As a percent of the original charge , how much battery i s l e f t ?
batteryleft = G.BatteryCharge [ -1][1]/G.BatteryCapInit
# I CommandWaypoints
c1relaysuccess = 1 - G.NetCommandWaypoints.mean()
c1success2 = 1 - G.NFailsc1 /(G.NFailsc1+G.NTransc1)
# I CommandPanTiltZoom
c2relaysuccess = 1 - G.NetCommandPanTiltZoom.mean()
c2success2 = 1 - G.NFailsc2 /(G.NFailsc2+G.NTransc2)
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# I FeedbackUAVPosition
f1relaysuccess = 1 - G.NetFeedbackUAVPosition.mean()
f1success2 = 1 - G.NFailsf1 /(G.NFailsf1+G.NTransf1)
# I FeedbackSensorOrientation
f2relaysuccess = 1 - G.NetFeedbackSensorOrientation.mean()
f2success2 = 1 - G.NFailsf2 /(G.NFailsf2+G.NTransf2)
# I VideoFile
d1relaysuccess = 1 - G.NetVideoFile.mean()
d1success2 = 1 - G.NFailsd1 /(G.NFailsd1+G.NTransd1)
# Calculate system pair in teroperab i l i t i e s for the SoS Interoperabi l i ty Matrix (SSIM)
PW2CDGT = 1 - (G.NFailsPW2CDGT /(G.NFailsPW2CDGT+G.NTransPW2CDGT))
SPW2CDGT = 1 - (G.NFailsSPW2CDGT /(G.NFailsSPW2CDGT+G.NTransSPW2CDGT))
CDGT2PW = 1 - (G.NFailsCDGT2PW /(G.NFailsCDGT2PW+G.NTransCDGT2PW))
CDGT2SPW = 1 - (G.NFailsCDGT2SPW /(G.NFailsCDGT2SPW+G.NTransCDGT2SPW))
CDGT2CDUT = 1 - (G.NFailsCDGT2CDUT /(G.NFailsCDGT2CDUT+G.NTransCDGT2CDUT))
VDGR2SPW = 1 - (G.NFailsVDGR2SPW /(G.NFailsVDGR2SPW+G.NTransVDGR2SPW))
CDUT2CDGT = 1 - (G.NFailsCDUT2CDGT /(G.NFailsCDUT2CDGT+G.NTransCDUT2CDGT))
CDUT2FCS = 1 - (G.NFailsCDUT2FCS /(G.NFailsCDUT2FCS+G.NTransCDUT2FCS))
VDUT2VDGR = 1 - (G.NFailsVDUT2VDGR /(G.NFailsVDUT2VDGR+G.NTransVDUT2VDGR))
FCS2CDUT = 1 - (G.NFailsFCS2CDUT /(G.NFailsFCS2CDUT+G.NTransFCS2CDUT))
FCS2SP = 1 - (G.NFailsFCS2SP /(G.NFailsFCS2SP+G.NTransFCS2SP))
SP2VDUT = 1 - (G.NFailsSP2VDUT /(G.NFailsSP2VDUT+G.NTransSP2VDUT))
SP2FCS = 1 - (G.NFailsSP2FCS /(G.NFailsSP2FCS+G.NTransSP2FCS))
## Construct the adjacency matrix for the graph of the SoS
## [PW, SPW, CDGT, VDGR, CDUT, VDUT, FCS, SP] <− order of rows , columns
n = 8 # number of systems (nodes)
# PW
row0 = [0]*n
row0 [2] = PW2CDGT
# SPW
row1 = [0]*n
row1 [2] = SPW2CDGT
# CDGT
row2 = [0]*n
row2 [0] = CDGT2PW
row2 [1] = CDGT2SPW
row2 [4] = CDGT2CDUT
# VDGR
row3 = [0]*n
row3 [1] = VDGR2SPW
# CDUT
row4 = [0]*n
row4 [2] = CDUT2CDGT
row4 [6] = CDUT2FCS
# VDUT
row5 = [0]*n




row6 [4] = FCS2CDUT
row6 [7] = FCS2SP
# SP
row7 = [0]*n
row7 [5] = SP2VDUT
row7 [6] = SP2FCS
A = matrix ([row0 , row1 , row2 , row3 , row4 , row5 , row6 , row7])
B = A.transpose ()
# Modified from DiMA.m by Santiago Balestrini Robinson , 2009
vals , vecs = linalg.eig(B)
# vals : 1x8 l i s t of r ight eigenvalues
# vecs : 8x1 l i s t of l i s t s of 1x8 l i s t s (8 eigenvectors )
D = vecs.diagonal () # 1x8 matrix of the i th entry of the i th eigenvector
j = where(D.imag == 0) # j [ 1 ] : 1x? l i s t of l i s t s of the indices of where there is no imaginary component
newvals = []
for index in j[1]:
newvals.append(vals[index]) # the eigenvalue corresponding to index j
#
#





## denom = sum of the force structure matrix
CNE = PFE/denom
print(’CNE = ’,CNE)
##For th is architecture , the maximum PFE and CNE are :
## PFE = 1.9182521554
## CNE = 0.239781519425
##This was calculated by set t ing every system pair interoperabi l i ty value to 1.
## OUTPUT−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
output = [SoSsuccess , batteryleft , PFE , CNE ,
c1relaysuccess , c1success2 , c1percent ,
c2relaysuccess , c2success2 , c2percent ,
f1relaysuccess , f1success2 , f1percent ,
f2relaysuccess , f2success2 , f2percent ,
d1relaysuccess , d1success2 , d1percent ,
PW2CDGT , SPW2CDGT , CDGT2PW , CDGT2SPW , CDGT2CDUT ,
VDGR2SPW , CDUT2CDGT , CDUT2FCS , VDUT2VDGR ,
FCS2CDUT , FCS2SP , SP2VDUT , SP2FCS]
return output
# 32 Columns: 4 overarching metrics , 15 metrics of resource exchanges , 13 system pair in teroperab i l i t i e s




## Name: sUASpart2 . py
## Scenario : Simple UAS part 2: perform simple calculations on the inputs (products , averages , etc . ) that don ’
t need to be done in the DES ( saves run time)
## Model : Model the time i t takes to send commands to and receive feedback from
## a small UAV that i s searching for a lo s t hiker/ l i f e boa t (3 mile l imit )
## Author : E. Annie Jones Wyatt
## Created : April 12, 2014
import relevant modules
## MODEL COMPONENTS−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
def main(TimePerAttempt , FeedbackInterval , c1PW , c1CDGT , c2CDGT , f1CDGT , f2CDGT , c1CDUT , c2CDUT , f1CDUT , f2CDUT ,
c2FCS , f1FCS , f2FCS , f2SP , d1SP , d1VDUT , d1VDGR , c2SPW):
"""
        main (17 floats):
        Inputs are the various system pair interoperability values , broken down by type of resource they are 
exchanging.
        Analysis of reliability of transmission , reliability of translation , and redundancy (if applicable) has 
already been done to obtain these values.
        main() returns calculated values , such as product , average , and eigenvalues , without conducting a time -
based performance analysis.
        """
## CommandDatalinkGroundTransceiver :
commandCDGTseries = c1CDGT*c2CDGT




commandCDUTparallel = 1-(1-c1CDUT)*(1- c2CDUT)
commandCDUTavg = (c1CDUT+c2CDUT)/2
feedbackCDUTseries = f1CDUT*f2CDUT








c1series = c1PW*c1CDGT*c1CDUT # I Resource c1
c1avg = (c1PW+c1CDGT+c1CDUT)/3
# I CommandPanTiltZoom
c2series = c2SPW*c2CDGT*c2CDUT*c2FCS # I Resource c2
c2avg = (c2SPW+c2CDGT+c2CDUT+c2FCS)/4
# I FeedbackUAVPosition




f2series = f2SP*f2FCS*f2CDUT*f2CDGT # I Resource f2
f2avg = (f2SP+f2FCS+f2CDUT+f2CDGT)/4
# I VideoFile





c1series , c1avg ,
c2series , c2avg ,
f1series , f1avg ,
f2series , f2avg ,
d1series , d1avg ,
c3CDGTseries , c4CDGTparallel , c5CDGTavg ,
c3CDUTseries , c4CDUTparallel , c5CDUTavg ,
f3CDUTseries , f4CDUTparallel , f5CDUTavg ,
f3FCSseries , f4FCSparallel , f5FCSavg]
## 23 outputs : 1 to ta l series , 10 resource metrics , 12 system pair metrics
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